Malwagon
DLL
SophosED.dll File Analysis · first seen Oct 2, 2026 06:01 · 3.1 MB
1proc 3IOCs
Suspicious53 Completed Public
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SophosED.dllPE analysis report - Suspicious

Run integrity

sample ran

The guest staged the sample and launched it, so what follows describes this file rather than an empty desktop.

9.0sto launch
4telemetry events
3observed
32agent notes

Suspicious

53/100

18 points past the suspicious line at 35, 17 short of malicious at 70.

Clean0-34 Suspicious35-69 Malicious70-100

Why this verdict

+33
Static analysis
  • 1 suspicious signature match(es)
  • 2 high-risk capability bucket(s): Process injection, Anti-debugging
  • Malicious strings: injection / execution, credential theft
+20
Runtime behavior
  • 2 living-off-the-land binary abuse(s)
+0
Model review
  • findings review (advisory, not scored): suspicious - anti-debug detection, high-entropy overlay, non-standard sections, signed binary

Model reading

Measured SUSPICIOUS53 of 100

Evidence ledger above, row by row. Published verdict rests on this column and on nothing to its right.

Model reads it asadvisory, no points NOT ASSESSEDnot shown on this page

Reads this report's derived findings, never the sample itself.

A model reading exists for this scan and is shown to the submitter and to staff only. It is a second opinion about evidence the score already priced, it is worth no points, and on a public page it would stand beside the verdict with no grounding a stranger could check.

Other high-severity findings
  • HIGH Credential-theft artifacts (browser/wallet paths)
  • HIGH Early-bird / QueueUserAPC on suspended process
  • HIGH Injection/execution API strings
  • HIGH LOLBin abuse: powershell downloads/executes via PowerShell

Analysis layers

Static ran moved the score
Dynamic ran moved the score
Threat intel local feeds only no points
AI not included

Sample

TypeFile
MIMEapplication/vnd.microsoft.portable-executable

Run conditions

Sandbox OSWindows 10
EnvironmentWorkgroup
InternetIsolated
Execution133s
Guest hardware2 vCPU4095 MB RAM

Detection signatures

24 detected · 10 withheld as common
Severity Detection Evidence Layer
HIGH
APC injection primitive (QueueUserAPC)
MITRE T1055.004
import kernel32.dll!QueueUserAPC
static
HIGH
Credential-theft artifacts (browser/wallet paths)
MITRE T1555
string cookies matched string
string encrypted_key matched string
static
HIGH
Early-bird / QueueUserAPC on suspended process
MITRE T1055.004
import kernel32.dll!QueueUserAPC requires queueuserapc
import kernel32.dll!ResumeThread requires resumethread
static
HIGH
Injection/execution API strings
MITRE T1055
string createremotethread matched string
string etwevent matched string
string queueuserapc matched string
string shellcode matched string
string virtualallocex matched string
static
HIGH
LOLBin abuse: powershell downloads/executes via PowerShell
MITRE T1059.001
command powershell observed command line
dynamic
HIGH
LOLBin abuse: pwsh runs an encoded/downloading PowerShell command
MITRE T1059.001
command pwsh observed command line
dynamic
HIGH
Opens processes with full access (LSASS dumping pattern)
MITRE T1003.001
import kernel32.dll!OpenProcess requires openprocess
import kernel32.dll!ReadProcessMemory requires readprocessmemory
static
HIGH
Reads another process's memory (credential access)
MITRE T1003
import kernel32.dll!ReadProcessMemory
static
HIGH
Thread-context hijack injection (SetThreadContext)
MITRE T1055.003
import kernel32.dll!SetThreadContext requires setthreadcontext
import kernel32.dll!GetThreadContext requires getthreadcontext
static
MED
Anti-analysis strings present
MITRE T1497
string checkremotedebuggerpresent matched string
string isdebuggerpresent matched string
static
MED
Calls low-level ntdll routines directly
MITRE T1106
import ntdll.dll!NtCreateThreadEx
static
MED
Exception-based anti-debug (SEH/VEH install)
MITRE T1622
import kernel32.dll!AddVectoredExceptionHandler
static
MED
Ransomware-related strings
MITRE T1486
string decrypt matched string
static
MED
Surveillance/keylogging strings
MITRE T1056
string bitblt matched string
string getdc matched string
string getforegroundwindow matched string
string screenshot matched string
static
LOW
Checks system uptime (sandbox age check)
MITRE T1497.001
seen in 12% of benign software
import kernel32.dll!GetTickCount64
static
LOW
Direct memory execution (VirtualProtect + memory copy)
MITRE T1055
seen in 9% of benign software
import kernel32.dll!VirtualProtect requires virtualprotect
import kernel32.dll!VirtualAlloc requires virtualalloc
static
LOW
Driver communication via DeviceIoControl
MITRE T1068
seen in 10% of benign software
import kernel32.dll!DeviceIoControl
static
LOW
Duplicates a process handle (handle theft)
MITRE T1134
seen in 10% of benign software
import kernel32.dll!DuplicateHandle
static
LOW
Hypervisor/CPUID-style environment check
MITRE T1497.001
seen in 7% of benign software
import kernel32.dll!GetNativeSystemInfo
static
LOW
Process-injection capability
MITRE T1055
seen in 5% of benign software
capability getthreadcontext capability: injection
capability queueuserapc capability: injection
capability setthreadcontext capability: injection
capability virtualallocex capability: injection
static
LOW
Reflective/manual DLL load pattern
MITRE T1620
seen in 8% of benign software
import kernel32.dll!VirtualAlloc requires virtualalloc
import kernel32.dll!GetProcAddress requires getprocaddress
import kernel32.dll!LoadLibraryA requires loadlibrary
import kernel32.dll!CreateThread requires createthread
static
LOW
Scans memory layout (VirtualQuery)
MITRE T1055
import kernel32.dll!VirtualQueryEx
static
LOW
Self-deletion pattern (MoveFileEx)
MITRE T1070.004
seen in 7% of benign software
import kernel32.dll!MoveFileExW
static
INFO
Stages in the temp directory (GetTempPath)
MITRE T1074
seen in 15% of benign software
import kernel32.dll!GetTempPathW
static
Withheld: 10 rules fired and were not reported above

These rules matched this sample, and they also match this much of known-clean software (measured over 1145 signed Windows and third-party binaries). A rule that fires on most clean files cannot move a verdict, so it is held back unless the detonation confirms the behaviour. They are listed because a count that shrinks without saying so is not a count an analyst can check.

Timing-based anti-analysis (QueryPerformanceCounter/rdtsc) fires on 92% of benign software
Anti-debugging capability fires on 65% of benign software
Dynamic API resolution (obfuscation) fires on 65% of benign software
Anti-debug: checks for a debugger fires on 60% of benign software
Resolves APIs dynamically (LoadLibrary + GetProcAddress) fires on 49% of benign software
Anti-debug via OutputDebugString probe fires on 41% of benign software
Reads its own startup info (parent/desktop check) fires on 36% of benign software
Executes external code / commands fires on 30% of benign software
Queries system information (host recon) fires on 25% of benign software
Enumerates files recursively (staging/collection) fires on 21% of benign software

What the tests returned

9 tests

Each test this run performed and what it returned. A test that was not performed says so rather than reading as a negative result.

TestResult
Persistence mechanismsnone established at runtime
Cross-process injectionnone observed
Payloads written to disknone observed
Network connectionsnot tested - internet was disabled
Behavioural rule matches (Sigma)none observed
Known-malicious hash (reputation sources)no source reported this file
Local anti-virus enginereported no detection
Capability analysis of the file's codenot checked - the check did not produce a usable result
Anti-analysis / evasion checksnot measured on this run - no in-process API monitor reported in, so the runtime anti-debug and anti-VM calls were never watched

Absence of an observation is not proof of absence - see Coverage for what this run could and could not test.

Arguing against malice

  • The local anti-virus engine reported no detection.
  • No reputation source reported this file as malicious.

How much weight this carries

Structure only. Structural evidence only. Nothing matching this verdict was seen running. The one fact that decided it: capability analysis of the file's imports.

Structure

What the file is made of: headers, imports, how it was built and whether it was signed.

