Malwagon
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Setup.exe File Analysis · first seen Sep 11, 2026 03:56 · 102.0 KB
2proc 4reg 3IOCs
Malicious100 Completed Public
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Setup.exeacrstealer analysis report - Malicious

Run integrity

sample ran

The guest staged the sample and launched it, so what follows describes this file rather than an empty desktop.

50.5sto launch
61telemetry events
51observed
69agent notes

Malicious

100/100

30 points past the malicious line at 70.

Clean0-34 Suspicious35-69 Malicious70-100

Why this verdict

+40
Threat intelligence
  • Known malicious hash (feed): threatfox: ACR Stealer
+35
Malware family
  • Identified as ACR Stealer (possible confidence, named by hash_feed)
+35
Static analysis
  • Loader stub: parses a PE header itself, changes memory protection, resolves imports at runtime, and 89088 of 103424 bytes sit in .rsrc at entropy 7.72 against a 7680-byte code section
+5
Runtime behavior
  • 1 evasion behavior(s)
+0
Execution
  • The sample ran and then faulted: the operating system's crash reporter (WerFault.exe) started under it. What it did before that point was observed and is scored above; what it would have done afterwards was not.

Model reading

Measured MALICIOUS100 of 100

Evidence ledger above, row by row. Published verdict rests on this column and on nothing to its right.

Model reads it asadvisory, no points NOT ASSESSEDnot shown on this page

Reads this report's derived findings, never the sample itself.

A model reading exists for this scan and is shown to the submitter and to staff only. It is a second opinion about evidence the score already priced, it is worth no points, and on a public page it would stand beside the verdict with no grounding a stranger could check.

Analysis layers

Static ran moved the score
Dynamic ran moved the score
Threat intel local feeds only moved the score
AI not included

Sample

TypeFile
MIMEapplication/vnd.microsoft.portable-executable

Run conditions

Sandbox OSWindows 10
EnvironmentWorkgroup
InternetIsolated
Execution141s
Guest hardware2 vCPU4095 MB RAM
Fake artifacts8 files 6 apps 5 URLs

Malware family

0 independent sources
ACR Stealer possible

Named by a single source. Treat it as a lead rather than a classification.

LayerSourceWhat it matched
hash_feed rule corpus threatfox: ACR Stealer

Detection signatures

3 detected · 3 withheld as common
Severity Detection Evidence Layer
MED
Evasion: anti debug
MITRE T1497
runtime anti debug evasion signal
dynamic
MED
High file entropy (encrypted/compressed payload)
MITRE T1027
entropy 7.49 threshold 7.20, maximum 8.00
static
MED
TLS callback (pre-main execution)
MITRE T1055
pe_header IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS present callbacks run before the entry point
static
Withheld: 3 rules fired and were not reported above

These rules matched this sample, and they also match this much of known-clean software (measured over 1145 signed Windows and third-party binaries). A rule that fires on most clean files cannot move a verdict, so it is held back unless the detonation confirms the behaviour. They are listed because a count that shrinks without saying so is not a count an analyst can check.

Dynamic API resolution (obfuscation) fires on 65% of benign software
Resolves APIs dynamically (LoadLibrary + GetProcAddress) fires on 49% of benign software
Reads its own startup info (parent/desktop check) fires on 36% of benign software

What the tests returned

5 tests

Each test this run performed and what it returned. A test that was not performed says so rather than reading as a negative result.

TestResult
Persistence mechanismsnone established at runtime
Payloads written to disknone observed
Network connectionsnot tested - this run had no route out, so an empty network section is a property of the run and not an observation about the sample
Behavioural rule matches (Sigma)none observed
Local anti-virus enginereported no detection

Absence of an observation is not proof of absence - see Coverage for what this run could and could not test.

Arguing against malice

  • The local anti-virus engine reported no detection.

How much weight this carries

Confirmed. Independent external evidence, or the same behaviour seen by more than one analysis layer. The one fact that decided it: a known-malicious hash feed matched.

Instrument coverage

3 of 5 measured

What this run was able to observe, as the run itself recorded it. A layer that did not run makes an empty result a fact about the sandbox rather than about the sample.

LayerRanWhat that means
Runtime anti-analysis watch measured Measured. The in-process hook group for debugger, timing and hypervisor checks armed on this run, so an empty signal list means something looked and saw nothing.
API call sequence measured Measured for the hooked anti-analysis calls. It is not a full API trace: the sequence carries interpreter spawns plus the hooked anti-analysis calls, and nothing else.
Explicit module loads measured Measured, with two limits. Only a module the sample asks for by hand is recorded, so one brought in by its own import table never appears, and the hooks arrive a few seconds after a process starts.
Network capture not on this plan Not included on this scan's plan.
Memory capture not measured Not measured. This run did not ask for the memory-dump option and nothing forced it, so the guest's memory was not read.
Live kernel introspection not measured Not measured. This run did not ask for the memory-dump option, which is what starts the introspection loop.

This lists the layers this run recorded for itself. A layer that is not listed was not recorded either way, so its absence here is not a result.

Structure

What the file is made of: headers, imports, how it was built and whether it was signed.

