Malwagon
file icon
procexp64.exe File Analysis · first seen Oct 14, 2026 01:05 · 2.3 MB
1proc 3IOCs
Nothing conclusive7 Completed Public
Get sample Report Sign in

procexp64.exePE analysis report - Nothing conclusive

Run integrity

sample ran

The guest staged the sample and launched it, so what follows describes this file rather than an empty desktop.

46.5sto launch
3telemetry events
2observed
60agent notes

Nothing conclusive

7/100

28 points short of the suspicious line at 35.

Clean0-34 Suspicious35-69 Malicious70-100

Why this verdict

+62
Static analysis
  • 2 high-risk capability(ies): sandbox evasion, token manipulation
  • 2 suspicious signature match(es)
  • Anti-debug API name(s) IsDebuggerPresent, NtQueryInformationProcess: ONE observation read by two static sources, not two findings - signature Suspicious_Anti_Debug_API matched them in the file and the Anti-debugging capability bucket read the same names from the import table; both charges kept. OutputDebugString matched in the file only.
  • 5 high-risk capability bucket(s): Privilege escalation, Anti-debugging, Ransomware behaviour, Anti-VM / anti-sandbox
  • Malicious strings: injection / execution, exfiltration / C2
+0
Persistence
  • 5 persistence mechanism(s): AppCert DLLs, AppInit DLLs, BootExecute Native Image
  • 15 point(s) are not charged here: AppCert DLLs, AppInit DLLs, BootExecute Native Image are named in this file's strings and not established at run time, so the reference is published and not scored.
-55
Code signing
  • Valid code signature (Microsoft Corporation) - trusted provenance; heuristic score discounted below malicious (no definitive malicious evidence)

Model reading

Measured CLEAN7 of 100

Evidence ledger above, row by row. Published verdict rests on this column and on nothing to its right.

Model reads it asadvisory, no points NOT ASSESSEDnot shown on this page

Reads this report's derived findings, never the sample itself.

A model reading exists for this scan and is shown to the submitter and to staff only. It is a second opinion about evidence the score already priced, it is worth no points, and on a public page it would stand beside the verdict with no grounding a stranger could check.

Other high-severity findings
  • HIGH Credential-access capability
  • HIGH Injection/execution API strings
  • HIGH Keylogging capability
  • HIGH LSA secrets access (LsaRetrievePrivateData/LsaOpenPolicy)

Analysis layers

Static ran moved the score
Dynamic ran no points
Threat intel local feeds only no points
AI not included

Sample

TypeFile
MIMEapplication/vnd.microsoft.portable-executable

Run conditions

Sandbox OSWindows 10
EnvironmentWorkgroup
InternetIsolated
Execution136s
Guest hardware2 vCPU4095 MB RAM
TimezoneGMT Standard Time
Localeen-GB