Signature
Microsoft Visual C/C++(19.36.35217)[LTCG/C++]
Not packed Untrusted root
CompilerMicrosoft Visual C/C++(19.36.35217)[LTCG/C++]
LinkerMicrosoft Linker(14.36.35217)
Identity
File
typedynamic library (DLL)
size3.1 MB
file arch64-bit (x64)
subsystemConsole
entropy6.4685
date2014-09-21 20:44:51 UTC
version2026.2.0.1
descriptionSophos Endpoint Defense In-Process Protection
productSophos Endpoint Defense
original nameSophosED.dll
languageEN

Antivirus engine

no signature matched

Nothing in the signature set below matched this file. That is one engine's negative answer against one signature set on one day, and it is not a verdict. A signature engine only recognises what has already been named and published, so a file nobody has named yet scans exactly like a file that is harmless. What this file does when it runs is the stronger evidence; read the behaviour sections for that.

This run did not record which signature set answered, so the result above cannot be tied to a named set or reproduced against one. Recording the set began part way through this platform's history, and this scan predates it.

Local ML assessment

no model score

This scan ran before the local classifier was installed on this host, so no model score was produced for it. Submitting the same file again produces one.

Structural rules of thumb, not a model. No structural rule of thumb fired either: the entropy, the section layout, the import count and the signature all read as an ordinary build.

Packing
Not packed
This file's code is readable on disk - nothing is compressed or encrypted around it.
22/100
packer confidence
Static analysis reads this file directly Nothing is hiding the code from a static pass, so what the file contains is what the report shows.
Indicators weighed 2 signals
  • Non-standard section names: .detourc, .wo, .detourd
  • High-entropy overlay (7.79, 53248 bytes)

Secrets & malicious strings

14 flagged strings

Flagged string categories

injection / execution high 5 hits
IndicatorFound inEvidence from the sample
createremotethread raw bytes present in the file bytes only
etwevent raw bytes present in the file bytes only
queueuserapc import table KERNEL32.DLL!QueueUserAPC
shellcode raw bytes present in the file bytes only
virtualallocex import table KERNEL32.DLL!VirtualAllocEx
credential theft high 2 hits
IndicatorFound inEvidence from the sample
cookies raw bytes present in the file bytes only
encrypted_key raw bytes present in the file bytes only
keylogging / surveillance med 4 hits
IndicatorFound inEvidence from the sample
bitblt raw bytes present in the file bytes only
getdc raw bytes present in the file bytes only
getforegroundwindow raw bytes present in the file bytes only
screenshot raw bytes present in the file bytes only
anti-analysis / evasion med 2 hits
IndicatorFound inEvidence from the sample
checkremotedebuggerpresent raw bytes present in the file bytes only
isdebuggerpresent import table KERNEL32.DLL!IsDebuggerPresent
ransomware med 1 hit
IndicatorFound inEvidence from the sample
decrypt raw bytes present in the file bytes only

Capabilities

7 behaviour buckets · 2 high-risk
SeverityCapabilityMITREAPIs
high Process injection
Writes and runs code inside another process
T1055, T1055.004, T1055.012 getthreadcontext, queueuserapc, setthreadcontext, virtualallocex
high Anti-debugging
Detects or obstructs a debugger
T1622 isdebuggerpresent, outputdebugstringa
med Evasion / stalling
Sleeps, times, or otherwise stalls analysis
T1497, T1497.003 getsystemtimeasfiletime, gettickcount, gettickcount64, queryperformancecounter, sleep
med Dynamic API resolution
Resolves APIs at runtime (obfuscation)
T1129 getprocaddress, loadlibrarya, loadlibraryexa, loadlibraryw
med Ransomware behaviour
Enumerates + encrypts files, deletes backups
T1083 findfirstfilew, findnextfilew
med Code execution
Creates processes / runs commands or shellcode
T1106 createthread
low Discovery
Enumerates the host, users, processes or network
T1082 getnativesysteminfo, getsysteminfo

Security mitigations

strong posture
ON ASLR (DynamicBase)
ON High-entropy ASLR (64-bit)
ON DEP / NX (NxCompat)
ON Control Flow Guard
OFF SafeSEH
ON Stack cookies (GS)
ON Force Integrity
OFF AppContainer isolation
OFF Authenticode signed

Rich header (toolchain)

richhash 609436df6177e7ec
ToolBuildUses
Utc1900 (VS2017)307957
Export 14.1030795181
prodid_253352071
Cvtres 14.103079526
Utc1900 (VS2017)3520710
Cvtres 14.103520715
Utc1900 (VS2017)3521710
Utc1900 (VS2017)307955
Import (linker)0317
prodid_26535217280
Export 14.103520797
Alias352171
Implib352171
prodid_15101
AliasObj 14.10352171

Sections

10 sections · the file's memory layout
SectionVirtual addrRaw sizeVirtual sizeAccessEntropy
.textEP
Executable code
0x1000
1.9 MB
1.9 MB
EXECUTEREAD
6.3815
.rdata
Read-only data
0x1e0000
715.5 KB
715.5 KB
READ
5.4118
.data
Initialised data
0x293000
328.5 KB
371.0 KB
READWRITE
5.4411
.pdata
Exception unwind data
0x2f0000
82.0 KB
81.6 KB
READ
6.1867
.didat
Delay-load imports
0x305000
512.0 B
136.0 B
READWRITE
0.8819
.detourc
Non-standard section
0x306000
8.5 KB
8.5 KB
READ
2.292
.wo
Non-standard section
0x309000
512.0 B
32.0 B
READWRITE
0.0
.detourd
Non-standard section
0x30a000
512.0 B
24.0 B
READWRITE
0.1161
.rsrc
Resources
0x30b000
2.0 KB
1.8 KB
READ
4.7539
.reloc
Base relocations
0x30c000
18.5 KB
18.3 KB
READ
5.4446
code data imports/exports resources metadata packer non-standard Entropy above 7.0 means compressed or encrypted content.

Imports

219 funcs / 2 DLLs · 16 mapped to a technique
Injection 10Anti-debug 6Cryptography 2Process 4Evasion 12

Runtime call marks need the in-guest monitor, which did not arm on this run.

Open the imports page

Binary metadata

what the headers declare about this build
Resource langsEN
Debug infoyes
TLS callbacksno

Code signing

Untrusted root
Sophos Limited
issued by Microsoft ID Verified CS AOC CA 04
Signed bySophos Limited
Issuer (CA)Microsoft ID Verified CS AOC CA 04
Valid2026-04-26 → 2026-04-29
Serial33000085c8b8d9642ea9ad72b70000000085c8
AlgorithmSHA384-RSA
Verification
Embedded signature: OK
Chain verification: not verified
Certificate chain (5)
SubjectIssuerValid toAlgo
Microsoft Identity Verification R… (root) Microsoft Identity Verification R… 2045-04-16 SHA384-RSA
Sophos Limited Microsoft ID Verified CS AOC CA 04 2026-04-29 SHA384-RSA
Sophos Limited Microsoft ID Verified CS AOC CA 04 2026-04-29 SHA384-RSA
Microsoft ID Verified CS AOC CA 04 Microsoft ID Verified Code Signin… 2031-03-26 SHA384-RSA
Microsoft ID Verified Code Signin… Microsoft Identity Verification R… 2036-04-01 SHA384-RSA

Capability detection

not completed

The capability analysis of this file's code did not finish, so what the file is able to do was not established from its instructions. This narrows what the run covered - read it alongside Coverage rather than as a finding about the file.

Signature matches

1 finding · 6 file properties · 1 scored
Rule What it matched Corpus Weight
Suspicious_Anti_Debug_API
Anti-debugging API names referenced
4 of 4 strings matched
$a IsDebuggerPresent at 0x234564 · 6 hits
$b CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent at 0x234504 · 5 hits
$c NtQueryInformationProcess at 0x2259a0 · 5 hits
$d OutputDebugString at 0x29110e · 2 hits
Built-in
ruleset this platform ships, and the only one the score reads
SCORED 5
Scored 5, sharing a 15 point cap with every other anti-vm, anti-debug, dropper or packer match.
File properties - not findings
IsPE64IsDLLIsConsoleHasOverlayHasDebugDataHasRichSignature

These say what the file IS or holds - bitness, subsystem, an overlay, an embedded macro stream, which compiler built it. Ordinary files match several, and none of them carry weight in the score.