Signature
MinGW
Not packed Unsigned
CompilerMinGW
Identity
File
typeexecutable
size102.0 KB
file arch64-bit (x64)
subsystemGUI
entropy7.4868
date2023-09-19 02:30:08 UTC
languageEN

Antivirus engine

no signature matched signature set 28169 - 3.6M signatures

Nothing in the signature set below matched this file. That is one engine's negative answer against one signature set on one day, and it is not a verdict. A signature engine only recognises what has already been named and published, so a file nobody has named yet scans exactly like a file that is harmless. What this file does when it runs is the stronger evidence; read the behaviour sections for that.

Signature setValue
Set version28169
Signatures in the set3,642,948
Set published30 Oct 2026 06:26 +0000
Age when this file was scannedsame day

A negative answer is only as good as the signature set that gave it, so the set is recorded with the result and the result can be reproduced against it.

Local ML assessment

0.0 of 100 8 strongest of 2568 features

A gradient-boosted model running entirely on this host scored this file 0.0 of 100 on structure alone: its headers, sections, imports, strings and signature. The file was not executed and nothing about it left this machine.

Read this as corroboration and not as a verdict. Measured across this corpus the model separates signed software from unsigned software more sharply than malicious from benign, so it is charged at most 15 of 100 verdict points and only on top of evidence this report measured for itself. The eight features below are the ones that moved it furthest.

Structural featureWhat it meansPushesWeight
feature column 407 Local byte randomness in one part of the file towards benign -0.9333
feature column 327 Local byte randomness in one part of the file towards benign -0.8577
parser warning: Suspicious flags set for section... Header defect reported by the parse: Suspicious flags set for section... (0) towards benign -0.5688
optional.minor_linker_version Version of the linker that produced the file (minor) (0) towards benign -0.4867
resource directory size Size of the resource table (88888) towards benign -0.4450
feature column 618 Randomness of the characters in the file's text towards malicious +0.4055
image flag dll Image flag: a library rather than a program towards malicious +0.3918
export directory size Size of the export table towards malicious +0.3300

A weight is a log-odds nudge away from the model's own baseline, not a percentage point. Where a feature names a section, an import or a build id, the number beside it is the model's own hashed cell for that name rather than a measurement of the file: two names can share one cell and the sign comes from the hash, so no number is shown for those rows.

Packing
Not packed
This file's code is readable on disk - nothing is compressed or encrypted around it.
16/100
packer confidence
Static analysis reads this file directly Nothing is hiding the code from a static pass, so what the file contains is what the report shows.
Indicators weighed 2 signals
  • High-entropy resource (possible packed payload)
  • TLS callback present

Family configuration search

Incomplete

1 of this platform's 69 family parsers could not decode this file, and none produced a configuration. A parser that carries no signature of its own is handed every file, and every parser that has ever failed here is one of those, so a failure is usually a decoder meeting a family it was not written for rather than a reading about this sample. Where the two numbers below differ, a signature did match and its decoder then returned nothing. The absence of a configuration is not evidence that none is present.

Parsers available69
Returned a result1
Failed to decode1

Capabilities

2 behaviour buckets
SeverityCapabilityMITREAPIs
med Dynamic API resolution
Resolves APIs at runtime (obfuscation)
T1129 getprocaddress, loadlibraryw
med Evasion / stalling
Sleeps, times, or otherwise stalls analysis
T1497.003 sleep

Security mitigations

partial posture
ON ASLR (DynamicBase)
ON High-entropy ASLR (64-bit)
ON DEP / NX (NxCompat)
OFF Control Flow Guard
? SafeSEH
? Stack cookies (GS)
OFF Force Integrity
OFF AppContainer isolation
OFF Authenticode signed

Build and packaging

6 checks, none matched
CheckResultDetail
PyInstaller bundle not found analyser ran over the bytes, no marker
Nuitka build not found analyser ran over the bytes, no marker
Electron application (asar) not found analyser ran over the bytes, no marker
HTML / SVG smuggling not found analyser ran over the bytes, no marker
Rust / Nim / Zig toolchain not found analyser ran over the bytes, no marker
Visual Basic 6 project not checked this document predates the check
LLM-enabled code not found analyser ran over the bytes, no marker

Sections

7 sections · the file's memory layout
SectionVirtual addrRaw sizeVirtual sizeAccessEntropy
.textEP
Executable code
0x1000
7.5 KB
7.1 KB
EXECUTEREAD
5.7753
.rdata
Read-only data
0x3000
4.5 KB
4.3 KB
READ
4.3507
.buildid
Non-standard section
0x5000
512.0 B
53.0 B
READ
0.5968
.data
Initialised data
0x6000
512.0 B
444.0 B
READWRITE
1.425
.pdata
Exception unwind data
0x7000
512.0 B
396.0 B
READ
3.122
.tls
Thread-local storage
0x8000
512.0 B
16.0 B
READWRITE
0.0
.rsrc
Resources
0x9000
87.0 KB
86.8 KB
READ
7.722
code data imports/exports resources metadata packer non-standard Entropy above 7.0 means compressed or encrypted content.

Imports

59 funcs / 10 DLLs · 3 mapped to a technique
Evasion 4

0 of these functions were seen called at runtime.

Open the imports page

Binary metadata

what the headers declare about this build
Resource langsEN
Debug infoyes
TLS callbacksyes

Code signing

Unsigned

This binary carries no Authenticode signature. Unsigned executables are a weak suspicious signal - most legitimate vendor software is signed.