Detection signatures

66 detected · 14 withheld as common
Severity Detection Evidence Layer
HIGH
Creates/duplicates a token (privilege manipulation)
MITRE T1134.002
import advapi32.dll!DuplicateTokenEx requires duplicatetokenex
import advapi32.dll!CreateProcessAsUserW requires createprocessasuser
static
HIGH
Credential-access capability
MITRE T1003
capability lsaopenpolicy capability: credential_access
static
HIGH
Injection/execution API strings
MITRE T1055
string setwindowshookex matched string
static
HIGH
Keylogging capability
MITRE T1056.001
capability getkeystate capability: keylogging
static
HIGH
LSA secrets access (LsaRetrievePrivateData/LsaOpenPolicy)
MITRE T1003.004
import advapi32.dll!LsaOpenPolicy
static
HIGH
Loads a kernel driver (NtLoadDriver)
MITRE T1014
import ntdll.dll!NtLoadDriver
static
HIGH
Opens processes with full access (LSASS dumping pattern)
MITRE T1003.001
import kernel32.dll!OpenProcess requires openprocess
import kernel32.dll!ReadProcessMemory requires readprocessmemory
static
HIGH
Reads another process's memory (credential access)
MITRE T1003
import kernel32.dll!ReadProcessMemory
static
MED
Anti-VM / sandbox-detection capability
MITRE T1497
capability getcursorpos capability: anti_vm
capability setupdigetclassdevsw capability: anti_vm
static
MED
Anti-analysis strings present
MITRE T1497
string dbghelp matched string
string isdebuggerpresent matched string
string procexp matched string
static
MED
Anti-debug via NtQueryInformationProcess
MITRE T1622
import ntdll.dll!NtQueryInformationProcess
static
MED
Controls services (start/stop)
MITRE T1543.003
import advapi32.dll!ControlService
static
MED
Creates a suspended process then resumes (hollowing/hijack)
MITRE T1055.012
import advapi32.dll!CreateProcessAsUserW requires createprocess
import ntdll.dll!NtResumeThread requires resumethread
static
MED
Creates/switches a hidden desktop
MITRE T1564.003
string createdesktop found in the sample's strings
static
MED
Elevated re-launch (ShellExecute runas)
MITRE T1548.002
import shell32.dll!ShellExecuteExW requires shellexecute
string runas found in the sample's strings
static
MED
Forces reboot/shutdown (post-impact)
MITRE T1529
import user32.dll!ExitWindowsEx
static
MED
Loads a registry hive (offline persistence)
MITRE T1112
import advapi32.dll!RegLoadKeyW
static
MED
Locks the workstation (locker / impact)
MITRE T1491
import user32.dll!LockWorkStation
static
MED
Network activity via WinHTTP
MITRE T1071.001
import winhttp.dll!WinHttpOpen
static
MED
Opens/suspends remote threads
MITRE T1055
import ntdll.dll!NtOpenThread requires openthread
import ntdll.dll!NtSuspendThread requires suspendthread
static
MED
Persistence-related strings
MITRE T1547
string \currentcontrolset\services\ matched string
string currentversion\runonce matched string
string image file execution options matched string
string software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\run matched string
string userinit matched string
static
MED
Raw socket networking
MITRE T1095
import ws2_32.dll!WSAStartup
static
MED
Scans loaded modules for analysis DLLs
MITRE T1518.001
import kernel32.dll!Module32FirstW
static
MED
Screen capture primitive (BitBlt)
MITRE T1113
import gdi32.dll!BitBlt
static
MED
Surveillance/keylogging strings
MITRE T1056
string bitblt matched string
string getdc matched string
static
MED
Token impersonation
MITRE T1134.001
import advapi32.dll!ImpersonateLoggedOnUser
static
MED
Writes the clipboard (hijack/replace)
MITRE T1115
import user32.dll!SetClipboardData
static
LOW
Adjusts token privileges (SeDebug / escalation)
MITRE T1134
seen in 8% of benign software
import advapi32.dll!AdjustTokenPrivileges
static
LOW
AppCertDlls autostart location named in the file
MITRE T1546.009
import advapi32.dll!RegSetValueExW requires regsetvalue
string appcertdlls found in the sample's strings
static
LOW
AppInit_DLLs autostart location named in the file
MITRE T1546.010
import advapi32.dll!RegSetValueExW requires regsetvalue
string appinit_dlls found in the sample's strings
static
LOW
COM hijack (InprocServer32 write)
MITRE T1546.015
seen in 8% of benign software
import advapi32.dll!RegSetValueExW requires regsetvalue
string inprocserver32 found in the sample's strings
static
LOW
Changes the desktop wallpaper (ransom note)
MITRE T1491
seen in 8% of benign software
import user32.dll!SystemParametersInfoW
static
LOW
Checks for WOW64 (bitness/anti-analysis)
MITRE T1497
seen in 9% of benign software
import kernel32.dll!IsWow64Process
static
LOW
Checks free disk space (sandbox sizing check)
MITRE T1497.001
seen in 6% of benign software
import kernel32.dll!GetDiskFreeSpaceExW
static
LOW
Checks parent process (sandbox parent detection)
MITRE T1497
import kernel32.dll!Process32NextW requires process32next
import kernel32.dll!GetCurrentProcessId requires getcurrentprocessid
static
LOW
Checks system uptime (sandbox age check)
MITRE T1497.001
seen in 12% of benign software
import kernel32.dll!GetTickCount64
static
LOW
Cryptographic capability (packing/ransom)
MITRE T1573
seen in 6% of benign software
capability cryptacquirecontextw capability: crypto
capability crypthashdata capability: crypto
static
LOW
Deletes files/backups (WriteFile + DeleteFile recursion)
MITRE T1485
seen in 14% of benign software
import kernel32.dll!DeleteFileW requires deletefile
import kernel32.dll!FindNextFileW requires findnextfile
static
LOW
Direct memory execution (VirtualProtect + memory copy)
MITRE T1055
seen in 9% of benign software
import kernel32.dll!VirtualProtect requires virtualprotect
import kernel32.dll!VirtualAlloc requires virtualalloc
static
LOW
Driver communication via DeviceIoControl
MITRE T1068
seen in 10% of benign software
import kernel32.dll!DeviceIoControl
static
LOW
Drops + executes from temp (GetTempPath + CreateProcess)
MITRE T1204
seen in 7% of benign software
import kernel32.dll!GetTempPathW requires gettemppath
import advapi32.dll!CreateProcessAsUserW requires createprocess
static
LOW
Duplicates a process handle (handle theft)
MITRE T1134
seen in 10% of benign software
import kernel32.dll!DuplicateHandle
static
LOW
Enumerates running processes
MITRE T1057
import kernel32.dll!CreateToolhelp32Snapshot
static
LOW
Enumerates terminal-server sessions
MITRE T1033
import wtsapi32.dll!WTSEnumerateSessionsW
static
LOW
Enumerates top-level windows (analysis-tool / target recon)
MITRE T1010
import user32.dll!EnumWindows
static
LOW
Enumerates windows (analysis-tool detection)
MITRE T1010
seen in 7% of benign software
import user32.dll!FindWindowExW
static
LOW
Executable heap allocation (GlobalAlloc + VirtualProtect)
MITRE T1055
seen in 6% of benign software
import kernel32.dll!GlobalAlloc requires globalalloc
import kernel32.dll!VirtualProtect requires virtualprotect
static
LOW
Executes via ShellExecute
MITRE T1204
seen in 12% of benign software
import shell32.dll!ShellExecuteExW
static
LOW
Hides its window (ShowWindow SW_HIDE pattern)
MITRE T1564.003
seen in 13% of benign software
import user32.dll!ShowWindow
static
LOW
Hypervisor/CPUID-style environment check
MITRE T1497.001
seen in 7% of benign software
import kernel32.dll!GetNativeSystemInfo
static
LOW
Image File Execution Options location named in the file
MITRE T1546.012
import advapi32.dll!RegSetValueExW requires regsetvalue
string image file execution found in the sample's strings
static
LOW
Installs a Windows hook (keylogging / injection)
MITRE T1056.001
seen in 5% of benign software
import user32.dll!SetWindowsHookExW
static
LOW
LSA notification package location named in the file
MITRE T1547.002
import advapi32.dll!RegSetValueExW requires regsetvalue
string notification packages found in the sample's strings
static
LOW
Network communication capability
MITRE T1071
seen in 6% of benign software
capability connect capability: network
capability recv capability: network
capability send capability: network
capability winhttpconnect capability: network
capability winhttpopen capability: network
capability winhttpsendrequest capability: network
static
LOW
Opens a device via CreateFile (driver/raw IO)
MITRE T1106
seen in 6% of benign software
import kernel32.dll!CreateFileMappingW requires createfile
string \\.\ found in the sample's strings
static
LOW
Print monitor location named in the file
MITRE T1547.010
import advapi32.dll!RegSetValueExW requires regsetvalue
string print\monitors found in the sample's strings
static
LOW
Process-injection capability
MITRE T1055
seen in 5% of benign software
capability getthreadcontext capability: injection
static
LOW
Reads autostart Run keys (persistence recon)
MITRE T1012
import advapi32.dll!RegQueryValueExW requires regqueryvalue
string currentversion\run found in the sample's strings
static
LOW
Reads the machine name (host recon)
MITRE T1082
seen in 8% of benign software
import kernel32.dll!GetComputerNameW
static
LOW
Reflective/manual DLL load pattern
MITRE T1620
seen in 8% of benign software
import kernel32.dll!VirtualAlloc requires virtualalloc
import kernel32.dll!GetProcAddress requires getprocaddress
import kernel32.dll!LoadLibraryExA requires loadlibrary
import kernel32.dll!CreateThread requires createthread
static
LOW
Scans memory layout (VirtualQuery)
MITRE T1055
import kernel32.dll!VirtualQueryEx
static
LOW
Screen-capture capability
MITRE T1113
seen in 8% of benign software
capability bitblt capability: screen_capture
capability createcompatiblebitmap capability: screen_capture
capability getdc capability: screen_capture
capability openclipboard capability: screen_capture
static
LOW
Spawns child processes
MITRE T1106
seen in 16% of benign software
import advapi32.dll!CreateProcessAsUserW
static
LOW
Winlogon Shell/Userinit location named in the file
MITRE T1547.004
import advapi32.dll!RegSetValueExW requires regsetvalue
string currentversion\winlogon found in the sample's strings
static
INFO
Stages in the temp directory (GetTempPath)
MITRE T1074
seen in 15% of benign software
import kernel32.dll!GetTempPathW
static
INFO
TLS callback (pre-main execution)
MITRE T1055
seen in 20% of benign software
pe_header IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS present callbacks run before the entry point
static
Withheld: 14 rules fired and were not reported above

These rules matched this sample, and they also match this much of known-clean software (measured over 1145 signed Windows and third-party binaries). A rule that fires on most clean files cannot move a verdict, so it is held back unless the detonation confirms the behaviour. They are listed because a count that shrinks without saying so is not a count an analyst can check.

Timing-based anti-analysis (QueryPerformanceCounter/rdtsc) fires on 92% of benign software
Anti-debugging capability fires on 65% of benign software
Dynamic API resolution (obfuscation) fires on 65% of benign software
Anti-debug: checks for a debugger fires on 60% of benign software
Resolves APIs dynamically (LoadLibrary + GetProcAddress) fires on 49% of benign software
Anti-debug via OutputDebugString probe fires on 41% of benign software
WMI usage (recon / execution) fires on 40% of benign software
Reads its own startup info (parent/desktop check) fires on 36% of benign software
Executes external code / commands fires on 30% of benign software
Writes to the registry fires on 30% of benign software
Persistence-capable APIs present fires on 29% of benign software
Queries system information (host recon) fires on 25% of benign software
Enumerates registry keys (discovery) fires on 21% of benign software
Enumerates files recursively (staging/collection) fires on 21% of benign software

Persistence

5 mechanisms
LOW
AppCert DLLs static
DLL Load Order · MITRE T1546.009
LOW
AppInit DLLs static
DLL Load Order · MITRE T1546.010
LOW
BootExecute Native Image static
Boot & Firmware · MITRE T1547.002
LOW
Registry Image File Execution Options static
Execution Hijack · MITRE T1546.012
LOW
WMI Event Subscription static
Scripting & Applications · MITRE T1546.003

Auto-start methods established during detonation or referenced statically. The Persistence tab lists these against every method checked.

What the tests returned

8 tests

Each test this run performed and what it returned. A test that was not performed says so rather than reading as a negative result.