Extracted strings

showing 200 of 251
  • !This program cannot be run in DOS mode.
  • \Rich&
  • .text
  • `.rdata
  • @.data
  • .pdata
  • @.didat
  • .detourc
  • @.wo
  • .detourd
  • .rsrc
  • @.reloc
  • INITIALSH
  • USERNAMEH
  • E PATH
  • E@ALG5
  • ATCF
  • FullPth
  • p UWATAVAWH
  • l$ VWATAVAWH
  • |$ ATAVAWH
  • @SWATAUH
  • UWATAVAWH
  • USWATI
  • T$Hfff
  • @VWATAVH
  • @SUWATAWH
  • t$hfD
  • tif9T
  • \$ UATAVAWL
  • @USVWATAUAVAWH
  • t$ UWATAVAWH
  • @SVWATH
  • p UWATAUAVH
  • UVWATAWH
  • { ATAVAWH
  • @VATAWH
  • HMPAu
  • ;SOPH
  • HMPA
  • @USVWH
  • @USVWATAVAWH
  • @USWH
  • VWATAVAWH
  • @USVWATAUH
  • true
  • Mozilla
  • ATAVAWH
  • t$ AVH
  • USAWH
  • trfB
  • t$ AWH
  • USVATAWI
  • ?HMPRt
  • t$ WATAVH
  • I9Shs
  • QPIc
  • @SATAVAWH
  • @VATAVAWH
  • @VWATH
  • @WATAWH
  • @VWATAVAWH
  • D$$:D$%u
  • \$ UVWATAWH
  • <cuIM
  • ATAUH
  • UWATAUAWH
  • ATAWH
  • Hcst
  • @SVWATAWH
  • <cuEA
  • \$ VWATAVAWH
  • SVATH
  • <%uzD
  • 8%uSI
  • path
  • type
  • hashD
  • filenameH
  • D$0name
  • hash
  • name
  • pathD
  • filepathH
  • D$8type
  • D$8hash
  • E hash
  • E type
  • uespemosH
  • modnarodI
  • arenegylH3
  • setybdetH3
  • L$Efff
  • roeH
  • USVWATAVAWH
  • rseH
  • H9Chw
  • AXH9A
  • 8lulH
  • 8rurH
  • 8lurH
  • G H9A(rII;
  • USVWATAUAVAWH
  • L#BHI
  • MDA9N$t*
  • @SVATAVAWH
  • IPIc
  • p ATAVAWH
  • tafD
  • A SEDT
  • .uIH
  • variableH
  • %uNHcI
  • dtrRH
  • %uLHc{
  • 9dtrR
  • @SWATH
  • k VWATAVAWH
  • ERROR: 0H;
  • @SUVWATAVH
  • NLA9O
  • t.ff
  • Reg_Req
  • 8.uQH
  • PQARH
  • ntel
  • ineI
  • Genu
  • sH9.tgH
  • USWH
  • x ATAVAWH
  • G0Hch
  • VWATH
  • p AWH
  • @USVWATAUAVH
  • WATAVH
  • svDE3
  • VWATAVAW
  • ATAUAVH
  • ADVAPI32.dll
  • SHELL32.dll
  • ole32.dll
  • ReleaseSRWLockExclusive
  • device or resource busy
  • invalid argument
  • no such process
  • not enough memory
  • operation not permitted
  • resource deadlock would occur
  • resource unavailable try again
  • address family not supported
  • address in use
  • address not available
  • already connected
  • argument list too long
  • argument out of domain
  • bad address
  • bad file descriptor
  • bad message
  • broken pipe
  • connection aborted
  • connection already in progress
  • connection refused
  • connection reset
  • cross device link
  • destination address required
  • directory not empty
  • executable format error
  • file exists
  • file too large
  • filename too long
  • function not supported
  • host unreachable
  • identifier removed
  • illegal byte sequence
  • inappropriate io control operation
  • interrupted
  • invalid seek
  • io error
  • is a directory
  • message size
  • network down
  • network reset
  • network unreachable
  • no buffer space
  • no child process
  • no link
  • no lock available
  • no message available
  • no message
  • no protocol option
  • no space on device
  • no stream resources
  • no such device or address
  • no such device
  • no such file or directory
  • not a directory
  • not a socket
  • not a stream
  • not connected

Stack and decoded strings were not recovered: it did not finish within the time allowed. Only literal strings present in the file are listed above.

Disassembly

entry point · x64 · 60 insns (listing capped)
AddressBytesMnemonicOperands
0x18000fc3048895c2408movqword ptr [rsp + 8], rbx
0x18000fc354889742410movqword ptr [rsp + 0x10], rsi
0x18000fc3a57pushrdi
0x18000fc3b4883ec20subrsp, 0x20
0x18000fc3f498bf8movrdi, r8
0x18000fc428bdamovebx, edx
0x18000fc44488bf1movrsi, rcx
0x18000fc4783fa01cmpedx, 1
0x18000fc4a7505jne0x18000fc51
0x18000fc4ce8efbb1800call0x18019b840
0x18000fc514c8bc7movr8, rdi
0x18000fc548bd3movedx, ebx
0x18000fc56488bcemovrcx, rsi
0x18000fc59488b5c2430movrbx, qword ptr [rsp + 0x30]
0x18000fc5e488b742438movrsi, qword ptr [rsp + 0x38]
0x18000fc634883c420addrsp, 0x20
0x18000fc675fpoprdi
0x18000fc68e9f3fbffffjmp0x18000f860
0x18000fc6dccint3
0x18000fc6eccint3
0x18000fc6fccint3
0x18000fc7048895c2408movqword ptr [rsp + 8], rbx
0x18000fc7557pushrdi
0x18000fc764883ec30subrsp, 0x30
0x18000fc7a498bc0movrax, r8
0x18000fc7d4c8bcamovr9, rdx
0x18000fc8049c7c0ffffffffmovr8, 0xffffffffffffffff
0x18000fc87488bd9movrbx, rcx
0x18000fc8a33ffxoredi, edi
0x18000fc8c0f1f4000nopdword ptr [rax]
0x18000fc9049ffc0incr8
0x18000fc9342383c00cmpbyte ptr [rax + r8], dil
0x18000fc9775f7jne0x18000fc90
0x18000fc99488bd0movrdx, rax
0x18000fc9c498bc9movrcx, r9
0x18000fc9fe82c2f0000call0x180012bd0
0x18000fca40f57c0xorpsxmm0, xmm0
0x18000fca70f1103movupsxmmword ptr [rbx], xmm0
0x18000fcaa48897b10movqword ptr [rbx + 0x10], rdi
0x18000fcae48897b18movqword ptr [rbx + 0x18], rdi
0x18000fcb20f1000movupsxmm0, xmmword ptr [rax]
0x18000fcb50f1103movupsxmmword ptr [rbx], xmm0
0x18000fcb80f104810movupsxmm1, xmmword ptr [rax + 0x10]
0x18000fcbc0f114b10movupsxmmword ptr [rbx + 0x10], xmm1
0x18000fcc0408838movbyte ptr [rax], dil
0x18000fcc348897810movqword ptr [rax + 0x10], rdi
0x18000fcc748c740180f000000movqword ptr [rax + 0x18], 0xf
0x18000fccf488bc3movrax, rbx
0x18000fcd2488b5c2440movrbx, qword ptr [rsp + 0x40]
0x18000fcd74883c430addrsp, 0x30
0x18000fcdb5fpoprdi
0x18000fcdcc3ret
0x18000fcddccint3
0x18000fcdeccint3
0x18000fcdfccint3
0x18000fce048895c2408movqword ptr [rsp + 8], rbx
0x18000fce557pushrdi
0x18000fce64883ec20subrsp, 0x20
0x18000fcea48837a180fcmpqword ptr [rdx + 0x18], 0xf
0x18000fcef488b7a10movrdi, qword ptr [rdx + 0x10]
callbranchretstackarithregisterimmediatememory

Screen recording

34 frames · screen recording · 134s
Screen recording frame
1 / 34
0:00 · 1/34
Download this recording Download video (.mp4) Download GIF (.gif) Building the file runs an encode on this platform, so it is kept to signed-in accounts. Signing in brings you back to this report.

Behavior summary

ran 133s

1 process(es) observed

Launchedregsvr32.exe /s "C:\Users\user\Desktop\SophosED.dll"
Privilegestandard
Telemetry sources: Kernel ETW (1 of 107 events) Process audit: 1Autostart diff: 2

Evasion / anti-analysis checks

3 checks
MED
Anti-debug API imports static-api
MITRE T1622 · getthreadcontext, isdebuggerpresent
MED
YARA: Suspicious_Anti_Debug_API Signature
MITRE T1497
MED
Anti-analysis strings (VM/debugger/tool names) strings
MITRE T1497 · checkremotedebuggerpresent, isdebuggerpresent

Statically visible checks (RDTSC/CPUID/red-pill instructions, anti-debug APIs) plus runtime evasion signals. Instruction-level interception at runtime requires hypervisor introspection (VMI).