Capability detection

10 capabilities
CapabilityNamespace
link function at runtime on Windows linking/runtime-linking
delay execution -
change memory protection -
parse PE header load-code/pe
contain loop -
terminate process host-interaction/process/terminate
get OS version -
write file on Windows host-interaction/file-system/write
enumerate PE sections load-code/pe
contain a thread local storage (.tls) section executable/pe/section/tls
ATT&CK techniques
Execution::Shared Modules [T1129]
Malware Behavior Catalog
Anti-Behavioral Analysis::Dynamic Analysis Evasion::Delayed ExecutionDiscovery::Code Discovery::Enumerate PE SectionsFile System::Writes FileMemory::Change Memory ProtectionProcess::Terminate Process

Signature matches

0 findings · 4 file properties · 0 scored
File properties
IsPE64IsWindowsGUIIsPackedHasDebugData

These say what the file IS or holds - bitness, subsystem, an overlay, an embedded macro stream, which compiler built it. Ordinary files match several, and none of them carry weight in the score.

No signature rule identified a threat in this file.

Extracted strings

showing 125
  • !This program cannot be run in DOS mode.$
  • .text
  • `.rdata
  • @.buildid5
  • @.data
  • .pdata
  • @.tls
  • .rsrc
  • VWUS
  • launcher_main_wide
  • Argument domain error (DOMAIN)
  • Argument singularity (SIGN)
  • Overflow range error (OVERFLOW)
  • Partial loss of significance (PLOSS)
  • Total loss of significance (TLOSS)
  • The result is too small to be represented (UNDERFLOW)
  • Unknown error
  • _matherr(): %s in %s(%g, %g) (retval=%g)
  • Unknown pseudo relocation protocol version %d.
  • Unknown pseudo relocation bit size %d.
  • %d bit pseudo relocation at %p out of range, targeting %p, yielding the value %p.
  • Address %p has no image-section
  • VirtualQuery failed for %d bytes at address %p
  • VirtualProtect failed with code 0x%x
  • Mingw-w64 runtime failure:
  • runtime error %d
  • _set_new_mode
  • calloc
  • free
  • malloc
  • __C_specific_handler
  • _cexit
  • _configure_narrow_argv
  • _configure_wide_argv
  • _crt_at_quick_exit
  • _crt_atexit
  • _initialize_narrow_environment
  • _initialize_wide_environment
  • _initterm
  • _set_app_type
  • _set_invalid_parameter_handler
  • abort
  • exit
  • signal
  • __p__commode
  • __stdio_common_vfprintf
  • __stdio_common_vfwprintf
  • __stdio_common_vswprintf
  • fwrite
  • memset
  • strlen
  • strncmp
  • wcslen
  • MessageBoxW
  • DeleteCriticalSection
  • EnterCriticalSection
  • GetLastError
  • GetProcAddress
  • GetStartupInfoW
  • InitializeCriticalSection
  • LeaveCriticalSection
  • LoadLibraryW
  • SetDllDirectoryW
  • SetUnhandledExceptionFilter
  • Sleep
  • TlsGetValue
  • VerSetConditionMask
  • VerifyVersionInfoW
  • VirtualProtect
  • __setusermatherr
  • __p__environ
  • __p__wenviron
  • __timezone
  • __tzname
  • _tzset
  • api-ms-win-crt-heap-l1-1-0.dll
  • api-ms-win-crt-private-l1-1-0.dll
  • api-ms-win-crt-runtime-l1-1-0.dll
  • api-ms-win-crt-stdio-l1-1-0.dll
  • api-ms-win-crt-string-l1-1-0.dll
  • USER32.dll
  • KERNEL32.dll
  • api-ms-win-crt-math-l1-1-0.dll
  • api-ms-win-crt-environment-l1-1-0.dll
  • api-ms-win-crt-time-l1-1-0.dll
  • IDATx
  • SBo&l
  • oMJN
  • hdn>"o
  • FOki<
  • tc/z%Is.ja;
  • COqf)
  • erLT
  • .pZ?g
  • .sYE
  • .BRq
  • MEOw
  • LERe
  • prrBeu
  • ahiA^
  • c:ouS
  • traJ
  • `secC
  • znco#
  • Vlst
  • ]OEsg
  • CSss
  • Tmims
  • //+ljqrzo
  • Jntz
  • gnd*x9
  • Ssnl
  • IDATm
  • l".EA-
  • Arb4df
  • l#LGK%
  • IEND
  • ofpz
  • //38
  • //^I
  • windows
  • This program requires Windows Vista or greater to run.
  • Version Not Supported
  • %ls\lib\py3-%ls-%ls
  • librenpython.dll

Stack and decoded strings were not recovered: no reason was recorded. Only literal strings present in the file are listed above.