TestResult
Persistence mechanismsnone established at runtime
Cross-process injectionnone observed
Payloads written to disknone observed
Network connectionsnot tested - this run had no route out, so an empty network section is a property of the run and not an observation about the sample
Behavioural rule matches (Sigma)none observed
Known-malicious hash (reputation sources)no source reported this file
Local anti-virus enginereported no detection
Anti-analysis / evasion checksnone above the reporting threshold - the anti-analysis calls this run did make are listed with their counts

Absence of an observation is not proof of absence - see Coverage for what this run could and could not test.

Arguing against malice

  • The file carries a code signature (Microsoft Corporation).
  • The local anti-virus engine reported no detection.
  • No reputation source reported this file as malicious.

How much weight this carries

Structure only. Structural evidence only. Nothing matching this verdict was seen running. The one fact that decided it: capability analysis of the file's imports.

Instrument coverage

1 of 2 measured

What this run was able to observe, as the run itself recorded it. A layer that did not run makes an empty result a fact about the sandbox rather than about the sample.

LayerRanWhat that means
Runtime anti-analysis watch measured Measured. The in-process hook group for debugger, timing and hypervisor checks armed on this run, so an empty signal list means something looked and saw nothing.
Network capture not on this plan Not included on this scan's plan.
Live kernel introspection not measured Not measured. This run did not ask for the memory-dump option, which is what starts the introspection loop.

This lists the layers this run recorded for itself. A layer that is not listed was not recorded either way, so its absence here is not a result.

Structure

What the file is made of: headers, imports, how it was built and whether it was signed.

Signature
Microsoft Visual C/C++(19.36.35228)[C++]
Packed VMProtect(new)[DS] Trusted signature
CompilerMicrosoft Visual C/C++(19.36.35228)[C++]
LinkerMicrosoft Linker(14.36.35228)
Identity
File
typeexecutable
size2.3 MB
file arch64-bit (x64)
subsystemGUI
entropy5.9945
date2026-09-10 08:07:54 UTC
version17.14
descriptionSysinternals Process Explorer
productProcess Explorer
original nameProcexp.exe
languageEN

Antivirus engine

no signature matched signature set 28152 - 3.6M signatures

Nothing in the signature set below matched this file. That is one engine's negative answer against one signature set on one day, and it is not a verdict. A signature engine only recognises what has already been named and published, so a file nobody has named yet scans exactly like a file that is harmless. What this file does when it runs is the stronger evidence; read the behaviour sections for that.

Signature setValue
Set version28152
Signatures in the set3,642,870
Set published13 Oct 2026 06:26 +0000
Age when this file was scannedsame day

A negative answer is only as good as the signature set that gave it, so the set is recorded with the result and the result can be reproduced against it.

Local ML assessment

1.4 of 100 8 strongest of 2568 features

A gradient-boosted model running entirely on this host scored this file 1.4 of 100 on structure alone: its headers, sections, imports, strings and signature. The file was not executed and nothing about it left this machine.

Read this as corroboration and not as a verdict. Measured across this corpus the model separates signed software from unsigned software more sharply than malicious from benign, so it is charged at most 15 of 100 verdict points and only on top of evidence this report measured for itself. The eight features below are the ones that moved it furthest.

Structural featureWhat it meansPushesWeight
countersigned at When a timestamp authority countersigned the signature (1789027712) towards benign -1.7964
feature column 649 Text in the file matching the stub message a Windows program carries towards malicious +0.8920
image flag dll Image flag: a library rather than a program towards malicious +0.8682
parser warning: Suspicious flags set for section... Header defect reported by the parse: Suspicious flags set for section... (0) towards benign -0.6311
debug directory size Size of the debug table (84) towards benign -0.5453
certificate chain length How many certificates the chain holds (2) towards benign -0.5432
security directory size Size of the security table (10008) towards benign -0.4858
image flag net_run_from_swap Image flag: run from swap on a network share towards benign -0.3155

A weight is a log-odds nudge away from the model's own baseline, not a percentage point. Where a feature names a section, an import or a build id, the number beside it is the model's own hashed cell for that name rather than a measurement of the file: two names can share one cell and the sign comes from the hash, so no number is shown for those rows.

Packing
Not packed
This file's code is readable on disk - nothing is compressed or encrypted around it.
20/100
packer confidence
Static analysis reads this file directly Nothing is hiding the code from a static pass, so what the file contains is what the report shows.
Indicators weighed 3 signals
  • High-entropy overlay (7.52, 10008 bytes)
  • Embedded executable in resources
  • TLS callback present

Family configuration search

Incomplete

3 of this platform's 71 family parsers could not decode this file, and none produced a configuration. A parser that carries no signature of its own is handed every file, and every parser that has ever failed here is one of those, so a failure is usually a decoder meeting a family it was not written for rather than a reading about this sample. Where the two numbers below differ, a signature did match and its decoder then returned nothing. The absence of a configuration is not evidence that none is present.

Parsers available71
Returned a result3
Failed to decode3

Secrets & malicious strings

12 flagged strings

Flagged string categories

injection / execution high 1 hit
IndicatorFound inEvidence from the sample
setwindowshookex import table USER32.dll!SetWindowsHookExW
exfiltration / C2 high 1 hit
IndicatorFound inEvidence from the sample
content-disposition extracted string Content-Disposition: form-data; name="apikey"
persistence med 5 hits
IndicatorFound inEvidence from the sample
\currentcontrolset\services\ extracted string System\CurrentControlSet\Services\WinSock2\Parameters\Protocol_Catalog9\Catalog_Entries
currentversion\runonce extracted string SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Terminal Server\Install\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Runonce
image file execution options extracted string Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options
software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\run extracted string SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Terminal Server\Install\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Runonce
userinit extracted string UserInitMprLogonScript
anti-analysis / evasion med 3 hits
IndicatorFound inEvidence from the sample
dbghelp extracted string DbgHelpPath
isdebuggerpresent import table KERNEL32.dll!IsDebuggerPresent
procexp extracted string ProcExpLogger
keylogging / surveillance med 2 hits
IndicatorFound inEvidence from the sample
bitblt import table GDI32.dll!BitBlt
getdc import table USER32.dll!GetDC

Capabilities

19 behaviour buckets · 9 high-risk
SeverityCapabilityMITREAPIs
high Privilege escalation
Adjusts tokens / privileges
T1134, T1134.001 adjusttokenprivileges, duplicatetokenex, impersonateloggedonuser, openprocesstoken
high Anti-debugging
Detects or obstructs a debugger
T1082, T1622 isdebuggerpresent, ntqueryinformationprocess, ntquerysysteminformation
high Ransomware behaviour
Enumerates + encrypts files, deletes backups
T1083 findfirstfilew, findnextfilew
high Anti-VM / anti-sandbox
Detects a virtual machine or analysis sandbox
T1497.001, T1497.002 getcursorpos, setupdigetclassdevsw
high Defense evasion
Tampers with security tooling / hides artifacts
T1055, T1562.001 controlservice, ntsetinformationprocess
high Process injection
Writes and runs code inside another process
T1055.012 getthreadcontext
high Keylogging / input capture
Hooks the keyboard or reads input state
T1056.001 getkeystate
high Hooking
Installs Windows or API hooks
T1056.001 setwindowshookexw
high Credential access
Reads credentials, tokens or the LSA/SAM
T1003 lsaopenpolicy
med Network / C2
Opens sockets, HTTP or downloads payloads
T1071, T1071.001, T1095 connect, recv, send, winhttpconnect, winhttpopen, winhttpsendrequest, wsastartup
med Code execution
Creates processes / runs commands or shellcode
T1059, T1106, T1134, T1203 createprocessasuserw, createprocessw, createthread, shellexecuteexw, shellexecutew, system
med Evasion / stalling
Sleeps, times, or otherwise stalls analysis
T1497, T1497.003 getsystemtimeasfiletime, gettickcount, gettickcount64, queryperformancecounter, sleep
med Screen capture
Grabs the screen / clipboard
T1113, T1115 bitblt, createcompatiblebitmap, getdc, openclipboard
med Dynamic API resolution
Resolves APIs at runtime (obfuscation)
T1129 getprocaddress, loadlibraryexa, loadlibraryw
med Cryptography
Uses crypto APIs (often ransomware / packers)
T1573 cryptacquirecontextw, crypthashdata
med Persistence
Survives reboot via autostart / services / tasks
T1547.001 regsetvalueexw
med System shutdown / reboot
Reboots or shuts down the host
T1529 exitwindowsex
low Discovery
Enumerates the host, users, processes or network
T1057, T1082 createtoolhelp32snapshot, findwindoww, getcomputernamew, getnativesysteminfo, getsysteminfo
low Registry manipulation
Reads / writes the registry
T1112 regcreatekeyexw