Kernel audit saw no cross-process reach. Kernel object-access auditing and the thread trace were active on this run and attributed no handle to another process, no remote or unbacked thread start and no spoofed parent to the sample tree. An observation, not a gap.

No WMI attributed to the sample. The WMI-Activity trace was running and recorded 1065 operations on the machine during the run; none of them came from the sample's process tree.

Living-off-the-land binaries

2 LOLBin abuses
HIGH
powershell downloads/executes via PowerShell MITRE T1059.001
# Caller validation to ensure we are calling from and actual script, and not from a malicious command line function Test-Caller { param( [Parameter(Mandatory=$true)] [System.Management.Automation.CallStackFrame[]] $CallStack ) $caller = $CallStack[1] $
HIGH
pwsh runs an encoded/downloading PowerShell command MITRE T1059.001
# Caller validation to ensure we are calling from and actual script, and not from a malicious command line function Test-Caller { param( [Parameter(Mandatory=$true)] [System.Management.Automation.CallStackFrame[]] $CallStack ) $caller = $CallStack[1] $

Deobfuscated scripts

18 blocks

PowerShell script blocks the sample executed, as PowerShell itself logged them (event 4104) - so an encoded or Invoke-Expression-decoded payload is captured in its final, deobfuscated form, the way it actually ran.

# Localized	12/07/2019 05:46 AM (GMT)	303:6.40.20520 	CL_LocalizationData.psd1
# Localized	01/04/2013 11:32 AM (GMT)	303:4.80.0411 	CL_LocalizationData.psd1
ConvertFrom-StringData @'
###PSLOC
Program_Choice_NOTLISTED=Not Listed
Version_Choice_DEFAULT=None
Version_Choice_WIN8RTM=Windows 8
Version_Choice_WIN7RTM=Windows 7
Version_Choice_WINVISTA2=Windows Vista (Service Pack 2)
Version_Choice_WINXPSP3=Windows XP (Service Pack 3)
Version_Choice_MSIAUTO=Skip Version Check
Version_Choice_UNKNOWN=I don't know
VersionD_Choice_ALL     =  
Display_Choice_DEFAULT=Normal
Display_Choice_256COLOR=256 Colors (8-bit)
Display_Choice_16BITCOLOR=65536 Colors (16-bit)
Display_Choice_640x480=640x480 Resolution
Display_Choice_HIGHDPIAWARE=Scaling on high DPI
Access_Choice_DEFAULT=Normal
Access_Choice_ADMIN=Run as administrator
Emulation_Choice_DEFAULT=Normal
Emulation_Choice_SAFE=Safe emulation
ProblemN_Choice_VERSION=The program worked in earlier versions of Windows but won't install or run now
ProblemD_Choice_VERSION=Example: the setup program won't begin
ProblemN_Choice_DISPLAY=The program opens but doesn't display correctly
ProblemD_Choice_DISPLAY=Example: wrong colors, size, or resolution
ProblemN_Choice_ACCESS=The program requires additional permissions
ProblemD_Choice_ACCESS=Example: Access denied errors appear, or the program requests administrator permissions to run
ProblemN_Choice_UNKNOWN=I don't see my problem listed
ProblemD_Choice_UNKNOWN =  
DisplayN_Choice_256COLOR=Error message saying the program needs to run in 256 colors or 8-bit color mode
DisplayD_Choice_256COLOR  =   
DisplayN_Choice_16BITCOLOR=Error message saying the program needs to run in 65536 colors or 16-bit color mode
DisplayD_Choice_16BITCOLOR  =   
DisplayN_Choice_640x480=Program starts up in a small window (640x480 pixel) and won't switch to full screen
DisplayD_Choice_640x480   =   
DisplayN_Choice_HIGHDPIAWARE=Program does not display properly when large scale font set
& 'C:\Windows\TEMP\SDIAG_3809c060-c649-4d61-9608-09e49d0f4a0e\TS_ProgramCompatibilityWizard.ps1'
# Caller validation to ensure we are calling from and actual script, and not from a malicious command line
function Test-Caller {
    param(
        [Parameter(Mandatory=$true)]
        [System.Management.Automation.CallStackFrame[]]
        $CallStack
    )
    $caller = $CallStack[1]
    $location = $caller.Location
    Write-Verbose -Message $('caller: ' + $location) -Verbose
    if ($location -eq '<No file>') {
        throw 'Invoke-Expression cannot be used in a script'
    }
}

# Generated with
# $var = New-Object System.Management.Automation.CommandMetadata (Get-Command Invoke-Expression)
# [System.Management.Automation.ProxyCommand]::Create($var) | Out-File .\Invoke-Expression.ps1
function Invoke-Expression {
    [CmdletBinding(HelpUri='https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkID=2097030')]
param(
    [Parameter(Mandatory=$true, Position=0, ValueFromPipeline=$true)]
    [string]
    ${Command})

begin
{
    try {
        Test-Caller -CallStack (Get-PSCallStack)
        $outBuffer = $null
        if ($PSBoundParameters.TryGetValue('OutBuffer', [ref]$outBuffer))
        {
            $PSBoundParameters['OutBuffer'] = 1
        }

        $wrappedCmd = $ExecutionContext.InvokeCommand.GetCommand('Microsoft.PowerShell.Utility\Invoke-Expression', [System.Management.Automation.CommandTypes]::Cmdlet)
        $scriptCmd = {& $wrappedCmd @PSBoundParameters }

        $steppablePipeline = $scriptCmd.GetSteppablePipeline($myInvocation.CommandOrigin)
        $steppablePipeline.Begin($PSCmdlet)
    } catch {
        throw
    }
}

process
{
    try {
        $steppablePipeline.Process($_)
    } catch {
        throw
    }
}

end
{
    try {
        $steppablePipeline.End()
    } catch {
        throw
    }
}
<#

.ForwardHelpTargetName Microsoft.PowerShell.Utility\Invoke-Expression
.ForwardHelpCategory Cmdlet

#>
}

# Generated with
# $var = New-Object System.Management.Automation.CommandMetadata (Get-Com
& 'C:\Windows\TEMP\SDIAG_3809c060-c649-4d61-9608-09e49d0f4a0e\VF_ProgramCompatibilityWizard.ps1' -AppName 'SophosED'
{ $_ -ne "" -and $_ -ne "~^" -and $_ -ne "^" }
{
        if(-not($_ -eq [String]::Empty) -and -not($layersToRemove.Contains($_)))
        {
            if($AllVersionModes.Contains($_))
            {
                Set-Variable compatModeParam $CompatibilityModeStrings[$_] -scope global
            }

            if($AllDisplayModes.Contains($_))
            {
                $displayMode = Get-Variable -name displayModeParam -valueOnly -scope global
                if($displayMode -eq $CompatibilityStrings.Display_Choice_DEFAULT)
                {
                    $displayMode = [String]::Empty
                }
                if (-not($displayMode.Contains($CompatibilityModeStrings[$_])))
                {
                    if($displayMode -ne [String]::Empty)
                    {
                        $displayMode += $displaySpacer
                    }
                    $displayMode += $CompatibilityModeStrings[$_]
                }
                Set-Variable -name displayModeParam -value $displayMode -scope global
            }

            if($RunAsAdminCompatMode -eq $_)
            {
                Set-Variable -name accessModeParam -value $CompatibilityStrings.Access_Choice_ADMIN -scope global
            }

            if($MsiAutoCompatMode -eq $_)
            {
                Set-Variable compatModeParam $CompatibilityModeStrings[$_] -scope global
            }

            if ($Arm64BasicSafeEmulationMode -eq $_)
            {
                Set-Variable emulationModeParam $CompatibilityModeStrings[$_] -scope global
            }
        }
    }
function GetSummary()
{

    set-variable compatModeParam $CompatibilityStrings.Version_Choice_DEFAULT -scope global
    set-variable displayModeParam $CompatibilityStrings.Display_Choice_DEFAULT -scope global
    set-variable accessModeParam $CompatibilityStrings.Access_Choice_DEFAULT -scope global
    set-variable emulationModeParam $CompatibilityStrings.Emulation_Choice_DEFAULT -scope global

    foreach($layer in $layersToApply)
    {

        if($allVersionModes -match $layer)
        {
            Set-Variable compatModeParam $CompatibilityModeStrings[$layer] -scope global
        }

        if($allDisplayModes -match $layer)
        {
            $displayMode = Get-Variable -name displayModeParam -valueOnly -scope global
            if($displayMode -eq $CompatibilityStrings.Display_Choice_DEFAULT)
            {
                $displayMode = [String]::Empty
            }
            if($displayMode -ne [String]::Empty)
            {
                $displayMode += $displaySpacer
            }
            $displayMode += $CompatibilityModeStrings[$layer]