Disassembly

entry point · x64 · 60 insns (listing capped)
AddressBytesMnemonicOperands
0x1400011404883ec28subrsp, 0x28
0x140001144488b05d51e0000movrax, qword ptr [rip + 0x1ed5]
0x14000114bc70001000000movdword ptr [rax], 1
0x140001151e80a000000call0x140001160
0x14000115690nop
0x14000115790nop
0x14000115890nop
0x1400011594883c428addrsp, 0x28
0x14000115dc3ret
0x14000115e6690nop
0x1400011604157pushr15
0x1400011624156pushr14
0x14000116456pushrsi
0x14000116557pushrdi
0x14000116653pushrbx
0x1400011674881ec90000000subrsp, 0x90
0x14000116e0f57c0xorpsxmm0, xmm0
0x1400011710f29442470movapsxmmword ptr [rsp + 0x70], xmm0
0x1400011760f29442460movapsxmmword ptr [rsp + 0x60], xmm0
0x14000117b0f29442450movapsxmmword ptr [rsp + 0x50], xmm0
0x1400011800f29442440movapsxmmword ptr [rsp + 0x40], xmm0
0x1400011850f29442430movapsxmmword ptr [rsp + 0x30], xmm0
0x14000118a0f29442420movapsxmmword ptr [rsp + 0x20], xmm0
0x14000118f48c784248000000000000000movqword ptr [rsp + 0x80], 0
0x14000119b4c8b357e1e0000movr14, qword ptr [rip + 0x1e7e]
0x1400011a241833e00cmpdword ptr [r14], 0
0x1400011a6740bje0x1400011b3
0x1400011a8488d4c2420learcx, [rsp + 0x20]
0x1400011adff152d280000callqword ptr [rip + 0x282d]
0x1400011b365488b042530000000movrax, qword ptr gs:[0x30]
0x1400011bc488b7008movrsi, qword ptr [rax + 8]
0x1400011c04c8b3d811e0000movr15, qword ptr [rip + 0x1e81]
0x1400011c731c0xoreax, eax
0x1400011c9f0490fb137lock cmpxchgqword ptr [r15], rsi
0x1400011ce0f94c3setebl
0x1400011d17425je0x1400011f8
0x1400011d34839c6cmprsi, rax
0x1400011d67420je0x1400011f8
0x1400011d8488b3d31280000movrdi, qword ptr [rip + 0x2831]
0x1400011df90nop
0x1400011e0b9e8030000movecx, 0x3e8
0x1400011e5ffd7callrdi
0x1400011e731c0xoreax, eax
0x1400011e9f0490fb137lock cmpxchgqword ptr [r15], rsi
0x1400011ee0f94c3setebl
0x1400011f17405je0x1400011f8
0x1400011f34839c6cmprsi, rax
0x1400011f675e8jne0x1400011e0
0x1400011f8488b35511e0000movrsi, qword ptr [rip + 0x1e51]
0x1400011ff8b06moveax, dword ptr [rsi]
0x14000120183f801cmpeax, 1
0x140001204750cjne0x140001212
0x140001206b91f000000movecx, 0x1f
0x14000120be8000f0000call0x140002110
0x140001210eb27jmp0x140001239
0x140001212833e00cmpdword ptr [rsi], 0
0x1400012157409je0x140001220
0x140001217c605e24e000001movbyte ptr [rip + 0x4ee2], 1
0x14000121eeb19jmp0x140001239
0x140001220c70601000000movdword ptr [rsi], 1
callbranchretstackarithregisterimmediatememory

Import fingerprint

no related sample
Fingerprint24:8MI0d6bi690h29H05D4Tg94upAbKaihfHRtBy7JYDMLSYSySPyjyKwhtewAfjcDZ:Cjwhk1YwLSYSV0tge3fxcRYBITd
Imports read59 functions from 10 libraries (59 distinct)
Comparableyes
Compared against171 stored samples
Samples built on the same import table

No stored sample you can see shares this import table.

Screen recording

31 frames · screen recording · 141s
Screen recording frame
1 / 31
0:00 · 1/31
Download this recording Download video (.mp4) Download GIF (.gif) Building the file runs an encode on this platform, so it is kept to signed-in accounts. Signing in brings you back to this report.

Behavior summary

ran 141s

2 process(es) observed

LaunchedC:\Users\user\Desktop\Setup.exe
Privilegestandard
Telemetry sources: Kernel ETW (196 of 620 events) Process audit: 2keydiff: 2In-process monitor: 6Autostart diff: 43

Evasion / anti-analysis checks

2 checks
MED
Dynamic Analysis Evasion::Delayed Execution Capability taxonomy
MITRE T1497 · Anti-Behavioral Analysis
MED
Anti-debug check dynamic
MITRE T1622 · anti_debug

monitor intact 90 monitor trampolines on 2 pages were watched from the shipper thread and none was overwritten; the ETW and AMSI stubs kept their bytes. Measured, not assumed.

Statically visible checks (RDTSC/CPUID/red-pill instructions, anti-debug APIs) plus runtime evasion signals. Instruction-level interception at runtime requires hypervisor introspection (VMI).

Anti-analysis API trace

2 APIs · 1 process hooked

Calls counted inside the running sample by in-process hooks. Scored means the call crossed the threshold that separates a deliberate check from what ordinary software does; a call that scored nothing is still listed, with the reason.

APISignalCallsSleepScored
GetTickCount timing 1 - no corroborates, never convicts on its own - ordinary software calls this
NtQueryInformationProcess anti_debug 1 - yes
Call order 2 events sampled
NtQueryInformationProcessGetTickCount

How to read the numbers: a repeated call is sampled at 1, 10, 100 and so on while the run is live and made exact when the process exits, so a count is a floor and not a total. The count kept for a name is the highest a single process reported, not a sum across the process tree. The hooks are placed a few seconds after a process starts, so a check made in the first moments of a launch is missed - and a sample that exits in those first seconds is never watched at all.

Kernel audit

3 rows

Recorded by the kernel's own object-access audit and thread trace, so a direct syscall or an unhooked ntdll does not hide it. Every row is the sample tree reaching into another process, placing a thread, or declaring a parent it did not have.