Security mitigations

strong posture
ON ASLR (DynamicBase)
ON High-entropy ASLR (64-bit)
ON DEP / NX (NxCompat)
ON Control Flow Guard
OFF SafeSEH
ON Stack cookies (GS)
OFF Force Integrity
OFF AppContainer isolation
OFF Authenticode signed

Rich header (toolchain)

richhash f0ad3828926183b9
ToolBuildUses
Export 14.1030795198
Utc1900 (VS2017)352078
Cvtres 14.103520717
Export 14.103520799
Import 14.10307952
Utc1900 (VS2017)307959
Cvtres 14.103079527
Utc1900 (VS2017)3079553
Import (linker)0742
Cvtres 14.10352283
Export 14.103522881
Implib352281
prodid_15101
AliasObj 14.10352281

Sections

6 sections · the file's memory layout
SectionVirtual addrRaw sizeVirtual sizeAccessEntropy
.textEP
Executable code
0x1000
1.1 MB
1.1 MB
EXECUTEREAD
6.4117
.rdata
Read-only data
0x120000
310.0 KB
309.9 KB
READ
5.0291
.data
Initialised data
0x16e000
53.0 KB
254.6 KB
expands
READWRITE
2.9751
.pdata
Exception unwind data
0x1ae000
41.5 KB
41.4 KB
READ
6.072
.rsrc
Resources
0x1b9000
796.0 KB
795.7 KB
READ
4.8897
.reloc
Base relocations
0x280000
6.0 KB
5.9 KB
READ
5.4232
code data imports/exports resources metadata packer non-standard Entropy above 7.0 means compressed or encrypted content.

Imports

691 funcs / 25 DLLs · 31 mapped to a technique
Injection 6Persistence 7Anti-debug 9Cryptography 4Network 5Process 18Credential access 7Evasion 15

5 imports resolved by ordinal only. 1 of these functions was seen called at runtime.

Open the imports page

Binary metadata

what the headers declare about this build
Resource langsEN
Debug infoyes
TLS callbacksyes

Code signing

Trusted signature
Microsoft Corporation
issued by Microsoft Code Signing PCA 2024
Signed byMicrosoft Corporation
Issuer (CA)Microsoft Code Signing PCA 2024
Valid2026-04-16 → 2027-04-15
Serial330000021d4d19c84ed70f574800000000021d
AlgorithmSHA256-RSA
Verification
Embedded signature: OK
Chain verification: verified
Provenance
The chain verifies as of now, so these bytes are attributable to the publisher above.
Signed at 2026-09-10T08:09:23+00:00 proven
Countersigned by Microsoft Time-Stamp Service under Microsoft Root Certificate Authority 20…
Countersignature form RFC3161 token a signed structure issued by the timestamp authority, which is the stronger of the two forms and the one preferred here when a file carries both
Authority revocation good this authority's own certificate was not revoked, so the proof above does not rest on a withdrawn identity
Dated by This platform's own verification of the countersignature - the same reading that proves it, so the moment the chain is judged at and the proof of that moment are one thing.
Second reading 2026-09-10T08:09:23+00:00 agrees with ours
Second opinion unverifiable an independent verifier's separate answer about the same countersignature, kept so the two can be compared
Certificate chain (2)
SubjectIssuerValid toAlgo
Microsoft Corporation Microsoft Code Signing PCA 2024 2027-04-15 SHA256-RSA
Microsoft Code Signing PCA 2024 Microsoft Root Certificate Author… 2036-03-22 SHA384-RSA