            Set-Variable -name displayModeParam -value $displayMode -scope global
        }

        if($RunAsAdminCompatMode -eq $layer)
        {
            Set-Variable -name accessModeParam -value $CompatibilityStrings.Access_Choice_ADMIN -scope global
        }

        if($MsiAutoCompatMode -eq $layer)
        {
            Set-Variable compatModeParam $CompatibilityModeStrings[$layer] -scope global
        }

        if ($Arm64BasicSafeEmulationMode -eq $layer)
        {
            Set-Variable emulationModeParam $CompatibilityModeStrings[$layer] -scope global
        }
    }

    $originalCompatMode.Split($delimiters.ToCharArray()) | foreach {
        if(-not($_ -eq [String]::Empty) -and -not($layersToRemove.Contains($_)))
        {
            if($AllVersionModes.Contains($_))
            {
                Set-Variable compatModeParam $Compatibil
{
        if (-not($layersToApply.Contains($_)))
        {
            $layersToRemove.Add($_)
        }
    }
function IsArm64Machine() {

    #During the build, a script will replace this keyword with build.arch.
    return ("amd64" -eq "arm64");
}
{
            if ($AllTSLayers.Contains($_) -and (-not($layersToApply.Contains($_))))
            {
                $layersToApply.Add($_)
            }
        }
{

        $Layer = $_

        #Executables don't get the MSIAUTO layer
        if ($isExecutable -and ($Layer -eq "MSIAUTO")) {
            $Layer = ""
        }

        #Vista+ era apps don't get some display layers
        if ($isVistaPlus -and ($PreVistaDisplayMode.Contains($Layer))) {
            $Layer = ""
        }

        $tempLayers = "{0} {1}" -f $Layer, $tempLayers
    }
function FilterRecommendedLayers([bool]$isExecutable, [bool]$isVistaPlus) {

    [string]$tempLayers = ""
    [string]$PreVistaDisplayMode = "256COLOR 16BITCOLOR 640X480"

    $Env:RecommendedLayer.Split(' ') | foreach {

        $Layer = $_

        #Executables don't get the MSIAUTO layer
        if ($isExecutable -and ($Layer -eq "MSIAUTO")) {
            $Layer = ""
        }

        #Vista+ era apps don't get some display layers
        if ($isVistaPlus -and ($PreVistaDisplayMode.Contains($Layer))) {
            $Layer = ""
        }

        $tempLayers = "{0} {1}" -f $Layer, $tempLayers
    }

    $tempLayers = $tempLayers.Trim(' ')

    if ($tempLayers -eq "") {
        $Env:RecommendedLayer = "NONE"
    } else {
        $Env:RecommendedLayer = $tempLayers
    }
}
gives up
    do
    {

        #Get the original layers string
        $originalCompatMode = [WerUtil]::GetExistingCompatMode($targetPath)

        if(-not($autoFix))
        {
            #Reset variables
            set-variable solutionSelected $false -scope global
            set-variable problemMask 0 -scope global
            $layersToApply.Clear()
            $layersToRemove.Clear()

            #Ask the user to identify their symptoms if this is an exe
            if($isExecutable)
            {
                GetProblemSelection
            }
            #MSIs get the RunAsAdmin layer automatically applied and automatically
            #prompt the user to select a version layer
            else
            {
                $mask = $VersionProblem
                $mask = $mask -bor $RunAsAdminProblem
                set-Variable problemMask $mask -scope global
                set-Variable solutionSelected $true -scope global
            }

            [int]$mask = get-Variable -name problemMask -valueOnly -scope global

            if($mask -band $VersionProblem)
            {
                GetVersionLayer($true)
            }
            else
            {
                GetVersionLayer($false)
            }

            if($mask -band $DisplayProblem)
            {

                #If this is a vista era or later application, the only display problem
                #we attempt to fix will be the high DPI aware issue
                if ($isVistaPlus)
                {

                    #No interaction for this; just need to set the layer
                    if($originalCompatMode -notlike "*$($VistaPlusDisplayMode)*")
                    {
                        SetCompatMode $VistaPlusDisplayMode $true
                    }
                    set-Variable solutionSelected $true -scope global

                }
                else
                {
                    GetDisplayLayers($
roblem
            }

            $mask = $mask -bor $RunAsAdminProblem
        }
    }

    Set-Variable -name problemMask -value $mask -scope global
}

#Function to determine the user's version choice
#Unlike other problem categories, this is a single selection
function GetVersionLayer([bool]$showInteraction)
{
    $choices = New-Object System.Collections.ArrayList
    $choiceDoc = $null

    if($appIs64Bit)
    {
        $choiceDoc = [xml] $versionChoiceXml64
    }
    else
    {
        $choiceDoc = [xml] $versionChoiceXml
    }

    $choiceDoc.SelectNodes("Choices/Choice") | foreach {
        $choice = @{}
        foreach ($node in $_.ChildNodes)
        {
            if($node.InnerXml -ne [string]::Empty)
            {
                $choice.Add($node.Name, $node.InnerXml)
            }
        }

        #localize the name and description
        $key = $choice["Name"]
        $choice["Name"] = $CompatibilityStrings.$key
        $key = $choice["Description"]
        $choice["Description"] = $CompatibilityStrings.$key

        $choices += $choice
    }

    $choices | where {$originalCompatMode -match $CompatibilityModes[$_["Value"]]} | foreach {
        set-selected $_ $true
    }
    $choices | where {-not($originalCompatMode -match $CompatibilityModes[$_["Value"]])} | foreach {
        set-selected $_ $false
    }

    $versionChoice = $null

    if($showInteraction)
    {
        $versionChoice = Get-DiagInput -id IT_WindowsVersions -choice $choices
        if(($versionChoice -ne [String]::Empty) -and ($versionChoice -ne $null))
        {
            Set-Variable -name solutionSelected -value $true -scope global
            SetCompatMode $CompatibilityModes[$versionChoice] $true
        }
    }

    #Make sure unselected choices are not set
    foreach($choice in $choices)
    {
        if($versionChoice -eq $null -or -not($CompatibilityModes[$choice["Value"]] -eq $CompatibilityModes[$vers
_USER))
        {
            return existingLayers.ToString();
        }

        return String.Empty;
    }

    [DllImport("apphelp.dll", EntryPoint="SdbSetPermLayerKeys", CharSet=CharSet.Unicode)]
    [return : MarshalAs(UnmanagedType.Bool)]
    public static extern bool SdbSetPermLayerKeys(String wszPath, String wszLayers, bool bMachine);

    public static void OverwriteCompatMode(String ExePath, String ModeToApply)
    {
        SdbSetPermLayerKeys(ExePath, ModeToApply, false);
    }

    public static String EscapePath(String Path)
    {
        if (Path == null)
        {
            return null;
        }
        return Path.Replace("$", "`$");
    }

    [DllImport("kernel32.dll", EntryPoint="GetBinaryTypeW", CharSet=CharSet.Unicode)]
    [return : MarshalAs(UnmanagedType.Bool)]
    public static extern bool GetBinaryType(string lpApplicationName, out uint lpBinaryType);

    public static bool AppIs64Bit(String AppPath)
    {
        uint binaryType;

        if (GetBinaryType(AppPath, out binaryType))
        {
            if (binaryType == SCS_64BIT_BINARY)
            {
                return true;
            }
        }

        return false;
    }

    [StructLayout(LayoutKind.Sequential, Pack=8)]
    public struct UNICODE_STRING : IDisposable
    {
        public ushort Length;
        public ushort MaximumLength;
        private IntPtr buffer;

        public UNICODE_STRING(string s)
        {
            Length = (ushort)(s.Length * 2);
            MaximumLength = (ushort)(Length + 2);
            buffer = Marshal.StringToHGlobalUni(s);
        }

        public void Dispose()
        {
            Marshal.FreeHGlobal(buffer);
            buffer = IntPtr.Zero;
        }

        public override string ToString()
        {
            return Marshal.PtrToStringUni(buffer);
        }
    }

    const UInt32 IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_I386 = 0x014c;

    static IntPtr INVALID_HANDLE_V
& 'C:\Windows\TEMP\SDIAG_3809c060-c649-4d61-9608-09e49d0f4a0e\RS_ProgramCompatibilityWizard.ps1' -TargetPath 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\SophosED.exe' -AppName 'SophosED'
function Test-Selection([string]$appPath)
{
    $testresult = $false

    if(($appPath -ne $null) -and -not([String]::IsNullOrEmpty($appPath)))
    {
        $testresult = test-path -literalpath $appPath

        if($testresult)
        {
            if(-not($type::IsFileProtected($appPath)))
            {
                $extension = [System.IO.Path]::GetExtension($appPath)
                $testresult = ($extension -eq ".exe") -or ($extension -eq ".msi")
            }
            else
            {
                $testresult = $false
                Set-Variable -name rebrowseText -value $CompatibilityStrings.Text_FILE_PROTECTED -scope global
            }
        }
    }

    Set-Variable -name appValid -value $testResult -scope global
}
# Copyright � 2008, Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.