Cross-process handles and controls (3)

CallerDidTargetRightsStatus
pid 4416 opened a handle to process pid 3420 0x1fffff write / thread rights 0x0
pid 4416 opened a handle to process pid 3420 0x1fffff thread write / thread rights 0x0
pid 4416 opened a handle to powershell.exe pid 4460 outside the sample tree 0x410 query only 0xc0000022

No .NET load worth listing. 25 loader events were seen and none belonged to the sample tree (24 from the agent, 1 from other processes), so no assembly came from memory on this run as far as the loader trace saw.

Module loads

1 notable

Modules the sample asked for by name while it ran, recorded inside its own process. Loads from system and installed-program directories are counted but not listed - what is listed is a module from somewhere else, a load that failed, or one whose loader is the question.

ProcessModuleLoadedWhy listed
Setup.exe 3420 librenpython.dll no the load failed

What this list cannot say: only an explicit LoadLibrary call is recorded, so a module the sample brought in through its own import table never appears here - absence from this list is not absence from the process. There is no signature check behind these rows, so an unlisted module is not a module that was verified. The hooks are placed a few seconds after a process starts, so the first loads of a launch are missed.

No WMI attributed to the sample. The WMI-Activity trace was running and recorded 932 operations on the machine during the run; none of them came from the sample's process tree.

Cross-process injection

2 calls

Seen from inside the calling process, so it names which process reached into which - something a dump of the result cannot show. Only calls whose target is another process are listed.

open_process pid 4416 → pid 3420
access 0x1fffff
open_thread pid 4416 → pid 3420
access 0x1fffff

Command lines, unwrapped

2 read

2 captured texts were read and unwrapped locally. No address was recovered from any of them, and none of them was hiding its own contents behind an encoding or a format string. This is a result, not a gap.

Network activity

The network section is a paid-plan layer: the DNS the sample resolved, the connections it opened, the TLS it negotiated, and the rule engine's reading of the capture.

This run was captured, and what it captured is on a paid plan rather than absent. An internet-connected detonation is the same plan, so a paid run also shows what the sample reached rather than only what it tried.

See plans Create an account

Process tree

What ran during the detonation, and what each process did. Select a node to see the activity attributed to it.

2processes
2registry operations

Setup.exe

2 processes
2 processes

Attributed activity

Not attributed to any process

1 kind

These operations were captured but carry no pid this tree could match, so they are not shown against any node above.

Registry operations45
0Mechanisms found
90Methods checked
0ATT&CK techniques
NONEHighest severity

Persistence mechanisms

clean

No persistence established

None of the 90 auto-start methods below were established during this run.

Detection coverage

0 / 90

Every auto-start method checked on this sample, grouped by family. A method with no result is reported clean, and one the sample only names in its own strings reads "named" rather than "detected".

Logon & Startup 22 clean
  • Active Setup Installed Component T1547.014 clean
  • Explorer Delay-Load Object T1547.001 clean
  • Explorer Run Key T1547.001 clean
  • Explorer SharedTaskScheduler T1547.001 clean
  • Group Policy Extension DLL T1547.004 clean
  • Group Policy Run Key T1547.001 clean
  • Logon Script T1037.001 clean
  • RDP WDS Startup Program T1547.001 clean
  • Registry Run Key T1547.001 clean
  • Registry RunEx Key T1547.001 clean
  • Registry RunOnce Key T1547.001 clean
  • Registry RunOnceEx Key T1547.001 clean
  • Registry RunServices Key T1547.001 clean
  • Startup Folder Item T1547.001 clean
  • Startup Folder Redirection T1547.001 clean
  • Terminal Services Initial Program T1547.001 clean
  • Winlogon GINA DLL T1547.004 clean
  • Winlogon MPNotify Value T1547.004 clean
  • Winlogon Notify Package T1547.004 clean
  • Winlogon Shell Value T1547.004 clean
  • Winlogon Taskman Value T1547.004 clean
  • Winlogon Userinit Value T1547.004 clean
Services & Tasks 9 clean
  • BITS Job T1197 clean
  • Print Monitor DLL T1547.010 clean
  • Print Processor DLL T1547.012 clean
  • Scheduled Task T1053.005 clean
  • Scheduled Task Registry Implant T1053.005 clean
  • Service Control Manager Security Descriptor T1574.011 clean
  • Service DLL Hijack T1543.003 clean
  • Time Provider DLL T1547.003 clean
  • Windows Service Creation T1543.003 clean
Execution Hijack 17 clean
  • .NET Managed Debugger T1546.012 clean
  • Accessibility Tool Hijack T1546.008 clean
  • AeDebug Postmortem Debugger T1546.012 clean
  • App Paths Hijack T1546.012 clean
  • Application Shim Database T1546.011 clean
  • Boot Verification Program T1547.002 clean
  • Command Processor AutoRun T1546.011 clean
  • Explorer Load Value T1547.001 clean
  • Explorer MyComputer Tool Hijack T1546.001 clean
  • Registry Image File Execution Options T1546.012 clean
  • Screensaver Hijack T1546.002 clean
  • Setup ErrorHandler Script T1546 clean
  • Shell Open Command Hijack T1546.001 clean
  • SilentProcessExit Monitor T1546.012 clean
  • Telemetry Controller Command T1546.015 clean
  • WER ReflectDebugger T1546.012 clean
  • Windows Error Reporting Debugger T1546.012 clean
DLL Load Order 12 clean
  • .NET CLR Profiler DLL T1574.012 clean
  • .NET Startup Hook DLL T1574 clean
  • AppCert DLLs T1546.009 clean
  • AppInit DLLs T1546.010 clean
  • AutodialDLL Winsock Injection T1546.006 clean
  • DLL Search-Order Hijack T1574.001 T1574.002 clean
  • DNS Server Plugin DLL T1574.001 clean
  • HTML Help Helper DLL T1546 clean
  • KnownDLLs Manipulation T1574.001 clean
  • Natural Language Platform DLL Override T1546 clean
  • Netsh Helper DLL T1546.007 clean
  • Winsock Layered Service Provider T1546.006 clean
COM & Browser 6 clean
  • Browser Extension T1176 clean
  • Browser Helper Object T1176 clean
  • COM Server Hijack T1546.015 clean
  • HTML Help COM Object Hijack T1546.015 clean
  • Shell Context Menu Handler T1546.001 clean
  • Shell Extension Handler T1546.001 clean
Security Providers & Accounts 11 clean
  • Account RID Hijack T1098 clean
  • AMSI Provider T1562.001 clean
  • Credential Provider T1547.014 clean
  • DSRM Admin Logon Backdoor T1556 clean
  • Hidden Local Account T1136.001 clean
  • LSA Authentication Package T1547.002 clean
  • LSA Extension DLL T1547.005 clean
  • LSA Notification Package T1547.005 clean
  • LSA Security Package T1547.005 clean
  • Network Provider DLL T1556.008 clean
  • Security Support Provider T1547.005 clean
Scripting & Applications 9 clean
  • Netsh Port Proxy T1090.001 clean
  • Office Add-in T1137.006 clean
  • Office Executable Sideload T1574.002 clean
  • Office Startup Template T1137.001 clean
  • Office Test Key T1137.002 clean
  • Power Automate Flow T1546 clean
  • PowerShell Profile T1546.013 clean
  • Windows Terminal Startup Action T1546 clean
  • WMI Event Subscription T1546.003 clean
Boot & Firmware 4 clean
  • BootExecute Native Image T1547.002 clean
  • PlatformExecute Native Image T1547.002 clean
  • SetupExecute Native Image T1547.002 clean
  • UEFI / Bootkit Artifact T1542.003 T1542.001 clean