Capability detection

110 capabilities
CapabilityNamespace
link function at runtime on Windows linking/runtime-linking
modify access privileges host-interaction/process/modify
create or open file -
create process on Windows host-interaction/process/create
set application hook host-interaction/gui
find graphical window host-interaction/gui/window/find
interact with driver via IOCTL host-interaction/driver
get user security identifier host-interaction/session
compare security identifiers host-interaction/sid
acquire debug privileges host-interaction/process/modify
open process -
create or open registry key -
get file attributes host-interaction/file-system/meta
get file system object information host-interaction/file-system
delay execution -
create thread host-interaction/thread/create
resume thread host-interaction/thread/resume
terminate thread host-interaction/thread/terminate
install driver host-interaction/driver
unload driver host-interaction/driver
hide graphical window host-interaction/gui/window/hide
open thread -
suspend thread host-interaction/thread/suspend
inspect load icon resource anti-analysis
enumerate processes via NtQuerySystemInformation host-interaction/process/list
make suspicious NtQuerySystemInformation call exploitation/enumeration
list TCP connections and listeners collection/network
list UDP connections and listeners collection/network
allocate memory -
allocate or change RW memory -
create new key via CryptAcquireContext data-manipulation/encryption
PEB access -
contain loop -
get thread local storage value host-interaction/process
query or enumerate registry value host-interaction/registry
get common file path host-interaction/file-system
enumerate processes host-interaction/process/list
query environment variable host-interaction/environment-variable
set environment variable host-interaction/environment-variable
allocate thread local storage host-interaction/thread/tls
set thread local storage value host-interaction/thread/tls
get OS version -
check OS version host-interaction/os/version
write file on Windows host-interaction/file-system/write
check if file exists host-interaction/file-system/exists
query or enumerate registry key host-interaction/registry
read .ini file host-interaction/file-system/read
get service handle -
get file size host-interaction/file-system/meta
read file on Windows host-interaction/file-system/read
schedule task via ITaskScheduler persistence/scheduled-tasks
connect to WMI namespace via WbemLocator host-interaction/wmi
extract resource via kernel32 functions executable/resource
link many functions at runtime linking/runtime-linking
resolve function by parsing PE exports load-code/pe
detect mouse movement via activity checks on Windows anti-analysis/anti-vm/vm-detection
log keystrokes via polling collection/keylog
hash data using fnv data-manipulation/hashing/fnv
get graphical window text host-interaction/gui/window/get-text
delete file host-interaction/file-system/delete
receive HTTP response communication/http/client
read HTTP header communication/http
initialize WinHTTP library communication/http
prepare HTTP request communication/http/client
set registry value host-interaction/registry/create
delete registry value host-interaction/registry/delete
accept command line arguments host-interaction/cli
get file version info host-interaction/file-system/meta
open clipboard host-interaction/clipboard
write clipboard data host-interaction/clipboard
enumerate process modules host-interaction/process/modules/list
persist via Windows service persistence/service
delete registry key host-interaction/registry/delete
check for unmoving mouse cursor anti-analysis/anti-vm/vm-detection
terminate process host-interaction/process/terminate
get session information host-interaction/session
get session user name host-interaction/session
persist via Run registry key persistence/registry/run
persist via Image File Execution Options registry key persistence/registry
enumerate threads host-interaction/thread/list
read file via mapping host-interaction/file-system/read
parse PE header load-code/pe
get hostname host-interaction/os/hostname
prompt user for credentials collection/credentials
shutdown system host-interaction/os
lock the desktop host-interaction/gui/session/lock
get memory capacity host-interaction/hardware/memory
get geographical location collection
initialize Winsock library communication/socket
get system information on Windows host-interaction/os/info
enumerate services host-interaction/service/list
check mutex on Windows host-interaction/mutex
get disk size host-interaction/hardware/storage
get disk information host-interaction/hardware/storage
get CPU information host-interaction/hardware/cpu
get token privileges host-interaction/session
query service status host-interaction/service
start service host-interaction/service/start
enumerate gui resources host-interaction/gui
initialize hashing via WinCrypt data-manipulation/hashing
hash data using SHA1 via WinCrypt data-manipulation/hashing/sha1
hash data via WinCrypt data-manipulation/hashing
hash data using SHA1 data-manipulation/hashing/sha1
print debug messages host-interaction/log/debug/write-event
enumerate files on Windows host-interaction/file-system/files/list
clear file content host-interaction/file-system/write
reference analysis tools strings anti-analysis
contains PDB path executable/pe/pdb
contain an embedded PE file executable/subfile/pe
reference anti-VM strings anti-analysis/anti-vm/vm-detection
ATT&CK techniques
Collection::Clipboard Data [T1115]Collection::Input Capture::Keylogging [T1056.001]Defense Evasion::Hide Artifacts::Hidden Window [T1564.003]Defense Evasion::Modify Registry [T1112]Defense Evasion::Obfuscated Files or Information [T1027]Defense Evasion::Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion::System Checks [T1497.001]Defense Evasion::Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion::User Activity Based Checks [T1497.002]Discovery::Account Discovery [T1087]Discovery::Application Window Discovery [T1010]Discovery::File and Directory Discovery [T1083]Discovery::Process Discovery [T1057]Discovery::Query Registry [T1012]Discovery::Software Discovery [T1518]Discovery::System Information Discovery [T1082]Discovery::System Location Discovery [T1614]Discovery::System Owner/User Discovery [T1033]Discovery::System Service Discovery [T1007]Execution::Command and Scripting Interpreter [T1059]Execution::Shared Modules [T1129]Execution::System Services::Service Execution [T1569.002]Execution::Windows Management Instrumentation [T1047]Impact::Endpoint Denial of Service [T1499]Impact::System Shutdown/Reboot [T1529]Persistence::Boot or Logon Autostart Execution::Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder [T1547.001]Persistence::Create or Modify System Process::Windows Service [T1543.003]Persistence::Event Triggered Execution::Image File Execution Options Injection [T1546.012]Persistence::Scheduled Task/Job::Scheduled Task [T1053.005]Privilege Escalation::Access Token Manipulation [T1134]
Malware Behavior Catalog
Anti-Behavioral Analysis::Debugger Detection::Process Environment BlockAnti-Behavioral Analysis::Dynamic Analysis Evasion::Delayed ExecutionAnti-Behavioral Analysis::Virtual Machine DetectionAnti-Behavioral Analysis::Virtual Machine Detection::Human User CheckCollection::Keylogging::PollingCommunication::HTTP Communication::Create RequestCommunication::HTTP Communication::Get ResponseCommunication::HTTP Communication::Read HeaderCommunication::HTTP Communication::WinHTTPCommunication::Socket Communication::Initialize Winsock LibraryCryptography::Cryptographic HashCryptography::Cryptographic Hash::SHA1Cryptography::Encryption KeyData::Non-Cryptographic Hash::FNVDiscovery::Analysis Tool Discovery::Process detectionDiscovery::Application Window DiscoveryDiscovery::File and Directory DiscoveryDiscovery::System Information DiscoveryExecution::Command and Scripting InterpreterExecution::Install Additional ProgramFile System::Create FileFile System::Delete FileFile System::Get File AttributesFile System::Read FileFile System::Writes FileHardware::Install DriverImpact::Clipboard ModificationMemory::Allocate MemoryOperating System::Environment Variable::Set VariableOperating System::Registry::Create Registry KeyOperating System::Registry::Delete Registry KeyOperating System::Registry::Delete Registry ValueOperating System::Registry::Open Registry KeyOperating System::Registry::Query Registry KeyOperating System::Registry::Query Registry ValueOperating System::Registry::Set Registry KeyPersistence::Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderProcess::Allocate Thread Local StorageProcess::Check MutexProcess::Create ProcessProcess::Create ThreadProcess::Enumerate ThreadsProcess::Open ProcessProcess::Open ThreadProcess::Resume ThreadProcess::Set Thread Local Storage ValueProcess::Suspend ThreadProcess::Terminate ProcessProcess::Terminate Thread

Signature matches

2 findings · 5 file properties · 2 scored
Rule What it matched Corpus Weight
Suspicious_Anti_Debug_API
Anti-debugging API names referenced
3 of 4 strings matched
$a IsDebuggerPresent at 0x16bf2e
$c NtQueryInformationProcess at 0x169700
$d OutputDebugString at 0x16a646
Built-in
ruleset this platform ships, and the only one the score reads
SCORED 5
Scored 5, sharing a 15 point cap with every other anti-vm, anti-debug, dropper or packer match.
Embedded_PE_In_Overlay
A second MZ/PE header appears inside the file body
1 of 1 string matched
$mz MZ at 0x0 · 9 hits
Built-in
ruleset this platform ships, and the only one the score reads
SCORED 5
Scored 5, sharing a 15 point cap with every other anti-vm, anti-debug, dropper or packer match.
File properties - not findings
IsPE64IsWindowsGUIHasOverlayHasDebugDataHasRichSignature

These say what the file IS or holds - bitness, subsystem, an overlay, an embedded macro stream, which compiler built it. Ordinary files match several, and none of them carry weight in the score.