#TS_ProgramCompatibilityWizard
#rparsons - 05 May 2008

$ShortcutListing = New-Object System.Collections.Hashtable
$ExeListing = New-Object System.Collections.ArrayList
$CombinedListing = New-Object System.Collections.ArrayList

Import-LocalizedData -BindingVariable CompatibilityStrings -FileName CL_LocalizationData

# Block PCW on unsupported SKUs
$BlockedSKUs = @(178)
[Int32]$OSSKU = (Get-WmiObject -Class "Win32_OperatingSystem").OperatingSystemSKU
if ($BlockedSKUs.Contains($OSSKU))
{
    return
}

$typeDefinition = @"

using System;
using System.IO;
using System.Runtime.InteropServices;
using System.Text;
using System.Collections;

public class Utility
{
    public static string GetStartMenuPath()
    {
        return Environment.GetFolderPath(Environment.SpecialFolder.StartMenu);
    }

    public static string GetAllUsersStartMenuPath()
    {
        return Path.Combine(Environment.GetFolderPath(Environment.SpecialFolder.CommonApplicationData), "Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu");
    }

    public static string GetDesktopPath()
    {
        return Environment.GetFolderPath(Environment.SpecialFolder.Desktop);
    }

    [DllImport("sfc.dll", SetLastError=true, EntryPoint="SfcIsFileProtected", CharSet=CharSet.Unicode)]
    [return : MarshalAs(UnmanagedType.Bool)]
    public static extern bool SfcIsFileProtected(IntPtr RpcHandle, String ProtFileName);

    public static bool IsFileProtected(String FileName)
    {
        return SfcIsFileProtected(IntPtr.Zero, FileName);
    }

    [DllImport("pcwutl.dll", EntryPoint = "GetAppInformationFromCloud", CharSet = CharSet.Unicode)]
    [return: MarshalAs(UnmanagedType.U4)]
    public static extern uint GetAppInformationFromCloud(String PathToFile, StringBuilder URL, out uint CompatStatus, StringBuilder RecommendedLayer, out bool Apphelp);

    public static ArrayList GetAppInfoFromCOS(String PathToF

Command lines, unwrapped

19 read · 4 with something in

19 captured texts were unwrapped locally; 4 yielded something. An address below is text found in a command line: recovering one is not evidence that the sample reached it, and a well-formed hostname here may be a file path or a type name.

Came fromHiddenLooks like an address
script block 2 no
https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkID=2097030 go.microsoft.com
As captured
# Caller validation to ensure we are calling from and actual script, and not from a malicious command line
function Test-Caller {
    param(
        [Parameter(Mandatory=$true)]
        [System.Management.Automation.CallStackFrame[]]
        $CallStack
    )
    $caller = $CallStack[1]
    $location = $caller.Location
    Write-Verbose -Message $('caller: ' + $location) -Verbose
    if ($location -eq '<No file>') {
        throw 'Invoke-Expression cannot be used in a script'
    }
}

# Generated with
# $var = New-Object System.Management.Automation.CommandMetadata (Get-Command Invoke-Expression)
# [System.Management.Automation.ProxyCommand]::Create($var) | Out-File .\Invoke-Expression.ps1
function Invoke-Expression {
    [CmdletBinding(HelpUri='https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkID=2097030')]
param(
    [Parameter(Mandatory=$true, Position=0, ValueFromPipeline=$true)]
    [string]
    ${Command})

begin
{
    try {
        Test-Caller -CallStack (Get-PSCallStack)
        $outBuffer = $null
        if ($PSBoundParameters.TryGetValue('OutBuffer', [ref]$outBuffer))
        {
            $PSBoundParameters['OutBuffer'] = 1
        }

        $wrappedCmd = $ExecutionContext.InvokeCommand.GetCommand('Microsoft.PowerShell.Utility\Invoke-Expression', [System.Management.Automation.CommandTypes]::Cmdlet)
        $scriptCmd = {& $wrappedCmd @PSBoundParameters }

        $steppablePipeline = $scriptCmd.GetSteppablePipeline($myInvocation.CommandOrigin)
        $steppablePipeline.Begin($PSCmdlet)
    } catch {
        throw
    }
}

process
{
    try {
        $steppablePipeline.Process($_)
    } catch {
        throw
    }
}

end
{
    try {
        $steppablePipeline.End()
    } catch {
        throw
    }
}
<#

.ForwardHelpTargetName Microsoft.PowerShell.Utility\Invoke-Expression
.ForwardHelpCategory Cmdlet

#>
}

# Generated with
# $var = New-Object System.Management.Automation.CommandMetadata (Get-Com
script block 13 no
node.name
As captured
roblem
            }

            $mask = $mask -bor $RunAsAdminProblem
        }
    }

    Set-Variable -name problemMask -value $mask -scope global
}

#Function to determine the user's version choice
#Unlike other problem categories, this is a single selection
function GetVersionLayer([bool]$showInteraction)
{
    $choices = New-Object System.Collections.ArrayList
    $choiceDoc = $null

    if($appIs64Bit)
    {
        $choiceDoc = [xml] $versionChoiceXml64
    }
    else
    {
        $choiceDoc = [xml] $versionChoiceXml
    }

    $choiceDoc.SelectNodes("Choices/Choice") | foreach {
        $choice = @{}
        foreach ($node in $_.ChildNodes)
        {
            if($node.InnerXml -ne [string]::Empty)
            {
                $choice.Add($node.Name, $node.InnerXml)
            }
        }

        #localize the name and description
        $key = $choice["Name"]
        $choice["Name"] = $CompatibilityStrings.$key
        $key = $choice["Description"]
        $choice["Description"] = $CompatibilityStrings.$key

        $choices += $choice
    }

    $choices | where {$originalCompatMode -match $CompatibilityModes[$_["Value"]]} | foreach {
        set-selected $_ $true
    }
    $choices | where {-not($originalCompatMode -match $CompatibilityModes[$_["Value"]])} | foreach {
        set-selected $_ $false
    }

    $versionChoice = $null

    if($showInteraction)
    {
        $versionChoice = Get-DiagInput -id IT_WindowsVersions -choice $choices
        if(($versionChoice -ne [String]::Empty) -and ($versionChoice -ne $null))
        {
            Set-Variable -name solutionSelected -value $true -scope global
            SetCompatMode $CompatibilityModes[$versionChoice] $true
        }
    }

    #Make sure unselected choices are not set
    foreach($choice in $choices)
    {
        if($versionChoice -eq $null -or -not($CompatibilityModes[$choice["Value"]] -eq $CompatibilityModes[$vers
script block 14 1 layer none
Unwrapped in order1. backtick
As captured
_USER))
        {
            return existingLayers.ToString();
        }

        return String.Empty;
    }

    [DllImport("apphelp.dll", EntryPoint="SdbSetPermLayerKeys", CharSet=CharSet.Unicode)]
    [return : MarshalAs(UnmanagedType.Bool)]
    public static extern bool SdbSetPermLayerKeys(String wszPath, String wszLayers, bool bMachine);

    public static void OverwriteCompatMode(String ExePath, String ModeToApply)
    {
        SdbSetPermLayerKeys(ExePath, ModeToApply, false);
    }

    public static String EscapePath(String Path)
    {
        if (Path == null)
        {
            return null;
        }
        return Path.Replace("$", "`$");
    }