File activity summary

create 0 write 0 modify 0 delete 0 rename 0

Dropped payload analysis

not observed

No payload write was recorded and no capture ran on this run, so nothing here is a measurement about dropped files either way.

File & registry ops

0 file · 4 registry · sample scope
OperationTargetProcess
create
Software\Microsoft\WindowsSelfhost\FIDs
kernel trace
WerFault.exe pid 4416
create
Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Flighting\Build
kernel trace
WerFault.exe pid 4416
setvalue
System\CurrentControlSet\Services\PptpMiniport
DriverMajorVersion = 1
autostart diffautostart diff
-
setvalue
System\CurrentControlSet\Services\RasPppoe
DriverMinorVersion = 0
autostart diffautostart diff
-
setvalue
System\CurrentControlSet\Services\wanarp
Start = 2
autostart diffautostart diff
-
setvalue
System\CurrentControlSet\Services\ndproxy
DriverMinorVersion = 0
autostart diffautostart diff
-
setvalue
System\CurrentControlSet\Services\wanarpv6
NdisMajorVersion = 6
autostart diffautostart diff
-
setvalue
System\CurrentControlSet\Services\RasAgileVpn
NdisMinorVersion = 30
autostart diffautostart diff
-
setvalue
System\CurrentControlSet\Services\wanarpv6
DriverMajorVersion = 0
autostart diffautostart diff
-
setvalue
System\CurrentControlSet\Services\NdisWan
DriverMinorVersion = 1
autostart diffautostart diff
-
setvalue
System\CurrentControlSet\Services\PptpMiniport
NdisMajorVersion = 6
autostart diffautostart diff
-
setvalue
System\CurrentControlSet\Services\RasPppoe
NdisMajorVersion = 6
autostart diffautostart diff
-
setvalue
System\CurrentControlSet\Services\Rasl2tp
DriverMajorVersion = 1
autostart diffautostart diff
-
setvalue
System\CurrentControlSet\Services\wanarpv6
NdisMinorVersion = 84
autostart diffautostart diff
-
setvalue
System\CurrentControlSet\Services\ndproxy
NdisMinorVersion = 30
autostart diffautostart diff
-
setvalue
System\CurrentControlSet\Services\NdisWan
NdisMajorVersion = 6
autostart diffautostart diff
-
setvalue
System\CurrentControlSet\Services\wanarp
NdisMajorVersion = 6
autostart diffautostart diff
-
setvalue
System\CurrentControlSet\Services\RasSstp
DriverMinorVersion = 0
autostart diffautostart diff
-
setvalue
System\CurrentControlSet\Services\ndiswanlegacy
NdisMajorVersion = 5
autostart diffautostart diff
-
setvalue
System\CurrentControlSet\Services\ndiswanlegacy
NdisMinorVersion = 0
autostart diffautostart diff
-
setvalue
System\CurrentControlSet\Services\wanarp
DriverMajorVersion = 0
autostart diffautostart diff
-
setvalue
System\CurrentControlSet\Services\NdisWan
DriverMajorVersion = 1
autostart diffautostart diff
-
setvalue
System\CurrentControlSet\Services\RasAgileVpn
NdisMajorVersion = 6
autostart diffautostart diff
-
setvalue
System\CurrentControlSet\Services\PptpMiniport
NdisMinorVersion = 30
autostart diffautostart diff
-
setvalue
System\CurrentControlSet\Services\BITS
Start = 2
autostart diffautostart diff
-
setvalue
System\CurrentControlSet\Services\NdisWan
NdisMinorVersion = 30
autostart diffautostart diff
-
setvalue
System\CurrentControlSet\Services\wanarpv6
DriverMinorVersion = 0
autostart diffautostart diff
-
setvalue
System\CurrentControlSet\Services\wanarp
NdisMinorVersion = 84
autostart diffautostart diff
-
setvalue
System\CurrentControlSet\Services\RasPppoe
NdisMinorVersion = 30
autostart diffautostart diff
-
setvalue
System\CurrentControlSet\Services\RasAgileVpn
DriverMajorVersion = 1
autostart diffautostart diff
-
setvalue
System\CurrentControlSet\Services\Rasl2tp
NdisMajorVersion = 6
autostart diffautostart diff
-
setvalue
System\CurrentControlSet\Services\RasSstp
NdisMajorVersion = 6
autostart diffautostart diff
-
setvalue