Extracted strings

showing 200 of 2118
  • !This program cannot be run in DOS mode.
  • .text
  • `.rdata
  • @.data
  • .pdata
  • @.rsrc
  • @.reloc
  • @USVWATAUAVAWH
  • UWATAVAWH
  • xuCH
  • VWATAVAWH
  • l$ VWATAVAWH
  • t$ AWH
  • ulfD
  • t$ ATAVAWH
  • @UVATAVAWH
  • @USWATH
  • @UWATH
  • @SUVWATAVH
  • @USVWATAWH
  • ATAVAWH
  • UVATAVI
  • @USVWATAVAWH
  • L9AHA
  • I9Shs
  • QPIc
  • @SATAVAWH
  • |$ ATAVAWH
  • t$ UWATAVAWH
  • @UWATAVAWH
  • @USATH
  • @UATH
  • @UVWATH
  • SATAUAWH
  • SVWATAUH
  • u.fE
  • @SWATH
  • @SUWATAWH
  • @USVWH
  • @USVH
  • @USATAVAWH
  • 9o(tFH
  • VWATH
  • @USVATAVH
  • yhtH
  • xDE;J0}>I
  • @USAVH
  • @SUVATAWH
  • @SVATH
  • t$ UWATAUAVH
  • 333333333333333333333
  • 333333333333
  • !"#$%333&'(3)333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333*3+33333,33-
  • thfA
  • !"#$%333&'(3)333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333*3+33333,33-3.33/03312
  • ATAUAVAWH
  • UVWATAWH
  • @UATAUH
  • .vXH
  • .textbssI
  • .data
  • :.tlst!H
  • :.bsst
  • rt_bss
  • 8.tlst"I
  • 8.bsst
  • eurH
  • UVATAVAWH
  • Genu
  • ineI
  • ntel
  • A;x ssL9L$X
  • USAVI
  • P$A9UPt
  • H$I9MPt
  • PERF
  • ShellComponent
  • StubPath
  • \AutorunsDisabled
  • VirusTotal
  • Autoruns - Sysinternals: www.sysinternals.com
  • Advapi32.dll
  • WSYSTEM
  • CLSID\
  • ntdll.dll
  • SysListView32
  • PATH
  • WINDOWS
  • Software\Classes\
  • SeDebugPrivilege
  • winlogon.exe
  • SeImpersonatePrivilege
  • SeSecurityPrivilege
  • SeBackupPrivilege
  • \Registry\Machine\
  • \Registry\User\
  • \Registry\Machine\Software\Classes\
  • Runas
  • RUNDLL32
  • RUNDLL
  • POWERSHELL
  • MSHTA
  • PCALUA.EXE
  • SCRIPTRUNNER.EXE
  • INFDEFAULTINSTALL
  • MICROSOFT
  • Kernel32.dll
  • advapi32.dll
  • Shell32.dll
  • \System32
  • %ProgramW6432%
  • %ProgramFiles%
  • ProgramW6432
  • %PROGRAMFILES(X86)%
  • PROGRAMFILES(X86)
  • %programdata%
  • %allusersprofile%
  • %c:\programdata\
  • \Microsoft\Windows Defender\
  • SeRestorePrivilege
  • \ntuser.dat
  • Default
  • Path
  • Environment
  • error
  • start
  • %PROGRAMFILES%
  • File not found:
  • <bad command>
  • \SYSTEMROOT\
  • %SYSTEMROOT%\SYSTEM32
  • Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths\
  • .com
  • .exe
  • .dll
  • %d.%d.%d.%d
  • \StringFileInfo\%04X%04X\%s
  • \VarFileInfo\Translation
  • %s %s
  • FileDescription
  • CompanyName
  • NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
  • Error loading profile for
  • Process Explorer
  • The full name of the selected key or value is not available.
  • \HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE
  • \HKEY_CURRENT_USER
  • \HKEY_CURRENT_CONFIG
  • \HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT
  • \HKEY_USERS
  • RegEdit_RegEdit
  • %systemroot%\regedit.exe
  • Error launching Regedit. Make sure you are running with Administrative rights.
  • SysTreeView32
  • desktop.ini
  • (Not verified)
  • (Verified)
  • (Not Verified)
  • System
  • Local System
  • (Default)
  • \InprocServer32
  • HKCR\CLSID\
  • \Instance
  • Software\Classes\CLSID\
  • Software\Wow6432Node\Classes\CLSID\
  • \Shell\Open\Command
  • Depend
  • \Depend
  • BootExecute
  • System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager
  • SetupExecute
  • Execute
  • S0InitialCommand
  • ServiceControlManagerExtension
  • System\CurrentControlSet\Control
  • Software\Microsoft\Office\Outlook\Addins
  • Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Office\Outlook\Addins
  • Software\Microsoft\Office\Excel\Addins
  • Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Office\Excel\Addins
  • Software\Microsoft\Office\PowerPoint\Addins
  • Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Office\PowerPoint\Addins
  • Software\Microsoft\Office\Word\Addins
  • Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Office\Word\Addins
  • Software\Microsoft\Office\Access\Addins
  • Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Office\Access\Addins
  • Software\Microsoft\Office\Onenote\Addins
  • Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Office\Onenote\Addins
  • SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Office test\Special\Perf
  • Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options
  • Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options
  • Autorun
  • Software\Microsoft\Command Processor
  • Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Command Processor
  • SOFTWARE\Classes\Exefile\Shell\Open\Command
  • Software\Classes\.exe
  • Software\Classes\.cmd
  • SOFTWARE\Classes\Htmlfile\Shell\Open\Command
  • ServiceControllerStart
  • SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon

Stack and decoded strings were not recovered: it did not finish within the time allowed. Only literal strings present in the file are listed above.

Disassembly

entry point · x64 · 60 insns (listing capped)
AddressBytesMnemonicOperands
0x1400e82c04883ec28subrsp, 0x28
0x1400e82c4e81b050000call0x1400e87e4
0x1400e82c94883c428addrsp, 0x28
0x1400e82cde97afeffffjmp0x1400e814c
0x1400e82d2ccint3
0x1400e82d3ccint3
0x1400e82d448895c2410movqword ptr [rsp + 0x10], rbx
0x1400e82d948896c2418movqword ptr [rsp + 0x18], rbp
0x1400e82de4889742420movqword ptr [rsp + 0x20], rsi
0x1400e82e357pushrdi
0x1400e82e44883ec10subrsp, 0x10
0x1400e82e833c0xoreax, eax
0x1400e82ea33c9xorecx, ecx
0x1400e82ec0fa2cpuid
0x1400e82ee81f16e74656cxorecx, 0x6c65746e
0x1400e82f481f2696e6549xoredx, 0x49656e69
0x1400e82fa0bd1oredx, ecx
0x1400e82fc8be8movebp, eax
0x1400e82feb801000000moveax, 1
0x1400e830381f347656e75xorebx, 0x756e6547
0x1400e83090bd3oredx, ebx
0x1400e830b8d48ffleaecx, [rax - 1]
0x1400e830e0fa2cpuid
0x1400e83108bf9movedi, ecx
0x1400e8312755ejne0x1400e8372
0x1400e831425f03fff0fandeax, 0xfff3ff0
0x1400e831948c70544f5080000800000movqword ptr [rip + 0x8f544], 0x8000
0x1400e832448c70541f50800ffffffffmovqword ptr [rip + 0x8f541], 0xffffffffffffffff
0x1400e832f3dc0060100cmpeax, 0x106c0
0x1400e83347428je0x1400e835e
0x1400e83363d60060200cmpeax, 0x20660
0x1400e833b7421je0x1400e835e
0x1400e833d3d70060200cmpeax, 0x20670
0x1400e8342741aje0x1400e835e
0x1400e834405b0f9fcffaddeax, 0xfffcf9b0
0x1400e834983f820cmpeax, 0x20
0x1400e834c7724ja0x1400e8372
0x1400e834e48b90100010001000000movabsrcx, 0x100010001
0x1400e8358480fa3c1btrcx, rax
0x1400e835c7314jae0x1400e8372
0x1400e835e448b05ff480c00movr8d, dword ptr [rip + 0xc48ff]
0x1400e83654183c801orr8d, 1
0x1400e8369448905f4480c00movdword ptr [rip + 0xc48f4], r8d
0x1400e8370eb07jmp0x1400e8379
0x1400e8372448b05eb480c00movr8d, dword ptr [rip + 0xc48eb]
0x1400e83794533c9xorr9d, r9d
0x1400e837c418bf1movesi, r9d
0x1400e837f458bd1movr10d, r9d
0x1400e8382458bd9movr11d, r9d
0x1400e838583fd07cmpebp, 7
0x1400e83887c40jl0x1400e83ca
0x1400e838a418d4107leaeax, [r9 + 7]
0x1400e838e33c9xorecx, ecx
0x1400e83900fa2cpuid
0x1400e83928bf2movesi, edx
0x1400e8394448bcbmovr9d, ebx
0x1400e83970fbae309btebx, 9
0x1400e839b730bjae0x1400e83a8
0x1400e839d4183c802orr8d, 2
0x1400e83a1448905bc480c00movdword ptr [rip + 0xc48bc], r8d
callbranchretstackarithregisterimmediatememory

Import fingerprint

no related sample
Fingerprint192:T3iQvlHzNlUujihVaMWbxqkW6+IY5rzkpSgtC7xbAz9GSPQw8:T3vd2hVaMmokYnHk/C7bSPQw8
Imports read691 functions from 25 libraries (691 distinct)
Comparableyes
Compared against39 stored samples
Samples built on the same import table

No stored sample you can see shares this import table.

Screen recording

10 frames · screen recording · 136s
Screen recording frame
1 / 10
0:00 · 1/10
Download this recording Download video (.mp4) Download GIF (.gif) Building the file runs an encode on this platform, so it is kept to signed-in accounts. Signing in brings you back to this report.