    [DllImport("kernel32.dll", EntryPoint="GetBinaryTypeW", CharSet=CharSet.Unicode)]
    [return : MarshalAs(UnmanagedType.Bool)]
    public static extern bool GetBinaryType(string lpApplicationName, out uint lpBinaryType);

    public static bool AppIs64Bit(String AppPath)
    {
        uint binaryType;

        if (GetBinaryType(AppPath, out binaryType))
        {
            if (binaryType == SCS_64BIT_BINARY)
            {
                return true;
            }
        }

        return false;
    }

    [StructLayout(LayoutKind.Sequential, Pack=8)]
    public struct UNICODE_STRING : IDisposable
    {
        public ushort Length;
        public ushort MaximumLength;
        private IntPtr buffer;

        public UNICODE_STRING(string s)
        {
            Length = (ushort)(s.Length * 2);
            MaximumLength = (ushort)(Length + 2);
            buffer = Marshal.StringToHGlobalUni(s);
        }

        public void Dispose()
        {
            Marshal.FreeHGlobal(buffer);
            buffer = IntPtr.Zero;
        }

        public override string ToString()
        {
            return Marshal.PtrToStringUni(buffer);
        }
    }

    const UInt32 IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_I386 = 0x014c;

    static IntPtr INVALID_HANDLE_V
Unwrapped
_USER))
        {
            return existingLayers.ToString();
        }

        return String.Empty;
    }

    [DllImport("apphelp.dll", EntryPoint="SdbSetPermLayerKeys", CharSet=CharSet.Unicode)]
    [return : MarshalAs(UnmanagedType.Bool)]
    public static extern bool SdbSetPermLayerKeys(String wszPath, String wszLayers, bool bMachine);

    public static void OverwriteCompatMode(String ExePath, String ModeToApply)
    {
        SdbSetPermLayerKeys(ExePath, ModeToApply, false);
    }

    public static String EscapePath(String Path)
    {
        if (Path == null)
        {
            return null;
        }
        return Path.Replace("$", "$");
    }

    [DllImport("kernel32.dll", EntryPoint="GetBinaryTypeW", CharSet=CharSet.Unicode)]
    [return : MarshalAs(UnmanagedType.Bool)]
    public static extern bool GetBinaryType(string lpApplicationName, out uint lpBinaryType);

    public static bool AppIs64Bit(String AppPath)
    {
        uint binaryType;

        if (GetBinaryType(AppPath, out binaryType))
        {
            if (binaryType == SCS_64BIT_BINARY)
            {
                return true;
            }
        }

        return false;
    }

    [StructLayout(LayoutKind.Sequential, Pack=8)]
    public struct UNICODE_STRING : IDisposable
    {
        public ushort Length;
        public ushort MaximumLength;
        private IntPtr buffer;

        public UNICODE_STRING(string s)
        {
            Length = (ushort)(s.Length * 2);
            MaximumLength = (ushort)(Length + 2);
            buffer = Marshal.StringToHGlobalUni(s);
        }

        public void Dispose()
        {
            Marshal.FreeHGlobal(buffer);
            buffer = IntPtr.Zero;
        }

        public override string ToString()
        {
            return Marshal.PtrToStringUni(buffer);
        }
    }

    const UInt32 IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_I386 = 0x014c;

    static IntPtr INVALID_HANDLE_V
script block 17 no
system.io
As captured
# Copyright � 2008, Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.


#TS_ProgramCompatibilityWizard
#rparsons - 05 May 2008

$ShortcutListing = New-Object System.Collections.Hashtable
$ExeListing = New-Object System.Collections.ArrayList
$CombinedListing = New-Object System.Collections.ArrayList

Import-LocalizedData -BindingVariable CompatibilityStrings -FileName CL_LocalizationData

# Block PCW on unsupported SKUs
$BlockedSKUs = @(178)
[Int32]$OSSKU = (Get-WmiObject -Class "Win32_OperatingSystem").OperatingSystemSKU
if ($BlockedSKUs.Contains($OSSKU))
{
    return
}

$typeDefinition = @"

using System;
using System.IO;
using System.Runtime.InteropServices;
using System.Text;
using System.Collections;

public class Utility
{
    public static string GetStartMenuPath()
    {
        return Environment.GetFolderPath(Environment.SpecialFolder.StartMenu);
    }

    public static string GetAllUsersStartMenuPath()
    {
        return Path.Combine(Environment.GetFolderPath(Environment.SpecialFolder.CommonApplicationData), "Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu");
    }

    public static string GetDesktopPath()
    {
        return Environment.GetFolderPath(Environment.SpecialFolder.Desktop);
    }

    [DllImport("sfc.dll", SetLastError=true, EntryPoint="SfcIsFileProtected", CharSet=CharSet.Unicode)]
    [return : MarshalAs(UnmanagedType.Bool)]
    public static extern bool SfcIsFileProtected(IntPtr RpcHandle, String ProtFileName);

    public static bool IsFileProtected(String FileName)
    {
        return SfcIsFileProtected(IntPtr.Zero, FileName);
    }

    [DllImport("pcwutl.dll", EntryPoint = "GetAppInformationFromCloud", CharSet = CharSet.Unicode)]
    [return: MarshalAs(UnmanagedType.U4)]
    public static extern uint GetAppInformationFromCloud(String PathToFile, StringBuilder URL, out uint CompatStatus, StringBuilder RecommendedLayer, out bool Apphelp);

    public static ArrayList GetAppInfoFromCOS(String PathToF

Network activity

The network section is a paid-plan layer: the DNS the sample resolved, the connections it opened, the TLS it negotiated, and the rule engine's reading of the capture.

This run was captured, and what it captured is on a paid plan rather than absent. An internet-connected detonation is the same plan, so a paid run also shows what the sample reached rather than only what it tried.

See plans Create an account

Process tree

What ran during the detonation, and what each process did. Select a node to see the activity attributed to it.

1process

SophosED.dll

1 process
1 process

Attributed activity

Not attributed to any process

1 kind

These operations were captured but carry no pid this tree could match, so they are not shown against any node above.

Registry operations2
0Mechanisms found
90Methods checked
0ATT&CK techniques
NONEHighest severity

Persistence mechanisms

clean

No persistence established

None of the 90 auto-start methods below were established during this run.

Detection coverage

0 / 90

Every auto-start method checked on this sample, grouped by family. A method with no result is reported clean, and one the sample only names in its own strings reads "named" rather than "detected".