System\CurrentControlSet\Services\RasAgileVpn
DriverMinorVersion = 0
autostart diffautostart diff
-
setvalue
System\CurrentControlSet\Services\Rasl2tp
DriverMinorVersion = 0
autostart diffautostart diff
-
setvalue
System\CurrentControlSet\Services\RasMan\Parameters
MiniportsInstalled = 65535
autostart diffautostart diff
-
setvalue
System\CurrentControlSet\Services\RasMan
Start = 2
autostart diffautostart diff
-
setvalue
System\CurrentControlSet\Services\Rasl2tp
NdisMinorVersion = 30
autostart diffautostart diff
-
setvalue
System\CurrentControlSet\Services\RasSstp
DriverMajorVersion = 1
autostart diffautostart diff
-
setvalue
System\CurrentControlSet\Services\RasPppoe
DriverMajorVersion = 1
autostart diffautostart diff
-
setvalue
System\CurrentControlSet\Services\wanarp
DriverMinorVersion = 0
autostart diffautostart diff
-
setvalue
System\CurrentControlSet\Services\RasMan
DelayedAutostart = 0
autostart diffautostart diff
-
setvalue
System\CurrentControlSet\Services\PptpMiniport
DriverMinorVersion = 0
autostart diffautostart diff
-
setvalue
System\CurrentControlSet\Services\RasSstp
NdisMinorVersion = 30
autostart diffautostart diff
-
setvalue
System\CurrentControlSet\Services\ndproxy
DriverMajorVersion = 1
autostart diffautostart diff
-
setvalue
System\CurrentControlSet\Services\ndproxy
NdisMajorVersion = 6
autostart diffautostart diff
-
setvalue
Software\Microsoft\WindowsSelfhost\FIDs
AllFlights = FX:124117A5,FX:124B38D0,FX:127FC878,FX:1283FFE8,FX:12840617,FX:128979F9,FX:129135BB,FX:129E053F,FX:12A74DB5,FX:12B8450E,FX:12BD6E73,FX:12C3331B,FX:12C7D66E,FX:12D1574C,FX:12D281C4,FX:12E8312D,FX:12EC0B54,FX:12F0AC91,FX:12FF5D3C,FX:13083122,FX:13143E2F,FX:1318CA30,FX:1318CAEE,FX:1318CAEF,FX:1318CBED,
read backread back
-
setvalue
Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Flighting\Build
OSVersion = 10.0.19045.2965
read backread back
-

External reputation was not produced for this scan. Threat intelligence enrichment is a paid-plan layer: every extracted indicator - hashes, addresses, hostnames - is checked against the external reputation services. Our own ingested feeds ran on this scan and every result below is theirs. Adding the paid layer adds an external reputation verdict on each indicator, so MalwareBazaar and filescan.io are listed below as not checked. See plans.

Earlier analysis of these bytes

5 earlier runs

Earlier analyses of the identical file, matched by SHA-256. Same bytes, same questions - what this platform found the last time it looked is evidence about the file in front of you now.

RunAnalysedModuleVerdictScore
#3066 2026-10-30 18:01 File Analysis Malicious100 100/100
#2890 2026-10-22 14:09 File Analysis Malicious100 100/100
#2889 2026-10-22 14:06 File Analysis Malicious100 100/100
#2649 2026-10-05 19:04 File Analysis Malicious100 100/100
#2406 2026-09-11 03:58 File Analysis Malicious100 100/100
1 reported a hit 9 answered no 12 had nothing to check
1Sources with a hit
10Sources queriedof 22 available
468.7kFeed records
0Could not answer

File reputation

1 of 6 listed
SourceChecksResultDetailFeed
ThreatFox hash IOCs File hash listed threatfox: ACR Stealer 1,261 records
31 minutes ago
MalwareBazaar hash feed File hash clean not in feed 6,171 records
31 minutes ago
MalwareBazaar ransomware feed File hash clean not in feed 3,348 records
3 hours ago
URLhaus payload hashes File hash clean not in feed 1,398 records
31 minutes ago
filescan.io File hash not checked no hash lookup ran for this scan live lookup
MalwareBazaar File hash not checked no hash lookup ran for this scan live lookup

Hash lookups only - the sample itself is never uploaded to any third party.