Behavior summary

ran 136s

1 process(es) observed

LaunchedC:\Users\user\Desktop\procexp64.exe
Privilegeelevated
Telemetry sources: Kernel ETW (2 of 134 events) agent poll: 1Process audit: 1In-process monitor: 1

Evasion / anti-analysis checks

14 checks
MED
Anti-debug API imports static-api
MITRE T1622 · getthreadcontext, isdebuggerpresent, ntqueryinformationprocess
MED
System Checks Capability analysis
MITRE T1497
MED
User Activity Based Checks Capability analysis
MITRE T1497
MED
Inspect load icon resource Capability rule
MITRE T1497 · Anti-analysis
MED
Detect mouse movement via activity checks on Windows Capability rule
MITRE T1497.001 · Virtual-machine detection
MED
Check for unmoving mouse cursor Capability rule
MITRE T1497.001 · Virtual-machine detection
MED
Reference analysis tools strings Capability rule
MITRE T1497 · Anti-analysis
MED
Reference anti-VM strings Capability rule
MITRE T1497.001 · Virtual-machine detection
MED
Debugger Detection::Process Environment Block Capability taxonomy
MITRE T1497 · Anti-Behavioral Analysis
MED
Dynamic Analysis Evasion::Delayed Execution Capability taxonomy
MITRE T1497 · Anti-Behavioral Analysis
MED
Virtual Machine Detection Capability taxonomy
MITRE T1497 · Anti-Behavioral Analysis
MED
Virtual Machine Detection::Human User Check Capability taxonomy
MITRE T1497 · Anti-Behavioral Analysis
MED
YARA: Suspicious_Anti_Debug_API Signature
MITRE T1497
MED
Anti-analysis strings (VM/debugger/tool names) strings
MITRE T1497 · dbghelp, isdebuggerpresent, procexp

Statically visible checks (RDTSC/CPUID/red-pill instructions, anti-debug APIs) plus runtime evasion signals. Instruction-level interception at runtime requires hypervisor introspection (VMI).

Anti-analysis API trace

1 API · 1 process hooked

Calls counted inside the running sample by in-process hooks. Scored means the call crossed the threshold that separates a deliberate check from what ordinary software does; a call that scored nothing is still listed, with the reason.

APISignalCallsSleepScored
GetTickCount timing 1 - no corroborates, never convicts on its own - ordinary software calls this
Call order 1 event sampled
GetTickCount

How to read the numbers: a repeated call is sampled at 1, 10, 100 and so on while the run is live and made exact when the process exits, so a count is a floor and not a total. The count kept for a name is the highest a single process reported, not a sum across the process tree. The hooks are placed a few seconds after a process starts, so a check made in the first moments of a launch is missed - and a sample that exits in those first seconds is never watched at all.

Kernel audit saw no cross-process reach. Kernel object-access auditing and the thread trace were active on this run and attributed no handle to another process, no remote or unbacked thread start and no spoofed parent to the sample tree. An observation, not a gap.

No module load worth listing. In-process hooks were placed in 1 process and recorded no explicit module load, so this is an observation rather than a gap. Modules brought in by the sample's own import table are never seen here.

No WMI attributed to the sample. The WMI-Activity trace was running and recorded 77 operations on the machine during the run; none of them came from the sample's process tree.

Command lines, unwrapped

1 read

1 captured text was read and unwrapped locally. No address was recovered from any of them, and none of them was hiding its own contents behind an encoding or a format string. This is a result, not a gap.

Network activity

The network section is a paid-plan layer: the DNS the sample resolved, the connections it opened, the TLS it negotiated, and the rule engine's reading of the capture.

This run was captured, and what it captured is on a paid plan rather than absent. An internet-connected detonation is the same plan, so a paid run also shows what the sample reached rather than only what it tried.

See plans Create an account

Process tree

What ran during the detonation, and what each process did. Select a node to see the activity attributed to it.

1process

procexp64.exe

1 process
1 process

Attributed activity

5Mechanisms found
90Methods checked
5ATT&CK techniques
LOWHighest severity

Persistence mechanisms

5 found
MethodFamilyATT&CKEvidenceSeverity
AppCert DLLs DLL Load Order T1546.009 Static hint LOW
AppInit DLLs DLL Load Order T1546.010 Static hint LOW
BootExecute Native Image Boot & Firmware T1547.002 Static hint LOW
Registry Image File Execution Options Execution Hijack T1546.012 Static hint LOW
WMI Event Subscription Scripting & Applications T1546.003 Static hint LOW

Runtime evidence means the mechanism was established during detonation. A static hint means the sample only references the technique.

Detection coverage

5 / 90

Every auto-start method checked on this sample, grouped by family. A method with no result is reported clean, and one the sample only names in its own strings reads "named" rather than "detected".

Logon & Startup 22 clean
  • Active Setup Installed Component T1547.014 clean
  • Explorer Delay-Load Object T1547.001 clean
  • Explorer Run Key T1547.001 clean
  • Explorer SharedTaskScheduler T1547.001 clean
  • Group Policy Extension DLL T1547.004 clean
  • Group Policy Run Key T1547.001 clean
  • Logon Script T1037.001 clean
  • RDP WDS Startup Program T1547.001 clean
  • Registry Run Key T1547.001 clean
  • Registry RunEx Key T1547.001 clean
  • Registry RunOnce Key T1547.001 clean
  • Registry RunOnceEx Key T1547.001 clean
  • Registry RunServices Key T1547.001 clean
  • Startup Folder Item T1547.001 clean
  • Startup Folder Redirection T1547.001 clean
  • Terminal Services Initial Program T1547.001 clean
  • Winlogon GINA DLL T1547.004 clean
  • Winlogon MPNotify Value T1547.004 clean
  • Winlogon Notify Package T1547.004 clean
  • Winlogon Shell Value T1547.004 clean
  • Winlogon Taskman Value T1547.004 clean
  • Winlogon Userinit Value T1547.004 clean
Services & Tasks 9 clean
  • BITS Job T1197 clean
  • Print Monitor DLL T1547.010 clean
  • Print Processor DLL T1547.012 clean
  • Scheduled Task T1053.005 clean
  • Scheduled Task Registry Implant T1053.005 clean
  • Service Control Manager Security Descriptor T1574.011 clean
  • Service DLL Hijack T1543.003 clean
  • Time Provider DLL T1547.003 clean
  • Windows Service Creation T1543.003 clean
Execution Hijack 1 / 17
  • .NET Managed Debugger T1546.012 clean
  • Accessibility Tool Hijack T1546.008 clean
  • AeDebug Postmortem Debugger T1546.012 clean
  • App Paths Hijack T1546.012 clean
  • Application Shim Database T1546.011 clean
  • Boot Verification Program T1547.002 clean
  • Command Processor AutoRun T1546.011 clean
  • Explorer Load Value T1547.001 clean
  • Explorer MyComputer Tool Hijack T1546.001 clean
  • Registry Image File Execution Options T1546.012 named
  • Screensaver Hijack T1546.002 clean
  • Setup ErrorHandler Script T1546 clean
  • Shell Open Command Hijack T1546.001 clean
  • SilentProcessExit Monitor T1546.012 clean
  • Telemetry Controller Command T1546.015 clean
  • WER ReflectDebugger T1546.012 clean
  • Windows Error Reporting Debugger T1546.012 clean
DLL Load Order 2 / 12
  • .NET CLR Profiler DLL T1574.012 clean
  • .NET Startup Hook DLL T1574 clean
  • AppCert DLLs T1546.009 named
  • AppInit DLLs T1546.010 named
  • AutodialDLL Winsock Injection T1546.006 clean
  • DLL Search-Order Hijack T1574.001 T1574.002 clean
  • DNS Server Plugin DLL T1574.001 clean
  • HTML Help Helper DLL T1546 clean
  • KnownDLLs Manipulation T1574.001 clean
  • Natural Language Platform DLL Override T1546 clean
  • Netsh Helper DLL T1546.007 clean
  • Winsock Layered Service Provider T1546.006 clean
COM & Browser 6 clean
  • Browser Extension T1176 clean
  • Browser Helper Object T1176 clean
  • COM Server Hijack T1546.015 clean
  • HTML Help COM Object Hijack T1546.015 clean
  • Shell Context Menu Handler T1546.001 clean
  • Shell Extension Handler T1546.001 clean
Security Providers & Accounts 11 clean
  • Account RID Hijack T1098 clean
  • AMSI Provider T1562.001 clean
  • Credential Provider T1547.014 clean
  • DSRM Admin Logon Backdoor T1556 clean
  • Hidden Local Account T1136.001 clean
  • LSA Authentication Package T1547.002 clean
  • LSA Extension DLL T1547.005 clean
  • LSA Notification Package T1547.005 clean
  • LSA Security Package T1547.005 clean
  • Network Provider DLL T1556.008 clean
  • Security Support Provider T1547.005 clean
Scripting & Applications 1 / 9
  • Netsh Port Proxy T1090.001 clean
  • Office Add-in T1137.006 clean
  • Office Executable Sideload T1574.002 clean
  • Office Startup Template T1137.001 clean
  • Office Test Key T1137.002 clean
  • Power Automate Flow T1546 clean
  • PowerShell Profile T1546.013 clean
  • Windows Terminal Startup Action T1546 clean
  • WMI Event Subscription T1546.003 named
Boot & Firmware 1 / 4
  • BootExecute Native Image T1547.002 named
  • PlatformExecute Native Image T1547.002 clean
  • SetupExecute Native Image T1547.002 clean
  • UEFI / Bootkit Artifact T1542.003 T1542.001 clean