Logon & Startup 22 clean
  • Active Setup Installed Component T1547.014 clean
  • Explorer Delay-Load Object T1547.001 clean
  • Explorer Run Key T1547.001 clean
  • Explorer SharedTaskScheduler T1547.001 clean
  • Group Policy Extension DLL T1547.004 clean
  • Group Policy Run Key T1547.001 clean
  • Logon Script T1037.001 clean
  • RDP WDS Startup Program T1547.001 clean
  • Registry Run Key T1547.001 clean
  • Registry RunEx Key T1547.001 clean
  • Registry RunOnce Key T1547.001 clean
  • Registry RunOnceEx Key T1547.001 clean
  • Registry RunServices Key T1547.001 clean
  • Startup Folder Item T1547.001 clean
  • Startup Folder Redirection T1547.001 clean
  • Terminal Services Initial Program T1547.001 clean
  • Winlogon GINA DLL T1547.004 clean
  • Winlogon MPNotify Value T1547.004 clean
  • Winlogon Notify Package T1547.004 clean
  • Winlogon Shell Value T1547.004 clean
  • Winlogon Taskman Value T1547.004 clean
  • Winlogon Userinit Value T1547.004 clean
Services & Tasks 9 clean
  • BITS Job T1197 clean
  • Print Monitor DLL T1547.010 clean
  • Print Processor DLL T1547.012 clean
  • Scheduled Task T1053.005 clean
  • Scheduled Task Registry Implant T1053.005 clean
  • Service Control Manager Security Descriptor T1574.011 clean
  • Service DLL Hijack T1543.003 clean
  • Time Provider DLL T1547.003 clean
  • Windows Service Creation T1543.003 clean
Execution Hijack 17 clean
  • .NET Managed Debugger T1546.012 clean
  • Accessibility Tool Hijack T1546.008 clean
  • AeDebug Postmortem Debugger T1546.012 clean
  • App Paths Hijack T1546.012 clean
  • Application Shim Database T1546.011 clean
  • Boot Verification Program T1547.002 clean
  • Command Processor AutoRun T1546.011 clean
  • Explorer Load Value T1547.001 clean
  • Explorer MyComputer Tool Hijack T1546.001 clean
  • Registry Image File Execution Options T1546.012 clean
  • Screensaver Hijack T1546.002 clean
  • Setup ErrorHandler Script T1546 clean
  • Shell Open Command Hijack T1546.001 clean
  • SilentProcessExit Monitor T1546.012 clean
  • Telemetry Controller Command T1546.015 clean
  • WER ReflectDebugger T1546.012 clean
  • Windows Error Reporting Debugger T1546.012 clean
DLL Load Order 12 clean
  • .NET CLR Profiler DLL T1574.012 clean
  • .NET Startup Hook DLL T1574 clean
  • AppCert DLLs T1546.009 clean
  • AppInit DLLs T1546.010 clean
  • AutodialDLL Winsock Injection T1546.006 clean
  • DLL Search-Order Hijack T1574.001 T1574.002 clean
  • DNS Server Plugin DLL T1574.001 clean
  • HTML Help Helper DLL T1546 clean
  • KnownDLLs Manipulation T1574.001 clean
  • Natural Language Platform DLL Override T1546 clean
  • Netsh Helper DLL T1546.007 clean
  • Winsock Layered Service Provider T1546.006 clean
COM & Browser 6 clean
  • Browser Extension T1176 clean
  • Browser Helper Object T1176 clean
  • COM Server Hijack T1546.015 clean
  • HTML Help COM Object Hijack T1546.015 clean
  • Shell Context Menu Handler T1546.001 clean
  • Shell Extension Handler T1546.001 clean
Security Providers & Accounts 11 clean
  • Account RID Hijack T1098 clean
  • AMSI Provider T1562.001 clean
  • Credential Provider T1547.014 clean
  • DSRM Admin Logon Backdoor T1556 clean
  • Hidden Local Account T1136.001 clean
  • LSA Authentication Package T1547.002 clean
  • LSA Extension DLL T1547.005 clean
  • LSA Notification Package T1547.005 clean
  • LSA Security Package T1547.005 clean
  • Network Provider DLL T1556.008 clean
  • Security Support Provider T1547.005 clean
Scripting & Applications 9 clean
  • Netsh Port Proxy T1090.001 clean
  • Office Add-in T1137.006 clean
  • Office Executable Sideload T1574.002 clean
  • Office Startup Template T1137.001 clean
  • Office Test Key T1137.002 clean
  • Power Automate Flow T1546 clean
  • PowerShell Profile T1546.013 clean
  • Windows Terminal Startup Action T1546 clean
  • WMI Event Subscription T1546.003 clean
Boot & Firmware 4 clean
  • BootExecute Native Image T1547.002 clean
  • PlatformExecute Native Image T1547.002 clean
  • SetupExecute Native Image T1547.002 clean
  • UEFI / Bootkit Artifact T1542.003 T1542.001 clean

File activity summary

create 0 write 0 modify 0 delete 0 rename 0

Dropped payload analysis

not observed

No payload write was recorded and no capture ran on this run, so nothing here is a measurement about dropped files either way.

File & registry ops

0 file · 0 registry · sample scope
OperationTargetProcess
setvalue
System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager
PendingFileRenameOperations = \??\C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\PCW9E1C.xml \??\C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\PCW9E1C.tmp
autostart diff
-
setvalue
System\CurrentControlSet\Services\BITS
Start = 2
autostart diff
-

External reputation was not produced for this scan. Threat intelligence enrichment is a paid-plan layer: every extracted indicator - hashes, addresses, hostnames - is checked against the external reputation services. Our own ingested feeds ran on this scan and every result below is theirs. Adding the paid layer adds an external reputation verdict on each indicator, so MalwareBazaar and filescan.io are listed below as not checked. See plans.

1 reported a hit 17 answered no 4 had nothing to check
1Sources with a hit
18Sources queriedof 22 available
468.7kFeed records
0Could not answer

File reputation

4 clear · 2 not checked
SourceChecksResultDetailFeed
MalwareBazaar hash feed File hash clean not in feed 6,171 records
20 minutes ago
MalwareBazaar ransomware feed File hash clean not in feed 3,348 records
3 hours ago
ThreatFox hash IOCs File hash clean not in feed 1,261 records
20 minutes ago
URLhaus payload hashes File hash clean not in feed 1,398 records
20 minutes ago
filescan.io File hash not checked no hash lookup ran for this scan live lookup
MalwareBazaar File hash not checked no hash lookup ran for this scan live lookup

Hash lookups only - the sample itself is never uploaded to any third party.

Network indicators

8 clear
SourceChecksResultDetailFeed
blocklist.de IP / domain / URL clean 2 observed indicators, none listed 24.2k records
20 minutes ago
CINS Army IP / domain / URL clean 2 observed indicators, none listed 15k records
20 minutes ago
Emerging Threats IP / domain / URL clean 2 observed indicators, none listed 511 records
20 minutes ago
Feodo Tracker IP / domain / URL clean 2 observed indicators, none listed 5 records
20 minutes ago
IPsum IP / domain / URL clean 2 observed indicators, none listed 17.7k records
20 minutes ago
Phishing.Database IP / domain / URL clean 2 observed indicators, none listed 391.5k records
3 hours ago
ThreatFox IP / domain / URL clean 2 observed indicators, none listed 1,261 records
20 minutes ago
URLhaus IP / domain / URL clean 2 observed indicators, none listed 297 records
20 minutes ago

TLS fingerprints

nothing of this kind to check
SourceChecksResultDetailFeed
JA3 / JA4 fingerprint blocklists JA3 / JA4 not checked no TLS client fingerprint observed 97 records
21 hours ago
SSL blocklist Server certificate not checked no server certificate fingerprint is extracted to check live lookup

Detection rules

1 of 2 listed
SourceChecksResultDetailFeed
Signature rules Sample content 1 match Suspicious_Anti_Debug_API 110 records
21 minutes ago
Sigma rules Behavior log clean - 2,275 records
17 hours ago

Tooling catalogs

4 clear
SourceChecksResultDetailFeed
LOLBAS Process image paths clean 1 process image path, none masqueraded 245 records
21 minutes ago
LOLBootloaders File hash clean not a known vulnerable bootloader 520 records
19 minutes ago
LOLDrivers File hash clean not a known vulnerable driver 2,346 records
20 minutes ago
LOLRMM Names and domains clean 4 name/domain indicators checked, no remote-management tooling 358 records
19 minutes ago

AI analysis

The AI layer is a paid-plan feature. It reads what the other layers produced - the behaviour summary, the call sequence, the indicator list - and writes the narrative and the kill-chain walkthrough.

Nothing is being withheld. This layer did not run for this scan, so there is no result stored behind the lock.

See plans Create an account

0 malicious 3 suspicious 0 info

File indicators

3
SeverityTypeIndicatorDescription
suspicious sample_sha256 cdbad2aa1a8974168601f711cd7244b75916fefc131ee589010efce2a148603e Submitted sample (SHA256)
suspicious sample_md5 92648f212d568581f9aeb46a4257e7a3 Submitted sample (MD5)
suspicious imphash e1aa2b1b1f889c6dc94772fbc833975b Import table hash (imphash)

Sigma detections

0 matches of 2275 rules

The Sigma corpus was evaluated against this run's processes, registry, file, network, DNS and script activity. Nothing matched.

Generated rules

YARA: auto_file_2606_yara

Auto-generated
rule auto_file_2606_yara
{
    meta:
        description = "Auto-generated from scan 2606"
        author = "sandbox auto-generator"
        imphash = "e1aa2b1b1f889c6dc94772fbc833975b"
        anchors = "5 independent regions"
    strings:
        $s0 = "operation in progress" ascii fullword
        $s1 = "regex_error(error_brack): The expression contained mismatched [ and ]." ascii fullword
        $s2 = "connection refused" ascii fullword
        $s3 = "invalid argument" ascii fullword
        $s4 = "433333333333333" ascii fullword
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and filesize < 12800000 and all of them
}

Extracted files

What came out of the sample: unpacked payloads, carved objects and captured memory. Each one is stored by content hash, so the same object extracted twice is the same row.

No extracted files

Nothing was unpacked or carved out of this sample. Packed samples, documents with embedded objects and installers are the ones that usually produce artifacts here.

Export & download

/s/2606

Structured exports for your SIEM/TIP - ATT&CK Navigator layer, STIX 2.1 bundle, MISP event and a defanged IOC list - are free on every report. The packet capture follows this scan's plan, because a capture is the rawest network output this platform produces.

Analysis report

PDF and DOCX reports are available to signed-in accounts on every plan, free included. Sign in to generate one.

Public analyses of this file

1 run
SubmittedEnvironmentVerdictScore
2026-10-02 06:01 Shown below Windows 10 22H2 Suspicious 53/100