Network indicators

nothing of this kind to check
SourceChecksResultDetailFeed
blocklist.de IP / domain / URL not checked no IP, domain or URL observed to check 24.2k records
31 minutes ago
CINS Army IP / domain / URL not checked no IP, domain or URL observed to check 15k records
31 minutes ago
Emerging Threats IP / domain / URL not checked no IP, domain or URL observed to check 511 records
31 minutes ago
Feodo Tracker IP / domain / URL not checked no IP, domain or URL observed to check 5 records
31 minutes ago
IPsum IP / domain / URL not checked no IP, domain or URL observed to check 17.7k records
31 minutes ago
Phishing.Database IP / domain / URL not checked no IP, domain or URL observed to check 391.5k records
3 hours ago
ThreatFox IP / domain / URL not checked no IP, domain or URL observed to check 1,261 records
31 minutes ago
URLhaus IP / domain / URL not checked no IP, domain or URL observed to check 297 records
31 minutes ago

TLS fingerprints

nothing of this kind to check
SourceChecksResultDetailFeed
JA3 / JA4 fingerprint blocklists JA3 / JA4 not checked no TLS client fingerprint observed 97 records
21 hours ago
SSL blocklist Server certificate not checked no server certificate fingerprint is extracted to check live lookup

Detection rules

2 clear
SourceChecksResultDetailFeed
Sigma rules Behavior log clean - 2,275 records
17 hours ago
Signature rules Sample content clean 4 structural rules matched (file properties, not findings) 110 records
32 minutes ago

Tooling catalogs

4 clear
SourceChecksResultDetailFeed
LOLBAS Process image paths clean 2 process image paths, none masqueraded 245 records
32 minutes ago
LOLBootloaders File hash clean not a known vulnerable bootloader 520 records
31 minutes ago
LOLDrivers File hash clean not a known vulnerable driver 2,346 records
32 minutes ago
LOLRMM Names and domains clean 3 name/domain indicators checked, no remote-management tooling 358 records
31 minutes ago

AI analysis

The AI layer is a paid-plan feature. It reads what the other layers produced - the behaviour summary, the call sequence, the indicator list - and writes the narrative and the kill-chain walkthrough.

Nothing is being withheld. This layer did not run for this scan, so there is no result stored behind the lock.

See plans Create an account

3 malicious 0 suspicious 0 info

File indicators

3
SeverityTypeIndicatorDescription
malicious sample_sha256 7123e1514b939b165985560057fe3c761440a9fff9783a3b84e861fd2888d4ab Submitted sample (SHA256)
malicious sample_md5 0323998e0e85eca5fd90d9f8ecbbd6c2 Submitted sample (MD5)
malicious imphash a9563ca2ee659a9314820bead4ec962b Import table hash (imphash)

Sigma detections

0 matches of 2275 rules

The Sigma corpus was evaluated against this run's processes, registry, file, network, DNS and script activity. Nothing matched.

Generated rules

Sigma: auto_file_3067_sigma_reg

Auto-generated
title: Auto-generated registry behavior rule (sandbox scan 3067)
id: sandbox-auto-3067-reg
status: experimental
description: Auto-generated from sandbox scan 3067
logsource:
    category: registry_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains:
            - 'Software\Microsoft\WindowsSelfhost\FIDs'
            - 'Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Flighting\Build'
    condition: selection
level: medium

YARA: auto_file_3067_yara

Auto-generated
rule auto_file_3067_yara
{
    meta:
        description = "Auto-generated from scan 3067"
        author = "sandbox auto-generator"
        imphash = "a9563ca2ee659a9314820bead4ec962b"
        anchors = "5 independent regions"
    strings:
        $s0 = "librenpython.dll" wide fullword
        $s1 = "%ls\\lib\\py3-%ls-%ls" wide fullword
        $s2 = "tc/z%Is.ja;" ascii fullword
        $s3 = "//+ljqrzo" ascii fullword
        $s4 = "Mingw-w64 runtime failure:" ascii fullword
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and filesize < 417792 and all of them
}

Extracted files

What came out of the sample: unpacked payloads, carved objects and captured memory. Each one is stored by content hash, so the same object extracted twice is the same row.

No extracted files

Nothing was unpacked or carved out of this sample. Packed samples, documents with embedded objects and installers are the ones that usually produce artifacts here.

Export & download

/s/3067

Structured exports for your SIEM/TIP - ATT&CK Navigator layer, STIX 2.1 bundle, MISP event and a defanged IOC list - are free on every report. The packet capture follows this scan's plan, because a capture is the rawest network output this platform produces.

Analysis report

PDF and DOCX reports are available to signed-in accounts on every plan, free included. Sign in to generate one.

Public analyses of this file

6 runs

This file has been analysed more than once. The report below is the run that found the most, which is not always the most recent one.

SubmittedEnvironmentVerdictScore
2026-10-30 17:58 Shown below Windows 10 22H2 Malicious 100/100
2026-10-30 17:58 Windows 10 22H2 Malicious 100/100
2026-10-22 14:07 Windows 10 22H2 Malicious 100/100
2026-10-22 14:03 Windows 10 22H2 Malicious 100/100
2026-10-05 19:01 Windows 10 22H2 Malicious 100/100
2026-09-11 03:56 Windows 10 22H2 Malicious 100/100