File activity summary

create 0 write 0 modify 0 delete 0 rename 0

Dropped payload analysis

not observed

No payload write was recorded and no capture ran on this run, so nothing here is a measurement about dropped files either way.

File & registry ops

0 file · 0 registry · sample scope
OperationTargetProcess

No file or registry operations captured.

External reputation was not produced for this scan. Threat intelligence enrichment is a paid-plan layer: every extracted indicator - hashes, addresses, hostnames - is checked against the external reputation services. Our own ingested feeds ran on this scan and every result below is theirs. Adding the paid layer adds an external reputation verdict on each indicator, so MalwareBazaar and filescan.io are listed below as not checked. See plans.

1 reported a hit 16 answered no 1 could not answer 4 had nothing to check
1Sources with a hit
18Sources queriedof 22 available
469.2kFeed records
1Could not answer

File reputation

4 clear · 2 not checked
SourceChecksResultDetailFeed
MalwareBazaar hash feed File hash clean not in feed 3,387 records
20 minutes ago
MalwareBazaar ransomware feed File hash clean not in feed 3,348 records
4 hours ago
ThreatFox hash IOCs File hash clean not in feed 1,689 records
21 minutes ago
URLhaus payload hashes File hash clean not in feed 1,310 records
20 minutes ago
filescan.io File hash not checked no hash lookup ran for this scan live lookup
MalwareBazaar File hash not checked no hash lookup ran for this scan live lookup

Hash lookups only - the sample itself is never uploaded to any third party.

Network indicators

7 clear · 1 could not answer
SourceChecksResultDetailFeed
URLhaus IP / domain / URL feed unavailable 10 observed indicators, none listed no records ingested
blocklist.de IP / domain / URL clean 10 observed indicators, none listed 26.3k records
20 minutes ago
CINS Army IP / domain / URL clean 10 observed indicators, none listed 15k records
20 minutes ago
Emerging Threats IP / domain / URL clean 10 observed indicators, none listed 511 records
21 minutes ago
Feodo Tracker IP / domain / URL clean 10 observed indicators, none listed 5 records
21 minutes ago
IPsum IP / domain / URL clean 10 observed indicators, none listed 18.4k records
21 minutes ago
Phishing.Database IP / domain / URL clean 10 observed indicators, none listed 391.5k records
4 hours ago
ThreatFox IP / domain / URL clean 10 observed indicators, none listed 1,689 records
21 minutes ago

TLS fingerprints

nothing of this kind to check
SourceChecksResultDetailFeed
JA3 / JA4 fingerprint blocklists JA3 / JA4 not checked no TLS client fingerprint observed 97 records
10 hours ago
SSL blocklist Server certificate not checked no server certificate fingerprint is extracted to check live lookup

Detection rules

1 of 2 listed
SourceChecksResultDetailFeed
Signature rules Sample content 2 matches Suspicious_Anti_Debug_API, Embedded_PE_In_Overlay 110 records
21 minutes ago
Sigma rules Behavior log clean - 2,275 records
6 hours ago

Tooling catalogs

4 clear
SourceChecksResultDetailFeed
LOLBAS Process image paths clean 1 process image path, none masqueraded 245 records
21 minutes ago
LOLBootloaders File hash clean not a known vulnerable bootloader 520 records
20 minutes ago
LOLDrivers File hash clean not a known vulnerable driver 2,346 records
21 minutes ago
LOLRMM Names and domains clean 2 name/domain indicators checked, no remote-management tooling 358 records
20 minutes ago

AI analysis

The AI layer is a paid-plan feature. It reads what the other layers produced - the behaviour summary, the call sequence, the indicator list - and writes the narrative and the kill-chain walkthrough.

Nothing is being withheld. This layer did not run for this scan, so there is no result stored behind the lock.

See plans Create an account

0 malicious 3 suspicious 0 info

File indicators

3
SeverityTypeIndicatorDescription
suspicious sample_sha256 22bb3c30cc79252284066fff934b62d35508d240d3fa844451adc99981012835 Submitted sample (SHA256)
suspicious sample_md5 055426a98e356509c231f0da7eda7b8c Submitted sample (MD5)
suspicious imphash 0eeb370fc645e9c036c0531402cbea67 Import table hash (imphash)

Sigma detections

0 matches of 2275 rules

The Sigma corpus was evaluated against this run's processes, registry, file, network, DNS and script activity. Nothing matched.

Generated rules

YARA: auto_file_2764_yara

Auto-generated
rule auto_file_2764_yara
{
    meta:
        description = "Auto-generated from scan 2764"
        author = "sandbox auto-generator"
        imphash = "0eeb370fc645e9c036c0531402cbea67"
        anchors = "5 independent regions"
    strings:
        $s0 = "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa384749(v=vs.85).aspx" wide fullword
        $s1 = "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa389231(v=vs.85).aspx" wide fullword
        $s2 = "Software\\Classes\\Clsid\\{AB8902B4-09CA-4bb6-B78D-A8F59079A8D5}" wide fullword
        $s3 = "SOFTWARE\\Wow6432Node\\Microsoft\\Active Setup\\Installed Components" wide fullword
        $s4 = "Software\\Wow6432Node\\Classes\\AllFileSystemObjects\\ShellEx\\DragDropHandlers" wide fullword
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and filesize < 9679968 and all of them
}

Extracted files

What came out of the sample: unpacked payloads, carved objects and captured memory. Each one is stored by content hash, so the same object extracted twice is the same row.

Artifacts

1 file
TypeNameSizeWhat it isSHA-256Download
Extracted file embedded_pe_273f4cc0fed5 28.0 KB PEno detection 273f4cc0fed50e02cecba873567322c8bef2834e7d3c79c8b5fdecba52a78896 ZIP

Export & download

/s/2764

Structured exports for your SIEM/TIP - ATT&CK Navigator layer, STIX 2.1 bundle, MISP event and a defanged IOC list - are free on every report. The packet capture follows this scan's plan, because a capture is the rawest network output this platform produces.

Analysis report

PDF and DOCX reports are available to signed-in accounts on every plan, free included. Sign in to generate one.

Public analyses of this file

1 run
SubmittedEnvironmentVerdictScore
2026-10-14 01:05 Shown below Windows 10 22H2 Nothing conclusive 7/100